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Missoula and western Montana are home to a microcosm of 
national interests involved in the wilderness preservation 
debate. This microcosm existed and continues to exist 
within a unique political atmosphere where wilderness-
related events routinely make headlines in the local news 
media. Since Missoula represents a microcosm for wilderness 
issues and it is a typical western American municipality, a 
historical study of wilderness using Missoula and its 
western Montana environs as examples will reflect the larger 
history of the evolution of wilderness preservation in the 
United States. 
This study identifies the components of the microcosm in 
Missoula and western Montana and then covers the history of 
statutory wilderness preservation in the United States 
Forest Service from 1891 to 1992. Missoula, Lolo National 
Forest and other pertinent regional examples are used to 
highlight the history of wilderness preservation in the 
Forest Service, charting events from the establishment of 
the forest reserves to the current polarized wilderness 
stalemate in Montana. Legislative events, court cases, and 
local and state politics receive special focus along with 
the problems the Forest Service has experienced as a result 
of the movement to preserve wilderness. 
Extensive primary and secondary research support this 
study. The author conducted interviews with many 
individuals who were responsible for influencing the events 
described in this history. Corroborating the oral 
interviews are numerous archival documents from both the 
University of Montana and the various Forest Service offices 
located in Missoula. The standard secondary works in 
wilderness history are referenced to place the primary 
research into context. 
The culmination of the wilderness preservation story has 
yet to occur. Missoula and western Montana face increasing 
polarization between preservationist and utilitarian 
interests, preventing a legislative resolution to the 
wilderness debate. This polarization also reflects the 
state of affairs in public land law in the West, and 
suggests that if Missoula and Montana can find a solution, 
then that solution could serve as a model for the nation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In western Montana civilization and wilderness collide in a juxtaposition that 
illuminates the debate over the future of wilderness as an entity in the United 
States. Along Interstate 90 north of Missoula, elk are visible grazing on hills 
that serve simultaneously as winter wildlife range, human homesites, and a city 
refuse disposal area. Beyond the herd of elk, the snowcapped peaks of the 
Rattlesnake Wilderness Area emerge above the smog trapped by a winter's 
temperature inversion. Within the city, a bald eagle surveys the waters of the 
Clark Fork River as cars whiz by on a nearby bridge. 
Missoula and the surrounding Lolo National Forest are the setting of one of 
the great natural, political, and spiritual confrontations of Western American 
history: that of wilderness preservation. No other location in the West contains 
such a passionate, and nearly balanced complement of people with an interest in 
either wilderness preservation or forest utilization. National wilderness policy 
here affects a microcosm, for wilderness purposes, of the coterminous states of 
the American West. Wilderness history in Missoula and the surrounding Lolo 
Forest both reflects and influences the larger history of wilderness in the entire 
West. 
Geographically, the Lolo National Forest occupies part of two distinctive 
environmental regions in the northern Rocky Mountains and western Montana. 
1 
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The western half and a northeastern portion of the forest lie in the Columbia 
Rockies region. This region is characterized by lush, humid, forested mountains 
and valleys. Comparatively few people inhabit this area, and those who do 
reside in small towns nestled in the narrow valleys. Lolo's central lands fall 
into the Broad Valley Rockies region. A more arid, sparsely vegetated, and 
populated landscape distinguishes this area. Missoula lies in one of these broad 
valleys and ranks as the most populous city completely enclosed within the 
Rocky Mountains.1 
In 1992 Bruce Vento, Democrat Congressman from Minnesota, introduced the 
National Forest Wilderness Management Act, HR 4325, that also called for the 
establishment of an Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute at Missoula. 
At the close of the 102nd Congress however, Vento's legislation was still in 
debate. Most probably the Forest Service administratively designated Missoula 
the site for the Leopold Institute in response to Vento's proposed bill. 
The United States Forest Service maintains a considerable presence in 
Missoula. The Northern Region's headquarters, an Aerial Fire Depot and 
Smokejumper's training center, the offices of Lolo National Forest, and 
'John A. Alwin, Western Montana: A Portrait of the Land and its People, 
Montana Geographic Series Number Five, (Helena, MT: Montana Magazine, 
Inc., 1983), 4-5. 
3 
Missoula Ranger District call Missoula home.2 Also in Missoula, the 
University of Montana provides a location for a laboratory of the Forest 
Service's Intermountain Research Station. Author Stephen Pyne called Missoula 
a "Forest Service company town."3 Recently, the Forest Service announced 
that the Missoula laboratory will house the Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research 
Institute.4 
Missoula's selection did not come without some controversy within the Forest 
Service. Other locations such as Boulder and Fort Collins, Colorado, competed 
for the institute. Negatives associated with the Missoula site included its remote 
northern Rockies location and somewhat small metropolitan area. What 
2Forest service administration emanates from Washington, D.C. down to 
nine regional headquarters: Northern Region-Montana, northern Idaho, North 
Dakota, northeast South Dakota, headquarters at Missoula, MT; Pacific 
Northwest Region- Washington and Oregon, headquarters at Portland, OR; 
California Region, headquarters at San Francisco; Intermountain Region- Utah, 
Nevada, western Wyoming and southern Idaho, headquarters at Ogden, UT; 
Southwestern Region- Arizona and New Mexico, headquarters at Albuquerque, 
NM; Rocky,Mountain Region- Colorado, central and eastern Wyoming, South 
Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; SoutJaem-Region- 13 southern states, 
headquarters at Atlanta, GA; Eastern Region- 20 midwest, Great Lake, and 
eastern states, headquarters at Milwaukee, WI; and the Alaska Region, 
headquarters at Juneau. Below the regions are the 155 national forests, headed 
by a forest supervisor and within the forests are numerous ranger districts, the 
lowest administrative level. 
3Stephen Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural 
Fire, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 257. 
4 Sherry Devlin, "Two USFS wilderness centers planned for Missoula 
County," Missoulian, January 12, 1993, 1. 
4 
attracted the Forest Service to the Missoula site was the combination of 
wilderness interests located there. The research laboratory has been instrumental 
in the development of wilderness management techniques, including the Limits 
of Acceptable Change (LAC) system.5 Another contributing factor to the 
decision for Missoula was the presence of the University's Wilderness Institute, 
an influential study group uniquely situated on a liberal arts campus and 
surrounded by millions of acres of designated wilderness.6 
The Forest Service also announced in early 1993 that Lolo National Forest's 
historic Nine Mile Remount Station, a fire-fighting center and ranger district 
headquarters, will house the Arthur Carhart Wilderness Training Center.7 This 
selection acknowledged the past wilderness skills training conducted at Nine 
Mile, including a three year program educating the Forest Service's upper 
echelon leaders in wilderness management issues. 
5The LAC system is a Forest Service "framework for establishing acceptable 
and appropriate resource and social conditions in recreation settings." Increasing 
public use of wilderness areas threatens the qualities of naturalness and solitude. 
The LAC system seeks to control the change associated with such widespread 
use. George H. Stankey, David N. Cole, Robert C. Lucas, Margaret E. Petersen, 
and Sidney S. Frissell, "The Limits of Acceptable Change (LAC) System for 
Wilderness Planning," United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 
General Technical Report INT-176, January 1985, Summary, 1. Forest Service 
managers first applied LAC to Montana's Bob Marshall Wilderness complex. 
interview with Elizabeth G. Close, Wilderness Specialist, Office of 
Wilderness, Recreation, and Cultural Resources, United States Forest Service, 
Northern Region, January 22, 1993. 
7Devlin, Missoulian, January 12, 1993. 
5 
Completing the complement of professional forestry elements in Missoula is 
the School of Forestry at the University of Montana. Established in 1913, the 
School of Forestry built a national reputation both as an educational center and 
as a controversial critic of Forest service policy with 1970's appraisal of forest 
management in the Bitterroot National Forest. In 1974 the school created the 
Wilderness Institute, an educational and informational center for wilderness. 
In 1992, the Boone and Crocket Club announced their intention to move their 
headquarters from Washington, D.C. to Missoula. In Missoula, Boone and 
Crocket will join other national conservation organizations that maintain either 
headquarters or regional offices in the city. Groups that have a major presence 
in Missoula are the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation, the National Wildlife 
Federation, the Craighead Institute, the Sierra Club, and the Wilderness Society. 
Citizen activism, born in the 1960's, along with the decline of the Anaconda 
Company's influence in Montana politics, converted what had been a 
Republican town into a city known for its political activism. Topping the 
political agenda are natural resource issues, from smog control to wilderness 
preservation. This activist tradition, perhaps more than any other aspect, 
identifies Missoula as the 'front line' of the wilderness debate. Other cities in 
the West contain sawmills, universities, Forest Service offices, and nearby 
wildlands; Ogden, Utah is one example. But the fiery heritage of political 
dissent keeps wilderness issues on the local newspaper's front page and confers 
6 
upon Missoula and the Lolo Forest area a unique position as a leader in the 
wilderness debate.8 
Most interesting among the newly-formed activist groups in Missoula are: the 
Alliance for the Wild Rockies, promoting bioregional wilderness legislation to a 
national audience; Wilderness Watch, a wilderness management watchdog 
group; Friends of the Rattlesnake, with a tradition of successful wilderness 
activism; and a spattering of new wise use groups, contesting further wilderness 
preservation at the expense of local economies. The extremist environmental 
group, Earth First! maintains a considerable presence in Missoula. 
Politically, Missoula has had an influence on natural resource issues wholly 
out of proportion to its population size. Missoula is a place of cultural diversity; 
loggers share city-space with University intellectuals and environmental 
activists. Since natural resource news is front-page in Missoula, participants in 
natural resource issues enjoy a high level of public exposure, enabling them to 
be big fish in an issue that commands national environmental interest. 
Missoula's crossroads setting, political uniqueness, and citizen environmental 
activism on all sides combine to replicate an almost Athenian style of 
democracy.9 
interview with Close, January 22, 1993. Missoula's daily newspaper is 
called The Missoulian. 
interview with Thomas Payne, retired professor of political science at the 
University of Montana, November 5, 1992, Missoula, MT, notes. 
7 
The esteemed writer of Western history and culture Wallace Stegner 
recognized Missoula as a "quintessential" example of the West. According to 
Stegner, Missoula had made "itself into a place and is likely to remain one." 
Missoula reflects Western diversity with its political and cultural milieu. 
Writers, including the nationally known Ivan Doig and the late Norman 
Maclean, have centered their works around Missoula and its environs.10 
Finally, Missoula's surrounding Lolo National Forest area contains numerous 
remnant wildernesses, both statutory and unprotected, or de facto. Within an 
hour's drive from downtown in any direction and one can encounter wilderness. 
This presence of wilderness adds to the immediacy of the region's wilderness 
debate and completes the microcosmic picture. The history of the development 
of statutory wilderness viewed from Missoula, both reflects and anticipates 
historical wilderness issues in the larger American West. 
10Wallace Stegner, The American West as Living Space, (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1988), 85. 
CHAPTER ONE: Forests, Fires, and Wilderness 
The United States' federal government gradually established administrative 
control over the western forests during the late 1800s and the first decade of the 
1900s. Administrators first concentrated on conserving these western forests 
from fire-caused destruction for future use as a supplier of the nation's need for 
wood products. Occurring at the same time as the federal conservation of 
forests for future utilization was a different sort of conservation. This 
conservation, or preservation, looked to ensure the continued existence of wild 
lands, with minimal human influence. Increasingly as the twentieth century 
evolved, the preservationist impulse would compete with utilitarianism for 
public favor as a forest management practice. 
Before the arrival of white people, primeval forests, wild and vast, stretched 
out in all directions from the juncture of the five valleys of western Montana 
called Hell Gate, later known as Missoula. Flathead Indians occupied this 
wilderness when the explorers Lewis and Clark and David Thompson travelled 
through and signaled the onslaught of white conquest. Since that time, as 
whites fanned out all over the west, the forested lands of western Montana faced 
gradual, increasing pressure to yield mineral wealth, provide water, and supply 
timber to the expected legions of homebuilders. The federal government in 
8 
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Washington, D.C. claimed these lands as public domain and originally sought 
to dispose of them through various settlement incentive bills such as the 
Homestead Acts and the Timber and Stone Act. 
As the federal policies of public land disposal bogged down in speculative 
corruption, new voices began to question the wisdom of dispensing with the 
public forested lands. The idea of placing the forests under federal protection 
arose in response to what appeared to be an impending timber famine in the 
United States. Western forests were subject to timber trespass- the unmanaged, 
free of charge, cutting of timber. Despite an 1831 statute that prohibited the 
harvest of public domain timber, both individuals and organized firms cut timber 
from the public domain at will.11 
Also influential in the development of protected forests, was the issue of 
watershed conservation. Bernhard Fernow, German forester and pioneer in 
American forestry, among others, battled the United States Geological Survey 
and no less a figure than John Wesley Powell over reserving forested lands in 
the West to facilitate watershed management. Powell feared that federal forest 
reserves would lock out future reclamation projects, and besides Powell saw no 
shortage of timber in the West. Fernow, echoing the sentiments of George 
nCharles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land. Water, and the 
Future of the West, (Washington, D.C., Covello, CA: Island Press, 1992), 120-
121. 
10 
Perkins Marsh in Man and Nature, preached the value of timber stands as 
defense against evaporation, and the secretary of the American Forestry 
Association, J. B. Harrison, warned of the problems of sedimentation to western 
agriculture if people stripped the forests away.12 
Fires in the western forests convinced some for the need for protection. The 
first two chiefs of the Division of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture 
noted with alarm the amount of western timber consumed by fire. These losses, 
combined with the public's perception that land resources were diminishing 
rapidly, especially through railroad land give-away legislation, provided a 
powerful call for forest protection.13 
Ironically, aside from the fires, the growing calls for forest protection had little 
to do with the western forests. In the northern Rocky Mountains the intensive 
harvest of the forests would await the post-World War II housing boom. Forest 
protection in the late nineteenth century sprung from the rapid depletion of the 
Great Lakes region's white pine forests. People responded to a perception of 
12Donald J. Pisani, "Forests and Reclamation, 1891-1911," in The Origins of 
the National Forests, ed. Harold K. Steen, (Durham, NC: Forest History Society, 
1992), 241; George Perkins Marsh, The Earth as Modified by Human Action: A 
Last Revision of Man and Nature, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907), 
236-237. 
"Wilkinson, 121-122. 
11 
scarcity in the timber resource, as Chicago consumed the remaining commercial 
white pines.14 
Congress responded in 1891 with a hastily written addition to a bill to repeal 
the Timber Culture Act that allowed the President to "set apart and reserve" 
forested tracts of public domain. President Benjamin Harrison wasted little time 
in exercising his new power, and in less than a month after the passage of the 
'Creative' act, designated the Yellowstone Park Forest Reserve.15 
Six years after the Creative Act, on February 22, 1897, President Grover 
Cleveland established the first forest reserves in Montana. The first three 
reserves, part of Cleveland's Washington's Birthday Reserves, were the 
Bitterroot, the Lewis and Clarke, and the Flathead.16 A forestry commission, 
that included America's first trained forester, Gifford Pinchot of the National 
Academy of Sciences, recommended the forests for reservation to President 
Cleveland.17 These reservations met with opposition, not just from loggers, 
14Patricia Nelson Limerick, "The Forest Reserves and the Argument for a 
Closing Frontier," in The Origins of the National Forests, ed. by Harold K. 
Steen, 15. William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West, 
(New York: W. W Norton and Company, 1991), 200-205. 
15Samuel Trask Dana and Sally K. Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy: Its 
Development in the United States, (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing 
Company, 1980), 56-58. 
16Proclamation, February 22, 1897, 29 Stat. 899, 907, 911. 
""Forestry Reserves," Great Falls Tribune, February 23, 1897, 1. Dana and 
Fairfax, 60. 
12 
miners, and homesteaders, but also from congressional delegations in the West. 
Congressmen questioned the need for forest reservations, calling them an 
"injustice to the people" and they disputed the claim of a timber famine by 
observing there was "no danger of exhausting the timber supply."18 
By 1897, significant acreage in the West was forest reserve land; however the 
administration of these lands was far from clear or effective. Congress 
attempted to address this shortcoming by the passage of the Organic Act or 
Pettigrew Amendment. The job of managing the reserves fell to the Department 
of the Interior and the act provided detailed guidance on the subjects of timber 
appraisals, sales, and use by settlers. Also included in the act were provisions 
for prospecting for minerals, water use, civil and criminal jurisdiction, and 
boundary modification.19 
At the time the Department of the Interior assumed control of the forest 
reserves, the expertise in the discipline of forestry rested in the Agriculture 
Department's Division of Forestry and in the person of Bernhard Fernow. 
German born and educated, Fernow was instrumental in the creation of national 
forest reserves in the United States. As the Division of Forestry's chief, Fernow 
18"Is unsatisfactory," Great Falls Tribune. February 24, 1897, 1. 
1930 Stat. 34, 1897. 
13 
changed the character of the division from that of an information source to 
developing real forest management policy.20 
Fernow faced the reality that his division lacked forests to manage, since the 
General Land Office of the Department of the Interior handled the forest 
reserves. This problem did not prevent Fernow from trying to implement what 
he considered sound forestry principles, German principles, into the 
administration of the American forests. First and foremost, forests existed to 
grow trees and foresters were to create a continuity of forest crops. This 
entailed a highly scientific, even "arithmetical" system that stressed the 
evaluation of soils and taking tree measurements so that the future timber yield 
could be determined. For Fernow, forests must be highly productive and 
managed; his vision for American forestry held no place for wilderness.21 
Upon Fernow's retirement in 1898, Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson 
selected an American forester to replace him, Gifford Pinchot. Trained in 
forestry in France, Pinchot picked up the task of crusading for effective timber 
management in the United States. Two fundamental management problems 
existed, the first was the need for fire control and on that most agreed. The 
20Dana and Fairfax, 51; for a biography of Fernow, see Andrew Denny 
Rodgers, III, Bernhard Fernow: A Story of North American Forestry, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1951). 
21Char Miller, "Wooden Politics: Bernhard Fernow and the Quest for a 
National Forest Policy, 1876-1898," in The Origins of the National Forests, ed. 
by Harold K. Steen, 290-292. 
14 
second was the need for sound harvesting practices. Pinchot preached the 
gospel of sustained yield forestry, implying continuous timber production by 
maintaining a balance between net growth and harvest.22 
Vital to Pinchot's plans for American forestry was the ascendancy of Theodore 
Roosevelt to the presidency following the assassination of William McKinley. 
In Roosevelt, Pinchot found a kindred spirit and together the two men would 
launch the Golden Age of Conservation in the United States. Pinchot enjoyed 
extraordinary access to Roosevelt and played a key role in determining the 
progressive conservation agenda. This agenda included a reversal of the long 
held policy of public land disposal. Instead, federal retention of land became 
the goal.23 
As had Fernow, Pinchot desired the transfer of the forest reserves to his 
control in the Department of Agriculture. Toward this end, Pinchot worked to 
convince western commodity interests and congressional delegations that he 
would better take care of the reserves. Scandals in the General Land Office 
aided Pinchot's cause and in February 1905, Congress passed the Transfer 
Act.24 
22Charles H. Stoddard, Essentials of Forestry Practice, second edition, (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1968), 319. 
23Dana and Fairfax, 72-73. 
24Dana and Fairfax, 81. 
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Important not only for the transfer of the reserves to Pinchot and the 
Agriculture Department, the Transfer Act provided that all money received from 
the sale of any land or resources from the reserves go into a special fund, for 
use for a period of five years for the reserves at the discretion of the Secretary 
of Agriculture. After that, the treasury would collect the proceeds from the 
forest reserves. This stipulation reflected Congress's intention that the reserves 
become independently supporting.25 The Transfer Act completed the first phase 
of legislative protection of the western, public forested lands. Forest 
administration, both physically and in expertise, emanated from one source, 
Gifford Pinchot.26 
Pinchot intended the forest reserves to serve the interests of a vigorous, 
expanding nation. When Congress delivered the reserves to the Division of 
Forestry, Pinchot changed the agency's name to the United States Forest 
Service. The word 'service' reflected Pinchot's desire that the agency remain 
aware of its public service mission.27 
One of Pinchot's first actions as chief of the Forest Service was to write 
himself a letter delineating the goals and purposes of the agency. Prepared for 
25Transfer Act of February 1, 1905, 33 Stat. 624. 
26Dana and Fairfax, 81. 
27Harold K. Steen, The U.S. Forest Service: A History. (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1976), 74-75. 
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the signature of Secretary Wilson, Pinchot's letter stressed that "the resources of 
the reserves are for use" and that conservation would ensure the permanence of 
those resources.28 Support for the developing American West formed the basis 
of the reserves' existence. Priority to use forest reserve resources went to the 
homebuilders and local, small businesses and industries, since they were the 
agents converting the West into a productive, settled region. When conflict 
arose over the multiple resource uses, the principle of "greatest good for the 
greatest number in the long run" governed land managers' decisions. Pinchot's 
letter, historian David Clary wrote, was the Forest Service's Magna Carta and 
the utilitarian philosophy of resource use contained in the letter set policy in the 
new agency and continues to influence the management of the nation's public 
forests today.29 
Apart from utilitarian conservation (that primarily emphasized conserving 
natural resources for future economic exploitation), a distinct preservationist 
movement evolved under the leadership of John Muir. Born in Scotland, and 
raised and educated in Wisconsin, Muir personified the struggle to preserve wild 
places for the inherent value of wild places. Muir rejected the dominant 
anthropocentric world view held by many of his fellow citizens, and instead 
conceived of humans as members of nature and not superior beings above 
28Dana and Fairfax, 82. 
29Clary, 22; Dana and Fairfax, 82; and Steen, 75. 
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nature. Espousing a pantheist philosophy, Muir viewed wilderness in deeply 
religious terms. Although reminiscent of the transcendentalists Emerson and 
Thoreau, Muir developed a separate sense of the indispensability of wilderness. 
Wilderness was a place to seek out the meaning of life, a spiritual sanctuary 
from the mundane rigors of civilized existence.30 
Muir began his championing of wilderness in the 1870's, he played a crucial 
role in the establishment of California's Yosemite National Park in 1890, and 
participated in the founding of the Sierra Club. Muir also held great hope for 
the forest reserves until he had a falling out with Gifford Pinchot over sheep 
grazing in the reserves. Although he did not oppose the creation of the forest 
reserves after his break with Pinchot, Muir directed most of his efforts toward 
the national parks where he considered wilderness values had better 
protection.31 
The controversy over the building of a dam in Yosemite's Hetch Hetchy 
Valley proved to be Muir's defining moment as a wilderness activist. His 
30Max Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness: From Pre-Historv to the Age 
of Ecology, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), chapter on John Muir, 
172-204; Steven Fox, John Muir and His Legacy: The American Conservation 
Movement, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1981), 70, 80; Frederick 
Turner, Rediscovering America: John Muir in His Time and Ours, (San 
Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1985), 66-71; Michael F. Cohen, The Pathless 
Way: John Muir and the American Wilderness, (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1984). 
31Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1973), 131-138. 
18 
vociferous opposition to the inundation of one of his favorite valleys in the 
Sierra Nevada constructed the model of wilderness advocacy that would find 
emulation in future preservation battles.32 Muir lost the Hetch Hetchy battle, 
San Francisco's water supply carried more weight in Washington D.C., but in a 
significant way wilderness preservation ideology reached the American 
people.33 
Americans were ready to receive Muir's message at the time of the Hetch 
Hetchy controversy. Inconceivable fifty years earlier, the controversy illustrated 
the progress non-utilitarian preservation made in the late nineteenth century and 
in the first decade of the twentieth. The traditional perception of wilderness as 
an evil to be subdued had changed; even supporters of the dam did not cast the 
issue as good versus evil. Muir's challenge of the dam inspired this change in 
attitude and announced the arrival of a full-time wilderness advocacy in 
contraposition to the type of utilitarianism preached by Gifford Pinchot.34 
As Muir initiated America's preservationist movement, Theodore Roosevelt 
continued to withdraw large tracts of western forests. Missoula's surrounding 
forests came under formal federal administration during Roosevelt's presidency. 
320elschlaeger, 172. 
33For a description of Muir and the Hetch Hetchy controversy, see Turner, 
336-343; Nash, 161-181. 
34Nash, 181. 
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First, TR established the Hell Gate Forest Reserve, east of Missoula, by 
proclamation on October 3, 1905. By November 1906, two more area forest 
reserves existed, Lolo Forest Reserve, west of Missoula, withdrawn on 
September 20, 1906, and the Missoula Forest Reserve, southeast of Missoula, 
created on November 6, 1906.35 As technical advances such as the telephone 
and the automobile facilitated the physical management of these reserves, the 
Forest Service consolidated the forests. Missoula Forest absorbed part of the 
Hell Gate in 1908, and Lolo Forest divided the Missoula Forest with Deerlodge 
Forest in 1931.36 
In keeping faith with Pinchot's utilitarian principles, the predominant 
occupation, ahead of grazing or mining, of the Forest Service in the National 
Forests of the Northern Rockies in the pre-World War II era was fire 
suppression.37 Fire had long ranked as a top priority menace, the first two 
chiefs of the Agriculture Department's Division of Forestry, Franklin Hough and 
35Proclamation of October 3, 1905, 34 Stat. 3168, Proclamation of 
September 20, 1906, 34 Stat. 3234, and Proclamation of November 6, 1906, 34 
Stat. 3259; United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "Historical 
List of National Forest Names," June 1, 1957, 6-7. 
36Executive Order 882, July 1, 1908; Executive Order 5761, December 16, 
1931; United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Division of 
Engineering, "Establishment and Modification of National Forest Boundaries: A 
Chronologic Record 1891-1968," Washington, D.C. June 1968, 22, 64. 
37The name "National Forests" replaced "Forest Reserves" on March 4, 1907 
by an Act of Congress, 34 Stat. 1269. The new name reflected Pinchot's idea 
that the forests were to support national growth. 
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Nathaniel Egleston in the 1880's and 1890's mentioned in their reports the 
immense devastation caused in western forests by fire.38 Fire became the 
enemy of the utilitarian forest managers because it degraded the potential timber 
value of any particular forest. Culturally and economically, burned forests 
represented a waste of resources.39 
In 1908, Pinchot organized the national forests into districts, later called 
regions. Missoula was the site of the northern district headquarters that 
administered the forests of northern Idaho, Montana, and the western part of 
North Dakota. During the period before World War II, the rangers of the 
Northern District occupied themselves with fire suppression, grazing, and some 
timber management.40 They considered their job custodial in nature, keeping 
the forests 'green' for future utilitarian purposes.41 
38Wilkinson, 121. 
39The standard secondary source for forest fire history in the United States 
is: Steven J. Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural 
Fire, (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1982). 
40Despite Pinchot's vision of the national forests as suppliers of timber to 
local needs, in the pre-World War II era the northern Rockies' national forests 
supplied little timber to mills because of the abundant supply of timber from 
private lands. 
41Interview with William R. Moore, retired Forest Service district ranger, for 
Powell Ranger District (part of Lolo National Forest, 1934-1961, thereafter part 
of Clearwater National Forest), Northern Region Assistant Forester for Fire, and 
served at the agency's headquarters in Washington, D.C. working in fire policy, 
Condon, MT January 7, 1993, notes. 
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Land ownership and the historical development of the lands contained in the 
Northern District explain why timber management commanded scant attention in 
the early days. Most of the desirable, easily obtained commercial timber, white 
and ponderosa pine, fell into private hands prior to the original forest reserves' 
withdrawal from the public domain. Most of the Montana lands that supported 
feasibly harvested commercial forests, valley stands and timber in proximity to 
rail lines fell under the ownership of two large corporations, Anaconda 
Company and the Northern Pacific Railroad. These corporations traced their 
ownership back to railroad land grants and perfected claims under the various 
land disposal laws of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.42 
Private interests thus controlled vast amounts of commercial timber, rendering 
the widespread harvest of national forest timber unnecessary. Northern Region 
forests, as with all forests, experienced periods of fire throughout the millennia. 
Fire, consuming all the forested acres at one time or another, played an integral 
role in the pristine ecosystems of the northern Rockies. With the advent of 
federal management, however, rangers of the Forest Service sought to eradicate 
fire from the natural realm and, by constructing road and trail networks, fire 
42Evan W. Kelley, "History of Forest Industry and Forest Conditions in the 
Inland Empire," speech at the Meeting of American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, Spokane, WA, September 3, 1940, Evan Kelley files, United States 
Forest Service Northern Region Archives, Missoula, MT. 
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lookouts, and equipment caches, opened up significant tracts of wilderness for 
future development. 
Fire destroyed potential timber receipts, threatened human habitations and 
adjacent private lands, and foreclosed management options. Thus, the rangers of 
the Forest Service considered fire as public enemy number one. Memories of 
devastating fire seasons, such as 1889, spurred the development of strategies to 
suppress fire. But, perhaps no fire season had more impact on Forest Service 
policy than the epic one of 1910. 
Arriving on the heels of a drought that started in 1909, the fires of the summer 
of 1910 were particularly destructive of both timber and human life. In the 
Northern District's forests, those in Idaho suffered most, but Montana forests 
such as Lolo also experienced considerable losses. Northern District saw more 
than six billion board feet of timber on one and a quarter million acres go up in 
smoke. Three-hundred million board feet burned on Lolo National Forest.43 
Most significantly, eighty-seven firefighters lost their lives along with countless 
numbers of animals and fish.44 The holocaust of 1910 traumatized the Forest 
43United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, District One 
Annual Fire Report for 1910, Archives, Headquarters, Northern Region, 
Missoula, MT. 
^Elers Koch, "1910 Fire Season," unpublished essay, 1910 Fire Season file, 
Archives, Headquarters, Northern Region, Missoula, MT. 
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Service and compounded the humiliation of Gifford Pinchot's dismissal earlier 
in the year as a result of the celebrated Ballinger-Pinchot controversy.45 
Illustrative of the fury of the 1910 fires are the events of August 21, and 22. 
Along the Idaho and Montana border, west of Missoula, several separate fires 
united in one great conflagration. An irregular swath 100 miles long and 40 
miles wide burned in untrammeled wilderness. Firefighters found the roadless 
and trailess country extremely difficult, and with the arrival of "hurricane" 
winds, putting the flames out became an impossibility. The wind drove the 
flames out of the wilderness and into area towns, such as Wallace, Idaho, which 
was reduced to ashes.46 
In the aftermath of the 1910 fires the Forest Service had to decide what to do 
with the burned timber. Enormous numbers of burned trees lay in the forests of 
the Northern District. These trees had to be harvested quickly before they 
began to deteriorate and were useless for commercial purposes. Northern 
District managers decided to push "vigorously" the sale of this burned timber. 
Mills could buy the timber on the stump at greatly reduced prices; they only had 
45Pyne, 103. President William Howard Taft dismissed Pinchot in January 
1910, when Pinchot conflicted with new Secretary of the Interior Richard 
Ballinger over coal reserves in Alaska. This incident reflected Pinchot's loss of 
influence in the White House after Theodore Roosevelt's departure and 
generally marks the end of the Golden Era of conservation, Dana and Fairfax, 
94-95. 
461910 Annual Fire Report; Koch. 
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to go and get it. This sell-off, contrary to the policy of Secretary Wilson, who 
adhered to a policy of conservation of federal timber in anticipation of future 
need, brought the lumberjack into the wilderness, armed with saw and axe.47 
Climatically, the conditions in the summer of 1914 approximated those of 
1910. A lengthy period of drought preceded the fire season of 1914 and, 
combined with the usual hazards of slash burning and campfires, promised 
another severe burn for the forests of western Montana. However, the fire 
season of 1914 failed to approach the level of devastation in 1910. Total 
acreage burned was 113,643, compared to almost three million acres consumed 
in 1910. This reduced burn, in terms of acres, came as a result of more total 
fires reported, 1, 975 to 1,582 in 1910 48 
The Forest Service interpreted the results of the 1914 fire season as 
confirmation of the efficacy of their policy of fire suppression. They cited their 
rate of 82 percent of all fires held to under ten acres as proof of the feasibility 
of detecting, fighting, and controlling forest fires, even in adverse natural 
conditions, as in the summer of 1914, Moreover, massive efforts to control 
forest fires represented good economic public policy. In 1914, the Northern 
471910 Annual Fire Report, 3-4. 
48United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "Review of 1914 
Fire Season, District One," December 2, 1914, Archives, Headquarters, Northern 
Region, Missoula, MT, 1-6. 
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Region spent $390,000 to protect an estimated one-hundred million dollar timber 
resource threatened by the fires of that year.49 
Although Elers Koch, supervisor of Lolo National Forest, characterized the fire 
suppression efforts of 1914 as "splendid," he noted the necessity of moving fire 
camps up close to the flames. Most fire crews had to walk great distances 
through rugged terrain to arrive at the scene of a fire. Koch noted the 
effectiveness of using the automobile to rush fire crews to critical points in the 
fire, demonstrated at the Granite Creek fire in the Lolo Forest. Koch 
undoubtedly referred to the advisability of constructing more roads, or trails, for 
the express purpose of facilitating fire control.50 The district headquarters also 
identified the increase in trail mileage over that in 1910, 4504 miles to 1751 in 
1910, as contributory to the successful effort in limiting the destructiveness of 
the 1914 fires.51 
Subsequent fire seasons reinforced the conclusions drawn in 1914. A slow, 
wet season in 1915 allowed firefighters to reflect on what improvements were 
49United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "Fires- Season 
1914, District Summary," Archives, Northern Region, Missoula, Mt, 4. 
50United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "Report on 1914 
Fire Season, Lolo National Forest," Archives, Headquarters, Northern Region, 
Missoula, MT, 7. Ironically, later in his career, Koch would lament the 
construction of these roads and even dared to question the wisdom of fighting 
wilderness fires. See below, this chapter. 
51"Review of 1914 Fire Season," 5. 
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necessary for optimum fire suppression. "Every fire season demonstrates the 
value of trails and telephone lines," opined the 1915 fire report. Funding for 
trails to "open up inaccessible country" was the district's greatest need.52 
Satisfactory fire suppression depended on increased access to the backcountry, 
where, irritatingly, lightning-caused fires always seemed to occur.53 
Within the Forest Service, as fire suppression continued as the top priority, 
there emerged a small movement that would eventually prove decisive in the 
history of wilderness. Aldo Leopold and Arthur Carhart initially represented 
this movement. Later, Robert Marshall came to lead this new, recreation 
oriented faction. Although recognized as a legitimate use of the national forests 
as early as 1905, yet, recreation ranked far below the extractive uses in priority. 
The multiple use concept attempted to cater to all potential uses of public 
forested land, and early in the history of the Forest Service, public interest in 
outdoor activities established recreation as a use.54 
52United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "General Report 
on the Fire Season of 1915, District One," Archives, Headquarters, Northern 
Region, Missoula, MT, 7. 
53United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "Forest Fires, 
July 26, 1918," 1918 Fire Season File, Archives, Headquarters, Northern 
Region, Missoula, MT, 1. 
54Dennis Roth, "The National Forests and the Campaign for Wilderness 
Legislation," Journal of Forest History, July 1984, 113. 
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When Henry S. Graves replaced Pinchot as chief of the Forest Service in 
1910, he explicitly recognized recreation as a valid use of the National Forests. 
Growing public demand for outdoor recreation (with the increased access to 
national forest land aided by the automobile) prompted Congress officially to 
recognize recreation as an approved use of the forested lands in 1915. 
However, this recognition extended primarily to utilitarian recreational uses such 
as permits for summer home construction, hotels, and stores.55 
In 1916, Congress established the National Park Service in the Department of 
the Interior. With the creation of the Park Service, the Forest Service found a 
rival agency for forested land management. Under the aggressive leadership of 
Borax Soap executive Steven Mather, the Park Service sought to claim prime, 
scenic national forest lands and convert them into parks.56 Earlier in the 
history of the National Parks, John Muir considered wilderness values better 
protected by national parks than by the Pinchot-led Forest Service. However, 
Mather's vision for the parks fundamentally differed from that of Muir.57 
55James P. Gilligan, "The Development of Policy and Administration of 
Forest Service Primitive and Wilderness Areas in the Western United States," 
Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1953, 62, 70-71. 
56Dyan Zaslowsky and the Wilderness Society, These American Lands: 
Parks, Wilderness, and the Public Lands, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1986), 21-22. 
57For a biography of Mather, see: Robert Shankland, Steve Mather of the 
National Parks, second ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), for Mather's 
side of the land dispute with the Forest Service, see pages 176-179. 
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Mather promoted the parks to take advantage of the rising tide of the 
American automobile tourist. He licensed concessionaires to provide the 
amenities of home life in the scenic setting of America's most spectacular 
country. Furthermore, Mather vigorously supported the construction of 
highways on which tourists could speed to their favorite destination.58 
Practiced in the art of bureaucratic battle, the Forest Service contested the 
upstart Park Service over land transfers. Under chief, and former Northern 
District forester, William B. Greeley, the Forest Service turned to the concept of 
Muir's wilderness in an effort to preserve national forest land from the raider 
Mather. Because of this interagency rivalry, the ideas of Forest Service 
employees Arthur Carhart and Aldo Leopold saw the light of day.59 
Perhaps the first person in the Forest Service to advocate a Muir-like 
wilderness area was Arthur Carhart.60 A landscape architect assigned as a 
recreation engineer, Carhart received instructions to survey Trappers Lake, in 
Colorado's White River National Forest. As he conducted his business of 
determining future summer home sites along the lake, Carhart met two hunters 
58Zaslowski, Ibid. 
59Hal K. Rothman, "A Regular Ding-Dong Fight: Agency Culture and 
Evolution in the NPS-USFS Dispute, 1916-1937," Western Historical Quarterly. 
(May 1989), 155. 
60For Carhart's role in the evolution of Forest Service wilderness policy, see: 
Don Baldwin, The Quiet Revolution: Grass-Roots of Today's Wilderness 
Preservation Movement, (Boulder, Pruett Publishing Company, 1972). 
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who inquired into the possibility of leaving Trappers Lake as it was, a 
wilderness. Receptive to arguments for nature, Carhart agreed with the hunters, 
and instead of advocating development for Trappers Lake he promoted a 
recreational plan emphasizing the natural state of the lake and its vicinity. 
Carhart succeeded in convincing his superiors in Denver not to develop 
Trappers Lake.61 
Aldo Leopold joined with Carhart in advocating a policy of non-development. 
Leopold, with Thoreau and Muir, ranks as a seminal figure in the evolution of 
both wilderness policy and philosophy. Leopold advanced the idea of a land 
ethic and its place in the management of lands. The land ethic, a biocentric 
perspective, abandoned a human centered ecology and alternatively placed 
humans into the internal operations of nature.62 Humans had a responsibility 
to integrate science into nature and nature could teach lessons to humans about 
land management. Arbitrary management decisions made by humans without 
the consideration of the natural world would fail, Leopold argued. In a passage 
from Leopold's masterpiece, A Sand County Almanac, this message is clear: 
61Craig W. Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, (Westport, CT.: 
Greenwood Press, 1982), 69; Roth, 114. 
620elschlaeger, 205-217; for a biography of Leopold, see: Curt Meine, Aldo 
Leopold: His Life and Work, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); 
for an interesting collection of articles placing Leopold into the context of 
wilderness policy and issues, see: Thomas Tanner, ed., Aldo Leopold: The Man 
and His Legacy, Aldo Leopold Centennial Celebration, Iowa State University, 
(Ankeney, IA: Soil Conservation Society of America, 1987). 
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The Cowman who cleans his range of wolves does not realize that 
he is taking over the wolf's job of trimming the herd to fit the 
range. He has not learned to think like a mountain. Hence we 
have dustbowls, and rivers washing the future into the sea.63 
As a forest supervisor for the Carson National Forest in New Mexico, Leopold 
became alarmed by the end of the first world war of the increased road systems 
into the backcountry. In 1922, when Leopold was the assistant district forester 
in Albuquerque, he devised a wilderness protection plan for 500,000 acres in the 
Gila National Forest. Leopold's plan excluded roads, trails, and use permits, but 
allowed trails and telephone lines for fire suppression. On June 3, 1924, District 
Forester Frank Pooler approved Leopold's Gila Wilderness plan.64 
While Leopold and Pooler created the first official wilderness reservation in 
the Forest Service, Chief Forester Greeley continued the war with the Park 
Service over which agency could best manage America's remaining wildlands. 
By 1926, Greeley acknowledged the need for a formal wilderness policy for the 
Forest Service. Greeley understood the appeal of wilderness to the public, and 
especially to big game hunters of the type that influenced Arthur Carhart. 
Wilderness was a weapon that Greeley could employ to thwart the Park 
Service.65 
63Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac: And Sketches Here and There, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), 132. 
^Roth, 113. 
65Gilligan, 101. 
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Greeley conducted extensive opinion surveys within and outside the Forest 
Service on the question of Wilderness preservation. These surveys indicated to 
Greeley that generally favorable opinions regarding wilderness preservation 
existed both inside and outside the Forest Service. Importantly, Greeley 
dispatched assistant forester Leon F. Kneipp on a mission to inventory all the 
roadless tracts of land then in existence in the national forests.66 
Kneipp set a figure of 230,400 acres as the minimum qualifying size for a 
roadless area. He found seventy-four areas meeting this requirement, almost 
exclusively in the West. Kneipp's roadless areas totaled 55,000,000 acres, 
representing one-third of the total Forest Service acreage. Kneipp's inventory 
also noted that if the Forest Service carried out all current road construction 
plans the roadless acreage would shrink to one-fifth of the total. Simultaneously 
as Kneipp's inventory, in September 1926, Secretary of Agriculture W. M. 
Jardine approved reserved wilderness as an element of the national recreation 
policy of the Forest Service.67 
Chief Greeley drafted, in December 1926, instructions for the western district 
foresters that guided the implementation of the Forest Service's new wilderness 
policy. Greeley's policy required an assessment of road construction plans and 
special use permits in areas "adapted for wilderness forms." This policy 
66Ibid, 101-102. 
67Ibid, 102-104. 
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delegated to the district foresters considerable power to carry out wilderness 
management in their districts. In Missoula, District One's forester, Richard 
Rutledge, opposed Greeley's wilderness policy and called it a departure from 
Pinchot's "greatest good for greatest number" principle. He advocated a policy 
of excluding information on wilderness reservations from the public so forest 
managers could freely make changes, without hindrance from the public.68 
By 1929, the Forest Service promulgated the L-20 Regulations for the 
management of wild lands and the term 'wilderness' changed to 'primitive' in 
the new policy. The on-going interagency battle between the Forest and Park 
Services influenced the issuance of the L-20 Regulations, although by 1929 the 
main antagonists, William Greeley and Steven Mather, no longer headed their 
respective agencies. L-20 was distinctive because of its relative flexibility in 
regard to wilderness protection. Management priorities emphasized primitive 
modes of transportation, habitation, and subsistence, all keyed to the highest 
degree of public recreational use. L-20 also contained provisions for planning 
the circumstances in which timber harvest and other extractive uses of primitive 
areas could occur. Due to their lack of any real protective measures, the Forest 
Service probably issued L-20 to please an unsuspecting public, and in the 
68Ibid, 105. 
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process head-off any attempt to transfer more national forest land to the Park 
Service.69 
While Carhart and Leopold advanced the idea of wilderness, and Greeley and 
his successor, another former Northern District forester, R.Y. Stuart* directed the 
war with the Park Service, fire suppression continued as the main order of 
business on the northern Rockies forests such as Lolo. Road and trail 
construction received both funding and attention, increasingly opening the 
pristine forests of western Montana. 
Replacing the recalcitrant Richard Rutledge as District Forester, in 1929, was 
the Forest Service's "toughest fire officer" Evan W. Kelley.70 A veteran of 
World War One's U.S. Tenth Engineers71, Major Kelley's goal was specifically 
fire suppression. A particularly bad fire season in 1929 greeted the new district 
forester, and lasted until November. Described as a "tough, violent," fire 
season, 1929 featured the Bald Mountain Fire in the Selway National Forest, 
69Allin, 74; Roth, 115; and Gilligan, 122-130. By July 1933, five roadless 
tracts in Montana were managed under the L-20 Regulations: Absaroka, 
Beartooth, Mission Mountains, South Fork of the Flathead River, and the 
Spanish Peaks. L-20 protected no Lolo Forest areas. 
70Pyne, 256. 
71Oral interview with Evan W. Kelley, conducted by Amelia Fry, University 
of California, Berkeley, October 10, 1964, Oral History 240-1, 2, K. Ross Toole 
Archives, University of Montana, Missoula, MT. The Tenth Engineers' mission 
was forestry in cooperation with French officials. The Tenth would supply the 
timber needs of the fighting forces. 
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southwest of Missoula on the Idaho side of the Bitterroot Divide. Major Kelley 
termed the Bald Mountain fire a "monster," and this blaze demonstrated all the 
difficulties of fighting wilderness fires, especially the difficulty of access.72 
Driven by the destruction of the fire season of 1929, Major Kelley launched a 
comprehensive fire policy for the Northern Region.73 This policy emphasized 
both greatly expanded road and trail construction and a standard of having all 
detected fires under control by 10:00 AM the day following detection- the 10:00 
AM Policy. Major Kelley's road plan called for long, narrow roads into the 
backcountry to facilitate the movement of fire crews in the event of another 
Bald Mountain type fire. Although this was a familiar theme in the Northern 
Region, Major Kelley prosecuted his fire suppression plan with the 
determination of an officer leading troops to battle. 
The increased pace of road construction, particularly the completion of a 
gravel highway over Lolo Pass and along Idaho's Lochsa River (following the 
Lewis and Clark trail), inspired a passionate critique of Forest Service policy by 
former Lolo National Forest supervisor, and assistant district ranger, Elers Koch. 
72Interview with William R. Moore; Ralph L. Hand, "The First Ten Years 
were the Toughest," and L.M. (Locke) Stewart, letter, in Early Days in The 
Forest Service, Volume 3, United States Department of Agriculture, Forest 
Service, Northern Region, Missoula, MT, November 20, 1962, 97, 246. 
73In 1930, the administrative category of 'district' was discontinued and 
instead called 'regions.' Missoula, thus, was the headquarters of Region One, or 
Northern Region. 
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After the infamy of 1910, Koch had advocated the increased construction of 
roads and trails, but by the 1930's, Koch recognized the destructiveness of that 
construction to the wilderness quality of the Northern Rockies' forests. He 
began an article in the Journal of Forestry with the following: 
The Lolo Trail is no more. The bulldozer blade has ripped out the 
hoof tracks of Chief Joseph's ponies. The trail was worn deep by 
centuries of Nezperce and Blackfeet Indians, by Lewis and Clark, 
by companies of Northwest Company fur traders, by General 
Howard's cavalry horses, by Captain Mullan, the engineer, and by 
the early day forest ranger. It is gone, and in its place there is 
only the print of the automobile tire in the dust.74 
Koch railed against the "hammer" of the Civilian Conservation Corps, as they 
dammed the waters of the wilderness of the Selway Forest, and he bemoaned 
the disappearance of the forest he knew as a pioneer forest ranger in the once 
vast wilderness of the northern Rocky Mountains.75 
Koch announced that the Forest Service's attempt at fire suppression in the 
wildernesses of the Northern Region was futile. Noting that the history of fire 
suppression was one of the "saddest" in Forest Service history, Koch lamented 
the expenditure of money and the sacrifice of human life involved in the 
impossible task of wildfire control. "When fire gets a good start in the dry fire-
killed cedar and white fir . . . the whole United States Army, if on the ground, 
74Elers Koch, "The Passing of the Lolo Trail," Journal of Forestry, (February 
1935), 98. 
75Ibid, 98-99. 
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could do nothing but keep out of the way." Koch seemed to say to the forestry 
profession that wildfire control was not a sufficient reason to degrade the last 
vestiges of wild country left in the northern Rockies.76 
Major Kelley promoted his fire suppression policy by referring to the necessity 
of preventing epic conflagrations such as seen in 1910 and 1929. He anticipated 
the completion of his "truck trail" or road system by 1934, supplemented by the 
construction of strategically located airstrips in the backcountry to take 
advantage of the technology of flight in the battle against the flames. Once 
these improvements were in place, then Major Kelley could concentrate on 
enforcing his 10:00 AM policy. He was absolutely certain that men armed with 
the latest in technology, assisted by an expanded transportation network, could 
defy nature's attempts to deprive humankind of valuable timber. "Verily, failure 
of the future seems far less likely than in the past," he wrote.77 
In 1934, Major Kelley's system received a stern test with the arrival of yet 
another devastating fire season. Large numbers of lightning strikes set off many 
fires, particularly in the backcountry, and burned much timber.78 Described 
by a former ranger as a "martinet," Major Kelley was not pleased with the 
76Ibid, 99-100. 
77Evan W. Kelley, "Natural and Human Forces in Fire Control," Evan W. 
Kelley file, Archives, Headquarters, Northern Region, Missoula, MT, 11. 
78Interview with William R. Moore. 
37 
results of the fire fighting effort of 1934.79 In a terse memorandum to 
Assistant Forester Elers Koch, Major Kelley declared the 1934 fire season as 
"historical," and demanded a statement for the record of the "costly and 
humiliating affair" by those (including Koch) involved.80 
Despite Evan Kelley's inviolable faith in the Forest Service's ability to stamp 
out commercially significant fires in the Northern Region, and his dedication to 
the Pinchot principle of greatest good for the greatest number, he managed to 
hold some sympathy for the continued existence of wild lands in the national 
forests. Major Kelley observed in 1937 a growing demand for solitude, for 
wilderness as a place to escape the rigors of everyday life. He pointed to the 
creation of the L-20 primitive areas, that by 1937 also included Montana's 
Selway-Bitterroot, Sun River, and Pentagon areas as examples of the Forest 
Service's commitment to satisfy this demand.81 
Major Kelley deplored a proposal to dam the Gallatin Canyon during an 
address to a conference of Western Farm Economics Association in Bozeman, 
Montana, on July 7, 1938. Citing several times that wilderness recreation was a 
79Telephone interview with Ed Slusher, Rockport, TX, January 27, 1993, 
notes. 
80Evan W. Kelley, "Memorandum for MR. Koch, August 30, 1934," 1934 
Fire Season File, Archives, Headquarters, Northern Region, Missoula, MT. 
81Evan W. Kelley, "Recreation in the National Forests," unpublished essay, 
January 16, 1937, Evan W. Kelley file, Archives, Headquarters, Northern 
Region, Missoula, MT, 6-7. 
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legitimate use of the national forest, Major Kelley analyzed the effects of the 
proposed dam project: 
The dam would impound water which would be drawn to irrigate 
crops for the benefit of a larger or more stable economy in the 
Gallatin Valley- a worthy project in itself, but at what costs! If 
this were done, the spiritual value of the scenic Gallatin Canyon, 
one of nature's architectural masterpieces, would be irreparably 
scarred.82 
Importantly during this time, Major Kelley's thinking was influenced by Robert 
Marshall, one of the most important wilderness advocates in history.83 
Illustrative of Marshall's impact on Major Kelley was the cessation of one of 
Kelley's prized road projects over Elk Summit in the Powell Ranger District of 
Lolo National Forest.84 Marshall maintained correspondence with Major 
Kelley from his office in Washington, D.C. where he served as the Forest 
Service's head of the Division of Recreation and Lands. In this position, 
Marshall supervised the management of the Forest Service's L-20 primitive 
areas. He soon would realize the vulnerability of the primitive areas under the 
82Evan W. Kelley, "Problems of Land Management and Administration 
Arising from Associated Uses of Land for the Various Services which the 
Public Seeks from the National Forests," address to the Conference of Western 
Farm Economics Association, Bozeman, Montana, July 7, 1938, Evan W. Kelley 
File, Archives, Headquarters, Northern Region, Missoula, MT, 6. 
83Interview with William R. Moore; for a flattering biography of Marshall, 
see: James M. Glover, A Wilderness Original: The Life of Bob Marshall. 
(Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1986). 
^Interview with William R. Moore. 
39 
loose L-20 Regulations. One proposal from Major Kelley to allow aircraft to 
ferry hunters into the South Fork of the Flathead Primitive Area elicited a 
response from Marshall. He opposed "opening up" the area to planes because 
of the increase in hunter pressure to the primitive area, but primarily because of 
the precedent that decision would set for the management of the nation's other 
. . Q< 
primitive areas. 
Most of Major Kelley's pronunciations on the benefits of wilderness echoed 
the philosophy of Robert Marshall. Wilderness could meet human needs that 
civilized society left unfulfilled. Away from the comforts of modern America, 
wilderness required of people a self-sufficiency, a dependence on one's own 
resources. Some people, Marshall believed, had a psychological desire for the 
thrills of the woods, while others craved the psychological release, the 
peacefulness of the wilderness experience. Marshall's wilderness philosophy 
emphasized the critical role wild country played in a healthy, satisfied life.86 
Critical to the evolution of protected wilderness was Marshall's crowning 
achievement to his prematurely ended life, the issuance of the Forest Service's 
U Regulations. Marshall's U Regulations evolved from his earlier participation 
85Bob Marshall to Evan W. Kelley, letter (copy), September 7, 1937, Bob 
Marshall File, Archives, Headquarters, Northern Region, Missoula, MT; Glover, 
223-224; Lawrence C. Merriam, "The Irony of the Bob Marshall Wilderness," 
Journal of Forest History, (April 1989), 83-
86Roderick Nash, "The Strenuous Life of Bob Marshall," Forest History. 
(October 1966), 19-20. 
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in the Copeland Report, published in 1933. Marshall wrote the recreation 
chapters of this report that assessed the state of the national forests and 
recommended future courses of action. He proposed a classification system for 
recreation areas: three of the classifications dealt with wilderness areas. 
Marshall's wilderness classifications divided wilderness by size, relative 
wildness, and permitted human activity.87 
Later in 1933, Marshall received an appointment as Director of Forestry in the 
Office of Indian Affairs. There, in addition to setting up a wilderness program 
for the Indian Reservations, Marshall continued to work for the reservation of 
large tracts of wilderness on all federal lands. In 1935, due to what Marshall 
perceived as inadequate progress in establishing wilderness, he, Aldo Leopold, 
and others founded the Wilderness Society. This organization's goals were to 
raise public consciousness on wilderness issues and to pressure federal agencies 
for more wilderness protection. In 1935, the Wilderness Society published its 
first quarterly magazine, The Living Wilderness, with funds provided by the 
millionaire Marshall.88 
"The fight to save the wilderness has grown during the last ten years from the 
personal hobby of a few fanatics to an important, nation-wide movement," 
Marshall wrote in the November, 1936 issue of Living Wilderness. Of 
87Gilligan, 176-177. 
88Ibid, 180-182. 
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particular concern to Marshall, were the vast roadless areas, existing primarily 
on Forest Service land. Marshall, and Althea Dobbins, inventoried the nation's 
roadless tracts of 300,000 acres or more. They found 48 such areas in the 
national forests, eight of which were in Montana. Dobbins and Marshall's 
survey substantially conformed to the earlier findings of the Kneipp inventory, 
conducted in the 1920s.89 By 1937, Marshall was back in the Forest Service, 
as Director of Recreation and Lands. Marshall left the Interior Department due 
to what he considered the department's growing affinity for recreational 
development, such as campgrounds, hotels, and concessionaires.90 As the 
Forest Service's main official for wilderness areas, Marshall set out to advocate 
the inclusion of more roadless areas in a protected status, and he drafted the U 
Regulations. As with his Copeland Report recommendations, the U Regulations 
divided wild lands into three categories. U1 authorized the chief of the Forest 
Service to designate areas of not less than 100,000 acres as 'wilderness'; U2 
allowed the chief to designate suitable forest lands under 100,000 acres as 'wild' 
areas. Both of these categories prohibited motorized traffic, commercial timber 
harvest, or permanent construction. Boundaries for these areas, once set, could 
only be altered by the Secretary of Agriculture. U3 provided for the 
89Robert Marshall and Althea Dobbins, "Largest Roadless Areas in the 
United States," Living Wilderness, (November, 1936), 11-13. 
90Roth, 116. 
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management of certain lands, including roadless areas, as recreation areas, 
determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. Management plans for all three 
regulations permitted grazing, and water storage construction.91 
The Forest Service announced the U Regulations in September 1939. The 
regulations provided for the Forest Service to examine the L-20 primitive areas 
for inclusion under the U Regulations, and also allowed a ninety-day public 
commentary period preceding any reclassification. Inter-agency rivalry with a 
Park Service that continually proposed land transfers to its jurisdiction during 
the 1930's continued to stimulate Forest Service preservation measures. 
Marshall, himself, felt the pressure from the Park Service, and this undoubtedly 
influenced him as he drafted the U Regulations.92 Ironically, only two months 
after he witnessed the advent of the strongest protection thus far for wild 
country, Robert Marshall, on his way from Washington, D.C. to a family 
reunion in New York, died on November 10, 1939, of 'coronary thrombosis'93 
In the aftermath of the U Regulations' promulgation, a brief period of 
reclassification took place. The Pacific Northwest Region reclassified one 
primitive area to wilderness, and three areas to wild areas. The Southwest 
91Gilligan, Appendix C, 6-7; Roth, 116. 
92Gilligan, 199. 
93United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Service Bulletin, 
Volume XXIII, Number 24, November 27, 1939, Robert Marshall File, 
Archives, Headquarters, Northern Region, Missoula, MT. 
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Region reclassified three primitive areas to wild, and two to wilderness. In the 
Northern Region the most significant reclassification prior to World War Two 
occurred. With the signatures of Major Kelley, acting Chief Forester Earle 
Clapp, and Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace in August 1940, the Forest 
Service established the Bob Marshall Wilderness in the Flathead and Lewis and 
Clark National Forests. At nearly one-million acres, the composite of the old 
South Fork of the Flathead, Sun River, and Pentagon primitive areas, constituted 
the only major reclassification before the war.94 
As the second world war approached, the Forest Service waited poised to 
provide the natural resources essential to national defense. Lolo National Forest, 
as with most Northern Region forests, retained significant tracts of wild country, 
notwithstanding Major Kelley's fire suppression roads and trails. To the east of 
Lolo Forest, the new expanses of the Bob Marshall Wilderness offered the 
strongest guarantee yet of the continued existence of this wild country. To the 
south, and including acres in the Lolo Forest, was the immense Selway-
Bitterroot Primitive Area that awaited reclassification under Ul. 
By World War II, then, the Forest Service had created the beginnings of a 
national wilderness preservation system. However, the aura of Gifford Pinchot 
94United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, U Classification -
R 1, Bob Marshall Wilderness Area, August 16, 1940, Bob Marshall File, 
Archives, Headquarters, Northern Region, Missoula, MT; Gilligan, 204. 
and the doctrine of utilitarianism still reigned supreme in the minds of forest 
managers. With the arrival of war, the Forest Service would find it natural to 
shift from incipient wilderness protection to full capacity extractive activity. 
CHAPTER TWO: Timber, Development, and Wilderness Preservation 
World War II brought fundamental change to the management of the national 
forests. Wood products were essential to the military, as the services required 
wood for, among other uses, pontoon bridges, truck beds, ship decks, gun 
stocks, and buildings. The Forest Service responded to the massive increased 
demand for wood products by increasing the harvest of national forest timber. 
Public timber, for the first time, ranked with privately supplied timber as a 
significant source of the United States' forest products consumption.95 
Complicating matters, a renewed drive for recreation and wilderness 
preservation occurred along with the increased demands for forest products. The 
Forest Service's inability to satisfy preservationist desires led to Congress's 
enactment of the Wilderness Act in 1964. 
Although, by the mid-1920s, timber receipts exceeded those from grazing as 
the Forest Service's principal source of income, the annual harvest did not 
approach the potential timber yield. Wilderness conditions and large tracts of 
roadless, substantially pristine, land existed in many regions, especially in the 
northern Rocky Mountains. Before the exigencies of global warfare, the 
95Harold K. Steen, The U.S. Forest Service: A History, (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1976), 246; David A. Clary, Timber and the Forest 
Service. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986), 110. 
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resources contained in these wilderness enclaves were in slight demand. 
Privately owned resources more than adequately quenched America's thirst for 
raw materials.96 
Wartime requirements for national forest timber disrupted the reclassification 
efforts for the primitive areas. Attention shifted to economic concerns and the 
supply of vital resources needed for the war effort.97 During wartime, 
Americans focused on the task of fighting a major two-front war and supplying 
the bulk of the Allied Powers' resource requirements. In such an atmosphere, 
people afforded wilderness policy little attention. The war removed two of the 
necessary factors that contributed to wilderness preservation appreciation: 
economic abundance and prodigious leisure time. Wilderness advocates' pleas 
for resource preservation, during a time of increasing demands, would appear 
unpatriotic and perhaps subversive. World War II cast a perception of 
unacceptability over any effort viewed to impair the nation's capability for 
•  QO 
victory. 
96Dennis Roth, "The National Forests and the Campaign for Wilderness 
Legislation," Journal of Forest History, (July, 1984), 117. 
97James P. Gilligan, "The Development of Policy and Administration of 
Forest Service Primitive and Wilderness Areas in the Western United States," 
Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1954, 204. 
98Craig W. Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation. (Westport, CT.: 
Greenwood Press, 1982), 87. 
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Administrative protection of wild areas commanded a low priority compared to 
the war effort. A 1940 letter to forest supervisors requested that all primitive 
area developments, prohibited by the U Regulations, be cleared by the Secretary 
of Agriculture. Nevertheless, under pressure to supply resources, forest 
supervisors allowed developments without approval." This demonstration of 
the flexibility of administrative wild land protection, coupled with future 
transgressions, eventually would reignite wilderness advocates into a drive for 
statutory protection. 
The Lolo National Forest reflected national trends during the war. Timber 
harvest occupied a much higher priority and soon represented the greatest threat 
to the continued existence of substantial tracts of wild lands. The increased 
pace of logging challenged the Forest Service's concept of sustained yield 
forestry. As Major Kelley noted in 1944, "Wartime demands have made it 
necessary to cut on some forests faster than the timber is growing." Still, 
Kelley looked forward to a return to a sustainable harvest when possible after 
the end of hostilities.100 
In 1944, the forests of the Northern Region harvested three- and-a-half times 
as much timber as the ten-year pre-war average, or 320,058,000 million board 
"Gilligan, 205, Appendix D. 
100United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region 
Press Release, R-l #939, October 14, 1944, Government Documents Division, 
Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
feet (MMBF). Military requirements consumed 300,000,000 MMBF of the 
1944 harvest. Axel Lindh, Chief of Timber Management for the Northern 
Region, explained that the increased harvest resulted from a shift from private to 
public timber. The private industrial lands were either "running out," or were 
held in reserve for future harvest.101 
For decades private foresters had practiced 'cut-and-run' forestry. They cut 
off all the valuable commercial species- white pine and ponderosa- without 
reseeding their lands to ensure future growth. At sites in the Pacific Northwest 
they employed clear cutting tactics (the removal of all timber from a given piece 
of land), and once they expended their timber, they sold their property. The 
consequences of these actions placed the demand of supplying the wartime 
lumber needs increasingly on the public's forests.102 
Major Kelley hoped that the end of the war, and its demands for forest 
products, would allow for a reduction of the harvests on the national forests. 
To the contrary however, the housing boom generated by returning GIs after 
the end of the war brought ever increasing harvests. Besides the pressures of 
increased logging, there were other demands on the National Forests and their 
101"Nation Cashing In on National Forest Timber," United States Department 
of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release, R-l #947, March 
19, 1945, Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of 
Montana, Missoula, MT. 
102Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the 
Future of the West, (Covello, CA: Island Press, 1992), 136. 
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wildernesses. The most significant of these was the post-war boom in outdoor 
recreation. Significantly, with the end of war, and in the climate of increased 
development in the national forests, wilderness advocacy returned to life. 
Wilderness proponents, such as Howard Zahniser of the Wilderness Society, 
viewed with alarm the ever increasing timber harvests, and the associated road 
networks necessary to support timber sales. Timber sales began a steady 
increase after a drop in board feet harvested in the last quarter of 1945 (8 
MMBF less than the last quarter of 1944), and a lower harvest in 1946.103 
Contributory to an increased harvest in the national forests was a growing 
appreciation for species of timber that were previously dismissed in favor of the 
standard sawlog species, ponderosa and white pine. Two of the more popular 
new sawlog species were lodgepole pine and western larch. P.D. Hanson, who 
replaced Evan Kelley as Region One Forester in May 1944, announced on 
February 27, 1946 the sale of 4,200 acres of lodgepole pine, located in the 
Lewis and Clark National Forest near White Sulphur Springs, Montana, to a 
103"Less Timber Cut in Forests," United States Department of Agriculture, 
Forest Service, Northern Region, Press Release #R-1 960, January 18, 1946, 
Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, 
Missoula, MT. Foresters measure sawtimber volume (timber stands in which 
trees of sawlog size make up most the volume) in board feet of lumber. A 
board foot is 12 in. by 12 in. by in. thick or 144 cu. in. of any dimension, 
Charles H. Stoddard, Essentials of Forestry Practice, second ed., (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1968), 121-122. 
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Milwaukee, Wisconsin firm. Hanson noted that the sale marked "a turning point 
in the forest economy in Montana." Hanson recognized that the commercial 
attractiveness of lodgepole pine, for uses such as power poles, fence posts, 
pulpwood, and even as sawlogs, would hasten the development of many 
Montana forests, especially in the eastern part of the state where three million 
acres of untouched lodgepole stood.104 
More significant to more humid forests such as Lolo National Forest, was the 
popularity of western larch as a commercial species. As with lodgepole pine, 
the wood products industry had dismissed larch as a species conducive to 
primary uses such as construction. During World War II and after, the harvest 
of larch for sawtimber steadily increased. In 1945, larch comprised 21.9% of 
the total Northern Region cut, compared to the more popular ponderosa species 
that totaled 28.7% of the cut. The rise of larch was best illustrated against the 
decline of the staple species, white pine. In 1940, white pine accounted for 
60.7% of all sawlogs harvested in Region One. By 1945, the white pine share 
104"Lodgepole Pine Timber Sold," United States Department of Agriculture, 
Forest Service, Northern Region, Press Release #R-1, 962, February 27, 1946, 
Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, 
Missoula, MT. 
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was a meager 13.2%. White pine became too scarce and expensive to harvest 
when Montana had such abundant stands of larch.105 
In the first quarter of 1946, timber sales more than doubled over the same 
period of 1945. Timber managers interpreted this increase as an indication that 
national forest timber would play a critical role in the already apparent post-war 
housing boom. Despite the first quarter increase, the 1946 federal harvest in 
Montana forests declined from 1945 (this decline was compensated by a 100-
plus MMBF increase in the private harvest). However, beginning in 1947 the 
harvests from the Montana forests (except for the year 1950) steadily increased, 
most spectacularly in the early to mid-1950s.106 Opening up backcountry was 
105"Larch Recognized as Excellent Timber," United States Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release #R-1, 963, February 
25, 1946, Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of 
Montana, Missoula, MT; also contributory to the decline of the white pine as a 
commercially significant species was its susceptibility to diseases such as white 
pine blister rust, United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, " 
Silvicultural Systems for the Major Forest Types of the United States," 
Agricultural Handbook No. 445, March 1973, 39. 
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now of paramount importance, and in April 1946, Northern Region actively 
recruited road building crews. P.D. Hanson announced, "We anticipate funds 
for a greatly expanded road building program on the national forests."107 
Congress, in 1946, appropriated seven million dollars for timber access road 
construction.108 Demonstrating the reason for this construction, the National 
Housing Agency supplemented these funds. Chief Lyle Watts reported that road 
construction was the top priority "in view of the critical lumber shortage." 
Watts disclosed that the Forest Service plans called for 138,167 miles of 
secondary or development roads. As of the close of 1946, 46,976 miles were of 
unsatisfactory standard, and 37,753 miles remained for construction.109 
Montana National Forest Harvest, 1945-1956. 
Source: The University of Montana, Bureau of Business and Economic 
Research, Missoula, MT, 59812. 
107"More Lumber for Timber Products," United States Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release, #R-1, 969, April 19, 
1946, "Forest Service Recruiting Road Location Crews," United States 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release #R-1, 
968, April 5, 1946, Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, 
University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
108Several sources supplied road construction funding: congressional 
appropriations; 10% funds- ten percent of all Forest Service receipts were 
committed to road construction and maintenance; special appropriations acts; 
and executive agencies. Private firms that purchased government timber often 
paid for road construction as a part of the timber appraisal. 
109"Report of Chief of Forest Service," Annual Reports of Department of 
Agriculture, 1946, 20. 
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Forest roads served as transportation conduits as well as providing access for 
timber harvest. With the end of the war, general traffic exceeded the pre-war 
total and this situation furthered the continuous Forest Service calls for increased 
road funding.110 In 1947, the Engineering Division of the Forest Service 
occupied itself with construction and maintenance of timber access roads instead 
of the Forest Highway System construction, which was urgently needed due to 
the system's deterioration during the war.111 
Pressures to supply sawtimber mounted as the 1940s progressed. Yet, funds 
for access roads into the pristine stands of Douglas-fir and western larch, which 
by 1948 accounted for 48% of Northern Region's harvest of sawtimber, were 
meager. While the timber managers called for over 30,000 miles of new roads 
in 1948 engineers constructed only 1,100 miles of new roads. Frustratingly for 
the Forest Service, the majority of the road appropriations went to maintenance 
of existing roads.112 
When maintenance requirements consumed the bulk of the roads appropriation 
in 1949, Chief Lyle Watts vented his pique in his annual report. He called the 
new construction funding, "wholly inadequate to meet the urgent needs for log-
110Annual Reports of Department of Agriculture, 1947, Report of the Chief 
of Forest Service, 34. 
mIbid. 
112Reports of Department of Agriculture, 1948, Report of the Chief of Forest 
Service, 33. 
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hauling roads and other forest traffic facilities." Watts estimated the cost to 
open up the "remaining large stands of national forest timber" at $100,000,000 
over five years. The lack of roads, according to Watts was "hampering forest 
management, and millions of board feet of timber are being lost each year 
through insects, disease, and rot, that might otherwise be salvaged."113 
The early 1950s witnessed a greatly expanded national forest timber harvest in 
the Northern Region. Despite road funding inadequacies, Montana forests 
supplied impressive sums of timber. Characteristic of the times, in May 1951, 
P.D. Hanson announced that Region One was putting 188,500,000 MMBF up 
for sale. 
Especially enticing to potential bidders was 100,000,000 MMBF of western 
white pine, "the king of the softwood species" included in the sale. Hanson 
described the timber as "overmature" and "decadent," and it was located in 
undeveloped portions of Lolo and Clearwater National Forests. The Forest 
Service promised to construct a main access road to the general area of the 
timber. The buyer was responsible for constructing 40 miles of main haul 
access road and "several" hundred miles of secondary and spur roads.114 
113Annual Reports of Department of Agriculture, 1949, Report of the Chief 
of the Forest Service, 54-55. 
114"Large Volume Back-Country National Forest Timber Offered for Sale," 
United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press 
Release, #R-1, 1079, May 24, 1951, Government Documents Division, 
Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
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This sale is typical of the Forest Service's shifting emphasis on timber 
management. The policy now specified the development of all suitable timber 
areas as rapidly as possible. Development projects had to be large to amortize 
the investment in road construction; since Congress inadequately funded road 
construction, needed roads for timber production would be financed through the 
timber sale.115 To get around the shortage of road building funds, the 
proceeds from the Lolo-Clearwater timber would underwrite the main access 
road. This road could be used in the future to facilitate additional timber sales 
of overmature stands of prime commercial timber such as white pine. Most 
importantly, the new road would allow for the permanent, sustained yield timber 
management of former unproductive wilderness.116 
The Northern Region took pains to point out the importance of Forest Service 
road projects. As late as the early 1950s the major north-south and east-west 
transportation corridors were Forest Service highway system roads. These roads 
were vital to commerce in an age that relied increasingly on motor 
transportation of goods to support a rapidly expanding national economy. In 
1952, a Northern Region press release lectured; 
The products of mines, forests and ranches are the raw materials of 
Montana's industry. Our highways are a part of our industrial 
"interview with John Milodragovich, retired Forest Service official, March 
22, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes. 
116Ibid. 
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plant. They carry the goods and the people. They are big cogs in 
the machine that makes the payrolls. The fishermen, the tourists, 
the logging truck drivers, the businessmen on their way over 
Highway 10 [present-day Interstate 90] want to know 'how's the 
road?' 'If its good, OK. If it's bad, it's bad for business.' How's 
the road?- depends on the money to build it and to rebuild it to 
modern standards.117 
By 1955 Northern Region forests reached a post-war timber production plateau 
and harvests leveled out until the mid-1960s when another production boom 
occurred. The 1955 Annual Report for Lolo National Forest is representative of 
the management situation during the mid-1950s. In this report, Supervisor 
Edward F. Barry applauded a record timber harvest for 1955, at 108 million 
board feet. However, Barry raised familiar complaints about the lack of access 
roads hampering a full utilization of Lolo Forest's resources, he wrote, "Good 
roads are essential for reaping the full harvest of wood that the forest can 
produce."118 
Barry noted that Missoula's sawmilling capacity far exceeded Lolo Forest's 
allowable cut. Missoula's sawmilling industry grew "tremendously" in the post­
war era. This growth was fed by ever-increasing harvests of public timber, and 
U7"Forests and Conservation," United States Department of Agriculture, 
Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release, #R-1, 1095, April 23, 1952, 
Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, 
Missoula, MT. 
118United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "Lolo National 
Forest, Report for 1955," Archives, Lolo National Forest File, Headquarters, 
Northern Region, Missoula, MT, 4. 
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by a continuous, but perceived dwindling, supply of private timber that averaged 
223,110,000 MMBF per year for the state of Montana in the post-war years, 
1945-1956.119 Barry warned that as the private lands were "cut over" the 
local lumber industry would become more dependent on public timber. Industry 
stability, founded on the full productive use of "all forest land," was Lolo 
National Forest's objective, according to Supervisor Barry.120 
Gifford Pinchot's vision for the Forest Service consisted of a decentralized 
agency that was responsive to local concerns. In the pre-World War II days, the 
agency lived up to this vision. With the post-war housing boom and the 
consequent demands for public timber, the Washington office, through its 
Division of Timber Management, increasingly attempted to influence field 
operations.121 The shift of emphasis to timber management in effect 
centralized decision making in the Forest Service. 
Yearly increases in harvest, despite road shortages, characterized the Forest 
Service's new timber orientation. By 1947, the Forest Service was beginning to 
see its prime objective as growing, selling, and harvesting timber crops. Timber 
management occupied increasing amounts of agency time and effort. By 1952, 
119The University of Montana, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, 
Missoula, MT. 
120"Lolo National Forest, Report for 1955," 4. 
121Clary, 119. 
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timber had such a firm grip on the agency that young foresters knew that timber 
management was the vehicle for professional advancement.122 
Complicating the management plans of the Forest Service in the post-war 
years was the explosion of outdoor recreation.123 After years of economic 
depression and war, by the late 1940s Americans took to the woods in 
unprecedented numbers. The National Park Service bore the brunt of this 
recreation 'invasion', but the national forests, too, experienced a marked 
upswing in visitors. Increasingly these visitors arrived via the automobile, and 
they required facilities.124 
Recreation pressures mounted in Northern Region's forests as well. The 
greatest recreational use occurred in the areas of easy access, roaded areas, but 
the remote wilderness areas experienced increased visitation as well. In 1947 
the region witnessed a 30% increase in sport fishing over 1946. Big game 
hunting also increased in popularity and the 1947 hunting seasons reported 
122Ibid, 123, 125. 
123For a discussion of the post-war environmental and recreation situation 
see: Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics 
in the United States. 1955-1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
124Allin, 89; in some wilderness areas, such as the Superior Roadless Area in 
Minnesota that in the 1940s was the only congressionally protected wilderness 
in the nation, a tourist invasion from the skies threatened. Many area flying 
services conducted a brisk trade in flying-in fishermen and tourists to secluded 
lakes and resorts within the roadless area. A special order from President Harry 
Truman finally restricted the airspace over the area, but the order came over the 
objection of the secretary of commerce, Ibid. 
122,000 hunters "bagging" 10,200 elk, 1,300 black bears, 11,000 mule deer, 
5,000 whitetail deer, and 46 grizzlies.125 
As in the Superior Roadless Area, the Northern Region experienced trouble 
with pilots landing their planes in the Bob Marshall Wilderness. Pilots landed 
on Forest Service airstrips located in the wilderness for fire suppression 
purposes, and they also landed hydroplanes on pristine lakes such as Big 
Salmon. Regulation U1 prohibited unauthorized planes from landing in the 
wilderness, and on July 22, 1949, Assistant Regional Forester for Recreation and 
Lands, R.U. Harmon, announced that violators of the regulation would be 
prosecuted.126 
Interestingly, the Forest Service periodically would actively promote the 
virtues of their wilderness areas as hunting grounds. A 1950 press release 
solicited more hunting pressure on the elk herds of the Selway-Bitterroot 
Primitive Area. Touting over "a million acres of good hunting territory," the 
125"Hunting and Fishing Increases in Region One in 1947," United States 
Department of Agriculture, Northern Region Press Release, #R-1,1017, 
Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, 
Missoula, MT. 
126"Airplanes prohibited in Wilderness Areas," United States Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release, #R-1, 1043, 
Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, 
Missoula, MT. 
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Forest Service advertised a success rate of 90% to those hunters intrepid enough 
to pack-in after snowstorms had driven the herds to the lower river valleys.127 
Wilderness areas became increasingly popular with elk hunters. In the 
expansive wildernesses of the Northern Region, such as the Bob Marshall and 
the Selway-Bitterroot, large herds of elk grew as a result of abundant forage 
created by the fires of 1910, 1919, 1929, and 1934. Former Northern Region 
wilderness specialist Ed Slusher remembers elk were so plentiful that "even 
inexperienced hunters were often successful."128 
By the mid-1950s, with timber production at record levels, recreational use 
also dramatically increased. Improving access, as engineers made progress in 
the struggle to carve roads into the backcountry, facilitated visitors' journeys to 
national forest attractions. These attractions included picnic areas, campgrounds, 
ski areas, hotels, resorts, scenic roads, and the various categories of wilderness. 
In 1955, 45,712,868 people visited the national forests nationwide. By 1956, 
127"Selway Wilderness Area Needs More Elk Hunters," United States 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release, #R-
1, 1062, October 9, 1950, Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, 
University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
128Ed Slusher, "Mostly About Elk Hunting," unpublished essay, 1992, 
Chapter 7 on wilderness. Copy in possession of author, used by permission of 
Ed Slusher. 
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this figure rose to 52,556,084, with a total of 131 million travelling the forest 
highway system.129 
While they facilitated access, timber, road, and recreation developments posed 
a threat to wild lands that the public could readily see, and increasingly 
lamented. However, the 1950s brought another, more sinister and often 
invisible, degradation to the wild quality of the nation's forests- the use of 
pesticides. Timber managers observed with alarm the devastating impact an 
insect infestation had on commercial timber. Making the problem most acute 
was the ceaseless demand for timber to feed the ever hungry mills that turned 
out wood products to support the creation of suburban America in the post-war 
era. Timber managers learned to appreciate the effects of a chemical called 
DDT in controlling insect caused tree destruction.130 
Ten years before Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring, informed the public on 
the hazards of DDT, G.M. Brandborg Supervisor of the Bitterroot National 
Forest, announced the spraying of 12,000 acres of Douglas-fir and spruce along 
the East Fork of the Bitterroot River. The spray consisted of one pound of 
DDT per one gallon of fuel oil, and airplanes delivered this concoction at the 
129United States Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1955, Reports of 
the Chief of Forest Service, 5; United States Department of Agriculture Annual 
Reports, 1956, Report of the Chief of the Forest Service, 26. 
130A standard work on the history of the use and policy of DDT is Thomas 
R. Dunlap, DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981). 
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rate of one gallon per acre. DDT had proven effective as a controlling agent for 
the spruce budworm, an insect that threatened large stands of commercial 
timber.131 This was the first use of aerially delivered DDT in Montana 
history.132 
In Lolo National Forest, 1954 witnessed an "epidemic" of spruce budworm in 
the Bonita and Powell Ranger Districts. The Annual Report for 1955 disclosed 
that 102,000 acres of the Powell Ranger District were scheduled for spraying 
with DDT in 1956.133 Former Powell District Ranger William R. 'Bud' 
Moore remembered the spraying as the most traumatic time of his Forest 
Service career. When Moore received notification that Regional Headquarters 
planned to spray his district, he was immediately concerned. Moore questioned 
the chemical's safety, but was reassured that DDT posed no threat to the pristine 
nature of the Powell District.134 
131The spruce budworm feeds on the new growth of trees. Successive years 
of spruce budworm induced defoliation causes the tree to die, or so weakens it 
that it becomes vulnerable to other insects. 
132Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1962; "Aerial 
Spraying Completed on Bitterroot," United States Department of Agriculture, 
Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release, #R-1, 1109, July 12, 1952, 
Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, 
Missoula, MT. Historians credit Carson for identifying the dangers of DDT to 
both humans and nature. Prior to Silent Spring people thought DDT was an 
"environmental wonder drug." Nash, 252, see also: Clary, 178. 
133"Aerial Spraying Completed on Bitterroot," 6. 
134Interview with William R. Moore, January 7, 1993, Condon, MT, notes. 
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Timber production concerns created great pressure to spray DDT, proven 
effective to kill the spruce budworm. The epidemic had to be limited to as few 
acres as possible, and the questioning of one district ranger about possible side-
effects on non-targeted organisms could not interfere with the health of a forest 
that contained resources in much demand. In 1956 airplanes from Missoula 
sprayed DDT on the Powell Ranger District. Moore noticed the results 
"immediately" after spraying. The formerly untrammeled Haskell Creek was 
"jam-packed with dead frogs" and trout were found "belly-up." Moore called 
the spruce budworm eradication effort a "disaster."135 
Nevertheless, the Forest Service placed unshakable faith in technology and 
chemicals. Science could indeed force nature to bend to the will of humans; 
spruce budworms would not be permitted to alter the planned harvest of timber. 
Bud Moore, outraged at what he found on Haskell Creek, called Lolo Forest 
Supervisor Ed Barry to report his findings. Barry replied, "You can't prove it 
was the spray that killed the fish." The Forest Service was so assured of DDT's 
safety that one ranger even ordered a ranger station building sprayed. A career 
Forest Service employee, Bud Moore began to question the effectiveness of his 
135Ibid. 
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superiors as good land managers in the wake of the DDT assault on the 
wilderness of the Idaho Lochsa River country.136 
Another insect that had extensive land management implications was the 
spruce bark beetle. In 1949, high winds caused a massive blowdown of timber 
in the northern Rockies, and out of this grounded timber grew a spruce bark 
beetle infestation. This infestation is significant because of the Forest Service's 
response to this natural calamity. They harvested the killed and infected spruce, 
with a timber management tactic known as clearcutting.137 
Except for Douglas-fir in the Pacific Northwest, clearcutting (the removal of 
all timber from a given piece of land) was uncommon in the nation's public 
forests before the post-war boom. In the late 1940s the forest administrators of 
the Pacific Northwest began planning clearcut harvests and by 1949, the idea 
spread to the Northern Rockies. Clearcutting had scientific and economic 
grounding. Foresters pointed out that some shade-intolerant species could have 
growth enhanced by clearcuts that opened space in which to grow. Lodgepole 
pine was a particular target for clearcutting as managers found lodgepole 
136Ibid. Moore is currently writing the history of the Lochsa River country, 
and devotes a chapter to the DDT episode. 
137G. Wesley Burnett, David G. Conklin, and Paul R. Saunders, "Montana 
Forests: A Synthesis," Western Wildlands. (Fall 1981), 34; Interview with 
William R. Moore. 
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vulnerable to wind after selective cutting, and suitable to even-aged 
1 management. 
Timber affected by the spruce bark beetle contributed to the increased harvests 
in Montana in the early to mid 1950s. Clearcuts of infected timber began along 
the North Fork of the Flathead River in the Flathead National Forest. 
Sometimes, rangers would "sweeten" beetle-killed timber sales with an adjacent 
swath of healthy "green" timber.139 Bud Moore conducted sales of beetle 
killed timber (clearcutting was the specified method of harvest) in the Powell 
District of Lolo Forest, at the top of Lolo Pass. These cuts contained no green 
sweeteners. "We were too busy getting out the killed timber" to worry about 
selling green timber, he remembered.140 
The cumulative effects of the insect eradication efforts caused a further 
degradation of the wild lands of Montana. Streams were poisoned and new 
roads led to clearcuts to rid the timber base of detrimental insects. Freed by this 
matrix, Northern Region foresters completed a transformation from custodians of 
the land to manipulators of the land. As the clearcuts grew, the image of the 
138Clary, 180-183. Clearcutting fits in well with an agricultural approach to 
forestry. Clearcutting, besides turning out masses of timber immediately, also 
establishes regenerated forests of even aged, same species timber. 
139Arnold Bolle, Oral History, May 1, 1990 by Gerald Williams, Number 
249, transcript, Archives, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula, 
MT. 
140Interview with William R. Moore. 
forest ranger in a white stetson hat changed to a picture of a person in a hard 
hat.141 
As the Forest Service directed its attention toward producing timber and 
managing expanding recreational use, the wilderness movement watched, 
eagerly, for the agency to begin reclassification of the remaining L-20 primitive 
areas under the U Regulations. As during the wartime period however, the 
post-war timber orientation tended to overshadow any sentiment for 
reclassification. At the time of James Gilligan's influential doctoral dissertation 
on wilderness at the University of Michigan in 1954, Montana's one-million 
acre Bob Marshall Wilderness represented the Forest Service's only 
reclassification of a large U1 area. Major tracts in Wyoming, Idaho, and even 
Aldo Leopold's Gila Wilderness in Arizona, awaited reclassification.142 
The Forest Service reclassified some smaller U2 Wild Areas, and in Northern 
Region, on June 10, 1947, created the Gates of the Mountains Wild Area, The 
area contained 28,562 acres along the Missouri River between Great Falls and 
Helena, Montana.143 However, more numerous than new wilderness 
141 Arnold Bolle, Oral History. 
142James P. Gilligan, " The Development of Policy and Administration of 
Forest Service Primitive and Wilderness Areas in the Western United States," 
Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1954, 211-212. 
143"Creation of New Wild Area Announced," United States Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release #R-1, 1001, June 10, 
1947, Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of 
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designations were acreage changes within existing wildernesses. In Leopold's 
Gila, the acreage had shrunk by a third. Timber supply was a major cause for 
boundary adjustments, as the Forest Service substituted 'rocks and ice' acres for 
lower elevation timbered slopes. Sometimes these land exchanges resulted in 
spectacular acreage losses in the primitive areas. In Wyoming's North and 
South Absaroka primitive areas, the Forest Service in 1951 reclassified the areas 
to wilderness and the process eliminated 113,000 acres, to allow for timber 
harvest and mining.144 
The best known Forest Service abuse in the slow reclassification process was 
the deletion of 55,620 acres from Oregon's Three Sisters Primitive Area in 
1954. Three Sisters comprised 246,728 acres in the Willamette and Deschutes 
National Forests. The controversy arose over the proposed elimination of the 
western section of the primitive area, including a timbered valley containing a 
creek from the reclassified U1 wilderness area. Local opposition came from the 
Save the Three Sisters Wilderness Association, and nationally the Wilderness 
Society protested to Chief Forester Richard McArdle, who had replaced Lyle 
Watts in 1952.145 
Montana, Missoula, MT. 
144Roth, 117; Gilligan, 209. 
145"Three Sisters Wilderness," The Living Wilderness. (Autumn 1954), 42. 
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In a portent of future patterns within the environmental movement, the 
mainstream 'conservation' groups supported a plan that allowed the Forest 
Service to delete 43,220 acres from Three Sisters, but protected the vital 
timbered creek valley. The local Save the Three Sisters Wilderness Association, 
however opposed all Forest Service reductions. United States Senators Richard 
L. Nueberger and Wayne Morse joined with the conservation groups in a call 
for the Forest Service to reconsider its reclassification plans.146 
Despite the opposition of most of the Oregon congressional delegation, and 
testimony on the deletion's adverse effects for the Three Sisters Wilderness 
from many respected wilderness leaders (including the Wilderness Society's 
Howard Zahniser and former Forest Service Chief Lyle Watts, representing the 
Isaak Walton League), the Forest Service on February 8, 1957 formally deleted 
53,380 acres, including the timbered creek valley.147 If the Forest Service 
'won' the Three Sisters controversy, then it was a Pyrrhic victory since the 
controversy demonstrated the vulnerability of administratively protected 
wilderness. Reclassification acreage deletions enhanced the distrust felt by 
preservationists for the Forest Service's commitment to wilderness in the face of 
skyrocketing demand for timber. Adding to the groundswell of heightened 
146Ibid; Roth, 117; "Three Sisters Wilderness," The Living Wilderness. (Fall, 
Winter, 1956-1957), 32. 
147Ibid, 36. 
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environmental awareness was the preservationists' victory in Utah/Colorado's 
Echo Park battle. In April 1950, Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman 
proposed the construction of two dams in Colorado and Utah's Dinosaur 
National Monument to impound the Green River. The dams, Split Mountain 
and Echo Park, threatened the primeval beauty of the Green River and an 
National Park Service National Monument, Dinosaur Monument.148 The 
proposal drew immediate opposition from not only the Wilderness Society and 
other conservation groups, but also from Major General Ulysses S. Grant III. 
General Grant, retired from 43 years of service in the Army Corps of Engineers, 
lent the opposition the credibility of a professional viewpoint.149 General 
Grant emphasized that the two dams were not necessary for successful and 
economic development of the Upper Colorado Basin. With the certainty of an 
engineer, Grant argued that better locations existed that would supply more 
water storage and hydraulic power without destroying rare natural beauty. Grant 
warned that if the dams were constructed, they would set a dangerous precedent 
for the development of other congressionally protected sites and injure the entire 
country and "future generations not here to defend their heritage."150 
148"Defending Dinosaur National Monument," The Living Wilderness. 
(Spring 1950), 21. 
149U.S. Grant, III, "The Dinosaur Dam Sites Are Not Needed," The Living 
Wilderness, (Autumn 1950), 17. 
150Ibid, 24. 
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The decision to dam Dinosaur National Monument was Congress's to make. 
Debate dragged on for years, with legislation introduced to construct a series of 
dams along the Colorado River, Echo Park now the main offending proposal. 
From January 18 to 28, 1954, General Grant testified, as President of the 
American Planning and Civic Association, against the inclusion of Echo Park in 
the system. Grant proposed an alternative series of dams that left Dinosaur 
Monument inviolate. Grant suggested the construction of dams at Flaming 
Gorge, Cross Mountain, Whitewater, and Glen Canyon, instead of at Echo Park, 
and Navajo, as recommended by the Department of the Interior.151 
The Battle to save Dinosaur National Monument united the major national 
conservation groups into an Echo Park 'Coalition'. The Executive Committee 
of the Council of Conservationists, a task force representing conservation 
interests in the Echo Park controversy, featured a line-up of the giants of the 
conservation movement, such as Howard Zahniser of the Wilderness Society and 
David Brower of the Sierra Club. United conservation opposition, expert 
witnesses such as General Grant, and an unparalleled public opinion campaign 
finally were enough to save Dinosaur Monument.152 
151"Dinosaur Hearings," The Living Wilderness, (Winter 1953-54), 31. 
152"Echo Park Controversy Resolved," The Living Wilderness, (Winter-
Spring, 1955-56), 23-43. 
A bill authorizing the construction of the Echo Park Dam arrived on the floor 
of the Senate in April 1955. Senator Richard L. Neuberger offered an 
amendment that eliminated Echo Park from the bill, but he faced a near 
unanimous vote; of opposition from the western delegations.1-3 The Senate 
passed the bill with Echo Park included. The House however, with Montana 
Representative Lee Metcalf playing a key role, passed a bill in July 1955 
without the Echo Park Dam. The final showdown on Echo Park occurred in the 
conference committee in 1956, with Howard Zahniser's Wilderness Society in 
the lead opposition role. A compromise was reached, similar to General Grant's 
proposal, that excluded the Echo Park dam. Importantly, the new law included 
a provision that prohibited the construction of a dam within any part of a 
national park or monument because of the new dam authorization. Dinosaur 
had been preserved, and the conservation movement "had its finest hour to 
date."154 
The success of the conservationists in the Dinosaur controversy, plus the Three 
Sister's reclassification battle, gave rise to proposals for permanently protected 
wilderness. Howard Zahniser advocated a wilderness protection system as early 
153Western states of the upper Colorado River basin felt the dam was critical 
to water storage and delivery. 
154Nash, 217-219. 
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as the late 1940s, and now, on the heels of victory at Dinosaur, statutory 
wilderness seemed an idea that was right for the times.155 
Lifted by the Echo Park victory, Howard Zahniser drafted a four page plan for 
a national wilderness preservation system. Zahniser circulated his draft among 
his friends and associates, including Bob Marshall's brother, George. Zahniser 
had three goals for his wilderness plan: first, he wanted a clear piece of 
legislation, free from ambiguity and loopholes; second, he wanted to maintain 
the successful Echo Park Coalition; and finally and perhaps most important, he 
wanted to minimize the opposition.156 
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota and Senator Richard Neuberger of 
Oregon introduced Zahniser's wilderness bill into the Senate and Representative 
John Saylor of Pennsylvania introduced it in the House during the Eighty-fourth 
Congress in 1956. The bill's legislative history, requiring more time and effort 
than any other piece of conservation legislation in U.S. history, was a process of 
obtaining support for wilderness preservation and responding to the opposing 
forces with a series of compromises.157 
Grazers, miners, and water users comprised the opposition to the wilderness 
bill. Grazing had a long, profitable history in the national forests. Zahniser had 
155Roth, 120. 
156Nash, 221; Roth, 120-121. 
157Nash, 221-222; Roth, 122. 
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opposed grazing in wilderness areas, calling it a "non-conforming use," and in 
his first draft of the wilderness bill he included this language. By 1957, 
however, the wilderness bill was amended to allow for grazing under the 
guidance of the Secretary of Agriculture. Some stockmen continued to oppose 
the bill because of its restrictions on motor vehicle use and motor 
1 equipment. 
Mining interests opposed the wilderness bill because they feared restrictions on 
their long-enjoyed tradition of free entry on the public lands. In his first draft, 
Zahniser prohibited mining from the wilderness areas. The Forest Service 
prodded the bill's sponsors to compromise on allowing mining, like they 
compromised to allow for water projects to placate water use opposition in the 
wilderness areas. Provisions for the continuation of mining in wilderness areas 
contributed to the inordinate delay in passing the legislation.159 
Another contributory factor in delaying passage of the wilderness bill was the 
insistence of Colorado's Wayne Aspinall, Chairman of the House Committee on 
Insular Affairs and one of the key supporters of the Echo Park dam, on 
providing for congressional affirmative action in the designation of wilderness 
areas. Aspinall engineered a compromise, designed to silence the mining 
158Ibid, 122-123; for a complete discussion of grazing in the national forests 
see: William D. Rowley, U.S. Forest Service Grazing and Rangelands (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1985). 
159Ibid, 123-124. 
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opposition, by which mining claims could be staked in wilderness areas until 
January 1, 1984. Aspinall also, in 1963, reached a compromise with President 
John F. Kennedy on the issue of congressional affirmative action. Congress 
could designate wilderness areas in exchange for a provision directing the 
review of the Forest Service's L-20 primitive areas for possible inclusion into 
the wilderness system.160 
Howard Zahniser poured all his energy into the fight to pass the wilderness 
bill. He attended every hearing, including the field hearings conducted in 
western states. Zahniser made a final appearance on behalf of the wilderness 
bill on April 28, 1964, and a week later he was dead at the age of fifty-eight, 
several months away from seeing his labors result in President Lyndon 
Johnson's signing the Wilderness Act into law on September 3, 1964.161 
The Forest Service's original stand was to oppose the idea of statutory 
wilderness. When Howard Zahniser approached the Forest Service in 1956 with 
his proposal for a wilderness system, the agency tried to talk him out of going 
forward with his idea. Chief Forester Richard McArdle remembered the Forest 
Service attitude as one of questioning the need for statutory protection. 
McArdle plainly did not care for many of the proposals in the first drafts of the 
legislation, such as the creation of a wilderness preservation council, invested 
160Ibid, 124. 
161Nash, 225; Roth, 118. 
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with no significant powers. As the bill went through its many transformations 
and compromises, the Forest Service gradually, if somewhat reluctantly, came to 
support the bill once Congress provided it with statutory recognition of multiple 
useW.%v;,> ^ 
Described as one of conservation's strongest and most idealistic laws, the 
Wilderness Act designated 9.1 million acres of 'instant' wilderness.163 Instant 
wildernesses were those areas managed as Forest Service U1 Regulation 
wildernesses. In the vicinity of Missoula, the Bob Marshall Wilderness and the 
recently (in 1963) reclassified Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness instantly passed to 
statutory control.164 
The purpose of the Wilderness Act was to ensure that "an increasing 
population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing mechanization, 
162Richard E. McArdle with Elwood R. Maunder, "Wilderness Politics: 
Legislation and Forest Service Policy," Journal of Forest History. (October 
1975), 171-173. 
163Wilkinson, 139. 
164The Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness was the nation's largest wilderness area 
at the time of the passage of the Wilderness Act. For an excellent description 
of the Selway-Bitterroot at the time of its reclassification, see: "The Selway-
Bitterroot Wilderness: A Wilderness Society Statement," The Living Wilderness. 
(Autumn-Winter 1960-61), 45-61. 
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does not occupy and modify all areas within the United States."165 
Importantly, the statute provided a definition of what constituted wilderness: 
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own 
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area 
where the earth and community of life are untrammeled by man, 
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain. An area of 
wilderness is further defined to mean in this Act an area of 
undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and 
influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation, 
which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural 
conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected 
primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work 
substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for 
solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has 
at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to 
make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired 
condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other 
features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.166 
Once committed to the passage of the Wilderness Act, the Forest Service 
interpreted the act as an endorsement of the wilderness management principles 
developed within the Forest Service. The Wilderness Act directed the Forest 
Service to study the remaining 5.4 million acres of L-20 primitive areas for their 
suitability or non-suitability for inclusion in the National Wilderness 
Preservation System.167 Significantly, the Wilderness Act failed, with any 
165The Wilderness Act of 1964, Public Law 88-577, 78 Stat. 890, Section 1 
(a). 
166Wilderness Act, Section 1 (c). 
167Charles F. Wilkinson and H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource 
Planning in the National Forests. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1987), 345. 
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certainty, to specify the disposition of the remaining roadless areas located in 
the national forests, millions of acres of which were, in effect, 'de-facto' 
wildernesses. 
Instead of 'solving' the problem of wilderness preservation, the Wilderness 
Act gave rise to an epic clash of land use interests in the succeeding decades. 
The 1960s would witness the final transformation of the public perception of the 
Forest Service as wise managers with a monopoly on forest management 
wisdom to an agency driven by a need to retain a feudal control over its domain 
of national forests. The wilderness movement, buoyed by statutory authority, 
would gain momentum and aggressively press the Forest Service to include 
wilderness preservation as a true multiple use of the forests. 
CHAPTER THREE: Multiple Use and Wildlands Controversy 
As preservationists pushed statutory wilderness protection during the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the Forest Service sought a statutory clarification of their 
multiple use mission. Ironically, after Congress provided both statutory 
wilderness and multiple use guidance, a growing conflict between the two 
management concepts evolved as the 1960s progressed. By the end of the 
decade, the Forest Service faced severe challenges to their professed multiple 
use management practices, from not just environmentalists, but also from fellow 
foresters, both inside and outside of the Forest Service.168 
The pace of post-war forest development quickened during 
the 1950s and the Forest Service sought to balance competing forest uses. 
Recreation, feeding on the prosperity of the fifties, emerged as a major function 
of the national forests. Initially perceived by the Forest Service as one type of 
recreation, wilderness posed a threat to the Forest Service's multiple-use 
doctrine. Mid-way in the lengthy legislative battle over statutory wilderness, 
Congress gave the Forest Service official legal recognition of its long-time 
168For an overview of environmental politics in the post-World War II era in 
the United States, see: Samuel P. Hays, "From Conservation to Environment: 
Environmental Politics in the United States Since World War Two," 
Environmental Review, (Fall, 1982); and Samuel P. Hays, Beauty. Health, and 
Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States. 1955-1985 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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multiple-use management direction. The enactment of the Multiple Use 
Sustained Yield Act in 1960, enabled the Forest Service to drop its opposition to 
the Wilderness Act.169 
Besides the enlarged demands of recreationists, other factors contributed to the 
Forest Service's desire for statutory clarification of its mission. Timber industry 
representatives maintained a constant pressure for ever increased harvests from 
the national forests. During the 1950s, when multiple use legislation first 
commanded official interest, the relationship between the Forest Service and the 
timber industry began to change. No longer did the Forest Service chastise 
industry for poor timber management practices, and the timber industry began to 
adopt a position on multiple use consistent with the Forest Service. This 
position emphasized material production.170 
Again, the National Park Service influenced Forest Service policy by actively 
campaigning for more land transfers. Park Service "marauders" promoted public 
discontent with the management policies of the Forest Service.171 Caught in 
the middle between the timber industry's demand for more timber and the 
169Glen O. Robinson, The Forest Service: A Study in Public Land 
Management, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 16. 
170David A. Clary, Timber and the Forest Service. (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1986), 153. 
171Samuel Trask Dana and Sally K. Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy: Its 
Development in the United States, second edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Publishing Co., 1980), 201. 
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recreationists' expanding presence, and exacerbated by the shenanigans of the 
Park Service, the Forest Service conceived of a way to moderate the competing 
• 17? interests. 
The Forest Service wrote the Multiple use bill and lobbied for its passage, 
with Assistant Chief Edward P. Cliff acting as the chief spokesman.173 
President Dwight Eisenhower signed the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act into 
law on June 12, I960.174 The act specified the multiple uses of the national 
forests as: outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and 
fish.175 Included in the act was a definition of multiple use: 
'Multiple use' means the management of all the various renewable 
resources of the national forests so that they are utilized in the 
combination that will best meet the needs of the American people; 
making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these 
resources or related services over areas large enough to provide 
sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to 
changing needs and conditions; that some land will be used for 
less than all of the resources; and harmonious and coordinated 
management of the various resources, each with the other, without 
impairment of the productivity of the land, with consideration 
being given to the relative values of the various resources, and not 
necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest 
dollar return or the greatest unit output.176 
172Clary, 154. 
173Dana and Fairfax, 201; Clary, 148. 
174Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 215. 
17574 Stat. 215, Section 1. 
17674 Stat. 215, Section 4 (a). 
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Wilderness, while not specifically named a use in the act, received statutory 
recognition by the insertion of the line: "The establishment and maintenance of 
areas of wilderness are consistent with purposes and provisions of this Act."177 
This insertion placated most of the wilderness community, or Echo Park 
Coalition, and made possible their support of the act. The notable dissenters 
within the Echo Park Coalition were David Brower and the Sierra Club, who 
thought passage of the Multiple Use bill threatened the progress of the stalled 
wilderness legislation that was then in Congress.178 
The Sierra Club pointed to the Act's deficiency in providing statutory 
standards for multiple use. The bill offered only two guidelines for setting 
priorities: first, managers need not produce every good or service on every acre; 
and second, economic maximization was not the sole criterion for the evaluation 
of competing interests. The Club worried that the Forest Service managers had 
almost absolute and unreviewable authority to make forest management policy 
under the act. The Forest Service, predisposed to timber production according 
17774 Stat. 215, Section 2. 
178Clary, 155. Among the Echo Park Coalition that supported the Multiple 
Use Sustained Yield Act were: The Wilderness Society, National Audubon 
Society, North American Wildlife Foundation, and the Isaak Walton League of 
America. Howard Zahniser of the Wilderness Society wrote a separate letter of 
support only after the inclusion of the provision that declared wilderness use to 
be consistent with the Act, "Multiple Use Act is Passed," The Living 
Wilderness. (Summer 1960), 27-28. 
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to the Sierra Club, was unqualified to balance the competing interests in the 
national forests.179 
Significantly, the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act passed Congress as an 
amendment to the old 1897 Organic Act. The Organic Act listed only two uses 
of the nation's forested reserves, timber and watershed. The 1960 Act 
mentioned nothing about priority of uses, and despite protestations to the 
contrary, the Forest Service would see little in the new legislation that 
prohibited their Pinchot-inspired bias toward timber production, often at the 
expense of the other uses. Chief Richard McArdle looked to the legislation as a 
grand mandate for the management of the nation's forests for years to come. 
Instead, the 1960s would bring challenges of a ferocity not seen before in the 
Forest Service.180 
The necessity to balance competing interests for the use of the national forests 
was apparent in the forests of western Montana. Regional Forester Boyd L. 
Rasmussen reported in May 1961, that recreation visits to the sixteen forests of 
Region one jumped from 3,320,000 in 1959 to 5,580,000 in 1960. "All signs 
indicate that we are on the threshold of a terrific upsurge in outdoor recreation," 
Rasmussen predicted. The increase in recreation visits stemmed from rising 
179Dana and Fairfax, 204. 
180Harold K. Steen, The U.S. Forest Service: A History. (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1976), 298-299, 307. 
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national population, faster modes of travel, more leisure time, and a growing 
interest in outdoor recreation.181 
By 1963, recreation visits topped the eight million mark in the Northern 
Region. The bulk of the visitors came in the summer months, drawn to the 
forests to pursue hiking, camping, fishing, swimming, horse riding, boating, 
mountain climbing, and picnicking. In the fall, hunters turned to the forests to 
stalk game, and in the winter 300,000 winter sports enthusiasts used the region's 
sixteen winter sports sites. To handle the droves of recreationists, the region 
constructed 800 new family campsites in the forests. Total regional campsites 
now numbered more than 4,000, in addition to 52 boat-launching sites, 18 
improved beaches, 23 organizational camps, and 52 resorts located in Northern 
Region at the end of 1963. Wilderness visitation made an increased 
contribution to the growing tourist industry. By 1964, 3.1 million acres in 
Region One were administered as wilderness.182 
181"Visits to Forests Jump Two and a Half Million," United States 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release, #R-
1, 1409, May 11, 1961, Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, 
University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
182"National Forest Recreational Visits Reach 8.3 million in '63," United 
States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press 
Release, #R-1, 1526, February 3, 1964, Government Documents Division, 
Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula, MT. In Montana by 1964 
the following areas were under wilderness management: Bob Marshall 
Wilderness, Cabinet Mountains, Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness, Anaconda-Pintlar 
Wilderness, and Gates of the Mountains Wild Area. Four other areas were still 
under primitive classification. 
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On top of the explosion in recreation, the Northern Region harvested record 
volumes of timber during the 1960s.183 Regional Forester Neal M. Rahm, in 
1963, explained the booming harvests as "approximately equivalent" to the 
region's annual allowable cut.184 Rahm also described the relationship 
between the Forest Service and the timber industry: 
In managing the timber on the National Forests to produce a 
sustained yield, the Forest Service is playing an important role in 
stabilizing the supply of timber and other wood products. The 
183 
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and Conservation Experiment Station, School of Forestry, University of 
Montana, Missoula, MT. 
184The volume of timber which may be cut from a forest under optimum 
sustained-yield management, Charles H. Stoddard, Essentials of Forestry 
Practice, second edition, (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1968), 309. 
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timber industry is an essential partner in the management of 
National forest timber lands. Without them, management could 
not be obtained.185 
Statistics for road construction within the Northern Region in 1963 reveal the 
dominance of timber under the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act. Forest 
Service engineers built 1,600 miles of roads and 57 miles of trails in region 
forests. Of the total construction, 700 miles of roads supported timber sales, 
while an additional 960 miles were for future timber access. All-purpose and 
recreational roads (roads expressly for access to picnic and camp sites) 
comprised a paltry 66 miles of construction.186 
The drive to produce timber in record amounts highlighted other management 
problems in the forests, such as insects and disease. In 1963 3.2 million acres 
out of a total of 36 million had active insect outbreaks.187 Four techniques 
served to control the infestations: establishment of parasitic insects such as 
185"Forest Service's Northern Region Timber Sales, Timber Harvest Reach 
Ail-Time High in 1963," United States Department of Agriculture, Forest 
Service, Northern Region Press Release, #R-1, 1533, March 17, 1964, 
Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, 
Missoula, MT. 
186"Road Construction Exceeds 1,600 Miles in Northern Region National 
Forests," United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern 
Region Press Release, #R-1, 1530, February 7, 1964, Government Documents 
Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
187Among the insects more active and detrimental to forest management in 
1963 were: the Douglas-fir beetle infesting 150,200 acres; the spruce budworm 
infesting 2,011,704 acres; and the larch casebearer 1,059,840 acres. 
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wasps to destroy those damaging the trees; logging over-age timber stands; 
spraying chemicals, such as DDT; and an unspecified method called "proper 
forest management."188 
Another serious outbreak of spruce budworm threatened commercial timber in 
Lolo, Helena, and Deerlodge Forests in the summer of 1964. The Northern 
Region planned to spray 155,000 acres in the Rock Creek and Monture Creek 
drainages. Regional Forester Rahm specifically pointed out the economic 
impact of the spruce budworm, valuing the infested timber as 30 million board 
feet worth $300,000. The spray area contained 1.3 billion board feet of timber 
not previously treated with chemical pesticides. In recognition of the 
controversial perception of pesticides, and in marked contrast to the 1956 DDT 
spraying, Rahm announced that the spray plan provided buffer zones one-quarter 
to one-half mile wide on both sides of streams and lakes in the spray area. 
Rahm also disclosed that representatives of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Montana Fish and Game 
Department would be invited to observe the spraying.189 
188"Forest Insects Infest 3.2 Million Acres in Northern Region," United 
States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service Northern Region Press Release, 
#R-1,1522, January 20, 1964, Government Documents Division, Mansfield 
Library, University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
189"Spruce Budworm Epidemic Requires Spraying East of Missoula," United 
States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press 
Release, #R-1, 1539, Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, 
University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
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On May 28, 1964 Rahm responded to widespread criticism of the Forest 
Service's spruce budworm attack program. Rahm said, "Opposition to insect 
and disease spray programs has gathered such momentum in Missoula and 
within the State of Montana that it is timely for people to sit back and consider 
the realities." The reality to which Rahm alluded was an annual 300-400 
MMBF reduction in harvest due to insects and disease, and the curtailment of 
the Christmas tree industry because of the spruce budworm. Rahm argued that 
70 cents out of each dollar in Montana related in some way to the timber 
industry, and suggestions that "we revert to a stone age culture" and leave the 
forests to the elements were shortsighted.190 
The 1964 spray program used the chemical malathion instead of DDT.191 
Rahm maintained that malathion was safe, "We know that chickens can be 
dusted with Malathion." Rahm offered as proof of the chemical's safety the 
190"Forest Service Position on Spray Program Explained," United States 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release, #R-
1, 1542, May 28, 1964, Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, 
University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
191It is possible that the switch to malathion reflected the Northern Region's 
desire for an alternative to DDT, in the wake of the evidence of the physical 
destructiveness of DDT seen in previous spruce budworm attacks and the 
popularity of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring. Still, as late as 1964, other 
managers in other regions relied upon DDT to combat the spruce budworm. In 
July 1964, 525,000 acres in Idaho's Salmon National Forest, part of the 
Intermountain Region, were sprayed with a DDT and diesel fuel mixture, 
"Monitoring the 1964 Spruce Budworm Aerial Spray Project," United States 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Salmon National Forest, December 
1965. 
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1963 pilot spray program in the Bitterroot Forest where "not one fish was killed, 
to our knowledge." Fish safety was a big issue since the 1964 spray area 
included the blue-ribbon trout stream, Rock Creek.192 
While citizens questioned the effects of chemicals on the health of their local 
environment, other angry groups of residents questioned the impact of the Forest 
Service's rapidly expanding timber harvests on the remaining roadless areas in 
the Missoula vicinity. One of the first roadless area controversies featured a 
protest over the development of a tract of pristine country north of the small 
town of Lincoln, Montana, one-hour east of Missoula. 
Until the completion of Montana Route 200 in 1957, Lincoln had existed in 
relative isolation as a small mountain village closely involved in the outdoor 
activities offered by the wild country north of town. With the coming of the 
highway that linked Missoula and Great Falls via Rogers Pass over the 
Continental Divide, the idyllic, rustic Lincoln began to change. What had taken 
decades in other locations now arrived in Lincoln in a "telescoped" manner in 
matter of a few years.193 
192"Forest Service Position on Spray Program Explained." 
193Richard W. Behan, "The Lincoln Back Country Controversy: A Case 
Study in Natural Resource Policy Formation and Administration," unpublished 
manuscript, School of Forestry, University of Montana, Missoula, MT, 12. The 
following discussion of the Lincoln Back Country Controversy closely follows 
this source. 
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Arriving with Route 200 were trans-state and trans-continental truckers, 
stopping at the new gas stations and convenience stores. Also tied to Lincoln's 
joining with the outside world was the construction of a sawmill that employed 
115 people. These developments contrasted with the traditional Lincoln 
economy based on outfitting into the Bob Marshall Wilderness.194 
Controversy came to Lincoln when the Forest Service, and in particular Helena 
National Forest Supervisor Vern Hamre, decided to develop the Lincoln 
backcountry for timber harvest and tourist road access. In a publication released 
in March 1963 titled "Long Range Plan, Northern Half Lincoln Ranger District, 
Helena National Forest," Hamre outlined his proposal. The plan called for a 
network of roads through the area to facilitate timber harvest, provide access to 
newly constructed picnic and camp sites, and to disperse hunting and fishing 
pressure. The local community, and interested persons in Missoula, reacted 
angrily when they learned of Hamre's plans.195 
Hamre wanted to move quickly with his development plan, but opposition by 
the local Lincoln Back Country Protective Association (led by former Forest 
Service employee Cecil Garland), Clifton Merritt and the Montana Wilderness 
Association and interest in the controversy on the part of Congressman Jim 
Battin, forced public discussions. On April 19, 300 people, comprising much of 
194Behan, 12, 15. 
195Ibid, 19-20. 
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Lincoln's adult population and groups from out of town filled the small 
community hall in Lincoln. Hamre took an hour and a half to outline his plan 
to change forever the wilderness characteristics of the area.196 
Mixed public reaction greeted Hamre's plan. The Forest service conducted the 
meeting under a rule of 'equal time', so it appeared that Hamre enjoyed at least 
half the meeting's support. Opponents, however, claimed that they had been 
'gagged' by the Forest Service and questioned the usefulness of the meeting. 
The Forest Service denied a proposal made during the meeting to call for a vote 
on Hamre's plan. The result of the April 19 meeting was to solidify the 
opposition to the Long Range Plan.197 
In June, sensing the growing public opposition to the Long Range Plan, Hamre 
modified his approach, slightly, eliminating part of one road. Regional Forester 
Boyd Rasmussen visited the area the following October and offered Hamre 
vigorous support. The modification did little to placate the opposition.198 
196Behan, 26; Dennis Roth, "The Wilderness Movement and the National 
Forests, 1964-1980, United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 
Document 391, Forest History Series, December 1984, 29. 
197Behan, 28. 
198Roth, 29-30. 
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Interestingly, the timber industry, after initial support of the Long Range Plan, 
grew increasingly silent on the issue as the controversy developed.199 Alone 
the Forest Service faced a fight for a plan that enjoyed a shrinking basis of 
public support. Within the win or lose climate that characterized the Lincoln 
Back Country Controversy, the Forest Service 'dug-in' to battle the opposition 
with no intention of compromise. Regional Forester Rasmussen, on October 15, 
1963, announced that it was the Forest Service's intention to develop the 
Lincoln Back Country within the next few years.200 
In late 1963, Robert Morgan replaced Vern Hamre as Helena Supervisor. 
Morgan saw the need for compromise and to Regional Office displeasure, 
delayed development indefinitely. Morgan realized that a fight to the finish 
over the Lincoln Long Range Plan would cost more to the Forest Service in 
public relations than the available commodities were worth.201 Cecil Garland, 
realizing that Morgan could be overwhelmed by Regional pressure to develop, 
decided to call for wilderness designation for the area. In 1965, Senators Mike 
Mansfield and Lee Metcalf introduced legislation to protect the 75,000 acres of 
199Ibid, 29. 
200Richard W. Behan, "Wilderness Decisions in Region I, U.S. Forest 
Service: A Case Study of Professional Bureau Policy Making," Ph. D. 
Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1971, 162. 
201Behan argues that the timber resources in the Lincoln Backcountry were 
"meager." 
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the Back Country under the newly enacted Wilderness Act. Congressman 
Battin, a Republican, did the Democrats one better and tacked on the Scapegoat 
Mountain roadless area to the Lincoln Back Country to form a 240,500 acre 
wilderness area. Mansfield and Metcalf soon abandoned their proposal to 
support Battin's bill.202 
The failure of Congress to include provisions in the Wilderness Act for the 
Forest Service to evaluate non-administratively designated roadless areas, called 
de facto wildernesses by advocates, led to a lengthy legislative history for the 
Scapegoat Wilderness bill. Statutory recognition of the undesignated roadless 
areas rested in the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, specifically in Section 2 
and the line about the compatibility of wilderness with the other uses of the 
national forests.203 The Scapegoat wilderness proposal represented the first 
citizen initiated wilderness legislation proposal after the passage of the 
Wilderness Act of 1964. Many were aware of the proposal's precedent setting 
potential and knew that it faced active, determined Forest Service 
opposition.204 Finally in 1969, the U.S. Senate passed the Scapegoat bill, but 
202Roth, 31. 
203Ibid, 24. 
204Only in 1969 did Regional Forester Neal Rahm begin to realize the 
inevitability of wilderness designation for the Lincoln-Scapegoat. Rahm tried to 
push a plan that allowed for a 'Back Country' designation for some of the 
Lincoln Back Country. Also included in his plan was a 75 mile "scenic" 
highway along the Continental Divide. Wilderness proponents were not 
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the legislation languished in the House for another three years. Wayne Aspinall, 
Chairman of the Interior Committee, delayed the bill by requiring a U.S. 
Geological Survey report on the area's mineral potential.205 
After the Geological report found no significant traces of mineralization in 
1971, the fate of the Scapegoat bill rested with the ability of Senator Mansfield 
to sway a recalcitrant Aspinall. In less than a year, Aspinall buckled, and in 
1972 the Scapegoat Wilderness became the first de facto wilderness to join the 
National Wilderness Preservation System.206 
In this battle and elsewhere, wilderness preservationists increasingly 
encountered an intransigent Forest Service that was dedicated to maximum 
timber production. As they ran into an agency not interested in getting 
management advice from outside the agency, preservationists had to turn to 
other means to accomplish their goal of achieving wilderness protection.207 In 
the Lincoln Controversy, the Montana congressional delegation came to the 
rescue of the Scapegoat Wilderness. Another 1960s controversy- the Magruder 
placated. Rahm acknowledged at that time the Forest Service had lost "control 
and leadership in the sphere of Wilderness [sic] philosophy," Roth, 32. 
205Roth, 33. 
206Ibid. 
207Allin, 154. 
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Corridor Controversy- also illustrates the power of grass roots organizations in 
battling the utilitarian designs of the Forest Service. 
In 1963 the Forest Service completed its reclassification proposal for the 
immense Selway-Bitterroot Primitive Area. Included in the reclassification of 
the area from primitive to wilderness (Regulation U-l), was the decision to 
delete over one half million acres from the area's southern boundary and release 
it to non-wilderness multiple use management. Local people called the southern 
deletion the Magruder Corridor. Ostensibly, the reason for the deletion was the 
presence of a fire road, built in 1934, through the area that linked the Bitterroot 
Valley in the east to Idaho's Elk City in the west. The deleted territory lay 
between the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness to the north and the Idaho Primitive 
area, still not reclassified, to the south.208 
The Magruder Corridor covered the upper drainage of the pristine waters of 
the Selway River and contained extensive commercial timber stands, hence the 
Forest Service's interest in excluding the area from wilderness protection. 
Three-fourths of the area's timbered acreage contained commercial sawtimber. 
Over half this acreage supported healthy stands of the valuable ponderosa and 
208"The Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness: A Wilderness Society Statement," The 
Living Wilderness, (Autumn-Winter 1960-61), 45. 
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Douglas-fir species. The presence of the fire road made this timber especially 
appealing.209 
The Selway-Bitterroot reclassification decision in 1963 put the wilderness 
advocates in a quandary. Howard Zahniser's reaction reflects this situation. 
Zahniser celebrated the extension of U1 protection to the huge Selway-
Bitterroot, but he deplored the exclusion of the Magruder Corridor. Of 
significance was another person disturbed by the deletion. Bitterroot Valley 
resident Doris Milner had used the corridor as a favorite spot to take her family 
on wilderness vacations for years.210 
Outraged at the decision to exclude the Magruder Corridor and the subsequent 
Forest Service refusal to reconsider the deletion, Milner decided to form a grass 
roots organization and contest the deletion. On September 20, 1964 at a 
meeting at Idaho's Lochsa Lodge, twelve members, including former Bitterroot 
National Forest Supervisor G.M. Brandborg, founded the 'Save the Upper 
Selway Committee'. The committee elected Doris Milner as chairman while 
209William P. Cunningham, "The Magruder Corridor Controversy: A Case 
History," M.S. Thesis, University of Montana, 1968, 9-11. Cunningham's thesis 
provides the basis for the following discussion of the Magruder Corridor 
Controversy. 
210Ibid, 74; Doris Milner, Presentation to Wildland Politics, Forestry 395:03, 
School of Forestry, University of Montana, March 11, 1993, notes. 
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she was away from the meeting, literally "out behind a bush." Milner proved to 
be an indefatigable activist for the preservation of the Magruder Corridor.211 
The passage of the Wilderness Act on September 3, 1964, complicated matters 
for the fledgling group. Wilderness decisions now emanated from the halls of 
Congress, not at the desk of an agency bureaucrat. With the enactment of the 
Wilderness Act, the Selway-Bitterroot became 'instant' wilderness, giving 
statutory recognition to the Forest Service's reclassification, and this reinforced 
the non-wilderness multiple use status of the Magruder Corridor. 
The Forest Service's first priority in launching its development plans was 
reconstructing the old 1934 fire road that traversed the corridor. While the land 
managers prepared for development, the citizen activists, joined by national 
conservation organizations such as the Wilderness Society, made overtures to 
the congressional delegations of Idaho and Montana. Critical to any effort to 
preserve the Magruder Corridor was the support of Idaho's Senator Frank 
Church, a legislator with known sympathies for the wild lands cause, and 
Montana's Mike Mansfield and Lee Metcalf.212 
211Doris Milner presentation, Cunningham, 77-78. Mrs. Milner went to 
work in the battle to save the Magruder Corridor by initiating a public mailing 
campaign. She sent a brochure, financed by the Wilderness Society, promoting 
preservation to everyone who could be identified as having a position on the 
corridor. Milner went to the sign-in box at the top of Nez Perce Pass on the 
Idaho-Montana border and copied down names to compile her initial mail list; 
Milner Presentation. 
212Milner presentation, Cunningham, 90. 
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Senator Metcalf showed hesitancy in coming to the support of the preservation 
of the Magruder Corridor. Metcalf opposed the deletion of the corridor during 
the 1963 Selway-Bitterroot reclassification, but since the Wilderness Act had 
been passed, he saw no need to reenter the fray. Besides, unlike the Lincoln 
Back Country Controversy, not everyone in the local area disagreed with the 
Forest Service's development plans. Timber interests in Montana's Bitterroot 
Valley, especially the timber- dependent community of Darby, voiced their 
support of the eventual logging of the corridor. Hamilton's newspaper The 
Ravalli Republican, became a medium for the timber interests to oppose the 
preservation designs of Milner and the Save the Upper Selway Committee.213 
Crucial to the efforts of the Save the Upper Selway Committee was the 
relationship of the Selway River drainage and the anadromous fishery that the 
Idaho Department of Fish and Game struggled to restore. The rehabilitation of 
this chinook salmon run had cost over a million dollars and represented five 
years of difficult work. This effort could be rendered invalid by the expected 
effects of increased silt load in the river caused by logging. Frank Church had a 
great interest in the anadromous fisheries of Idaho. In April 1965, Church had 
the pending Wild and Scenic Rivers Act revised to include the upper Selway.214 
213Milner presentation, Cunningham, 82,86. 
214Milner presentation, Cunningham, 90. 
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With continued public interest in the area centering on the salmon runs, and 
congressional support in the persons of Church and Metcalf, (who by now was 
over his wilderness battle fatigue), the Save the Upper Selway Committee 
managed to delay the Forest Service's logging plans. Gradually the controversy 
attracted a wider audience that increasingly worried about the effects of 
development on the pristine and fragile nature of the Magruder Corridor. In 
1966, Church and Metcalf prevailed upon Secretary of Agriculture Orville 
Freeman to appoint a non-Forest Service committee to study the effects of the 
land use plans on the environment.215 
On September 20, 1966 Secretary Freeman announced the formation of the 
committee to study the Magruder Corridor. Dr. George A. Selke, special 
consultant to Freeman and former Montana educator, chaired the committee. 
Freeman gave the committee strict instructions not to consider the corridor for 
inclusion into the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness. The committee was supposed 
to concentrate on the advisability of implementing the development plans and 
the effects of such development on the environment.216 
A highlight of Selke's review was a series of three public meetings, held in 
Grangeville and Boise, Idaho, and Missoula, Montana. For those who were 
participating in the controversy, the public meetings were long awaited. Selke 
215Cunningham, 111-112. 
216Ibid, 113, 114. 
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made a point of stressing that the meetings were not 'hearings' but, rather, 
information gathering sessions. Both pro-and anti-development forces appeared 
at these meetings. Pro-development advocates, usually connected to the timber 
industry, voiced concerns about 'locking-up' natural resources and the effects of 
resource lock-up on local communities' tax bases.217 
On June 1, 1967 Secretary Freeman released the results of the Selke 
Committee. The 58-page report criticized the Forest Service's development 
plans as consistently lacking detail. Contradicting the Forest Service, and 
confirming preservationist suspicions, timber resources were found to be 
marginal, at best. The Selke Committee judged the multiple use planning for 
different sections in the corridor to be arbitrary and not based on a systematic 
pattern of resource allocation. The Forest Service should manage the Magruder 
Corridor for its watershed, fishery, historic, and recreational values, the 
committee concluded.218 
The Selke Committee's report contributed much to the credibility of the 
preservationist groups struggling to save the Magruder Corridor. Forest Service 
development plans abruptly stopped, as Secretary Freeman ordered the agency to 
217,,Magruder Corridor Committee Sets Three Public Meetings at Boise, 
Grangeville, Missoula," United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 
Northern Region Press Release #R-1, 1538, November 24, 1966, Government 
Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula, MT.; 
Cunningham, 119-122. 
218Ibid, 132. 
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devise a plan that fully coordinated multiple resource uses. Doris Milner was 
elated by the report; the Forest Service had been "overruled in its own domain," 
the New York Times reported.219 
As the Forest Service duly complied with the secretary's edict, they continued 
to harbor development designs for the Magruder Corridor. Morton Brigham, an 
Idaho wilderness activist claimed that the Forest Service planned to construct a 
thirty-foot wide 'trail' to connect the corridor with the Salmon River Breaks 
Primitive Area, to the south.220 In a 1968 progress report, Regional Forester 
Neal Rahm mentioned that the directed study began after the close of the 1967 
Fire Season. Rahm said the Forest Service studied the corridor's soil and 
topography so that tentative locations for road and trail networks would have 
minimal impact on the area's environmental values. Rahm added that timber 
/ 
resources "have been intensively inventoried with an emphasis on the potential 
growth of young stands."221 
Rahm failed to appease preservationists such as Doris Milner. They called 
for a wilderness bill to protect the corridor. The congressional delegations 
219Ibid, 134; "An Island Saved," New York Times. June 13, 1967, 
220Boyd Norton, "The Oldest Established Perennially Debated Tree Fight in 
the West," Audubon, (July 1972), 68. 
221"Magruder Corridor Plans Progressing," United States Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release, #R-1,648, 
November 12, 1968, Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, 
University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
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urged patience; they would not consider statutory protection until the Forest 
Service completed its study. Finally, in 1970 the Bitterroot National Forest 
released its plan, again calling for extensive logging and road building for the 
corridor. In an attempt to mollify preservationists, Bitterroot Forest Supervisor 
Orville Daniels announced that the development would be delayed for five years 
to allow for more study of stream sedimentation.222 
Finally, after seven years of waiting for the Forest Service to demonstrate 
some interest in preserving the natural values of the Magruder Corridor, 
Senators Church and Metcalf, after reviewing the Bitterroot National Forest's 
plan, gave up. In August 1971, the two introduced legislation in the Senate 
calling for wilderness protection for the Magruder Corridor. Another nine 
years would pass before, in the summer of 1980, legislation definitively 
established the Magruder Corridor as a part of the Selway-Bitterroot 
Wilderness.223 
As one of the longest fights in conservation history, the Magruder Controversy 
attracted national attention to the wilderness preservation battle. Montana and 
222Milner presentation; Norton, 69; "Proposed Broad Management Direction 
for 173,400 acre Magruder Corridor To be Circulated for Public Review," 
United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press 
Release, #R-1, 858, November 13, 1970, Government Documents Division, 
Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
223Norton, 69, Allin, 154. Also established in the same act as Magruder, 
was the giant River of No Return Wilderness, 2.2 million acres, south of the 
Magruder Corridor. 
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Idaho wilderness activists became known throughout the wider conservation 
community as leaders in the preservation struggle. The Magruder episode 
illustrated the difficulty in allocating resources among a public dedicated to 
different uses.224 Magruder also demonstrated the power of grass roots 
organizations, especially when they enlisted the aid of sympathetic congressional 
influences. Magruder stands with the Lincoln Controversy as an example of 
local people using Congress to circumscribe Forest Service development plans. 
During the same period, in Colorado, wilderness advocates resorted to another 
powerful branch of government to arrest Forest Service development of 
wilderness in the famous East Meadow Creek case. 
East Meadow Creek flowed in a timbered area directly west of the Gore 
Range-Eagle's Nest Primitive Area in Colorado's White River National Forest. 
The newly constructed (1964) resort community of Vail lay nine miles south of 
the area. In 1962 the Forest Service proposed to log the area, and in 1964 
constructed a road to the edge of the East Meadow Creek area to support the 
future timber sale. More than five million board feet of timber were involved in 
any potential sale in the area and this required Regional Office approval of the 
sale. Rocky Mountain Region Forester David Nordwall recognized a potential 
conflict in developing East Meadow Creek: The Region had not completed its 
224Cunningham, 139. 
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primitive area reviews for possible inclusion into the National Wilderness 
Preservation System, as directed by the 1964 Wilderness Act. Nordwall 
proposed a comprise that allowed for the logging of the majority of the area but 
reserved a small buffer zone next to the primitive area.225 
In 1969 a timber sale contract went out for bids for the East Meadow Creek 
timber. Kaibab Industries, Inc. of Phoenix, Arizona won the contract. This sale 
triggered a group of Vail residents led by Robert W. Parker and the Sierra Club 
to move to prevent the contract from being fulfilled.226 The residents of Vail 
feared the development would degrade the quality of the country that 
surrounded their resort community and that the logging would cut into tourist 
dollars. Clifton Merritt, regional director of the Wilderness Society, pointed the 
Vail people to a young criminal lawyer, Tony Ruckel, for advice on contesting 
the sale in court.227 
With funding provided by the Sierra Club, Ruckel took the case. He 
originally wanted to pursue the case through the Multiple Use Sustained Yield 
Act, but Merritt pointed him toward the Wilderness Act for legal ammunition. 
The Wilderness Act states in Section 3, (b),: 
225Roth, 19-20. 
226H. Byron Mock, " Forest Management and Litigation," Journal of 
Forestry. (April 1971), 202. 
227Roth, 21. 
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Nothing herein contained shall limit the President in proposing, as 
part of his recommendations to Congress, the alteration of existing 
boundaries of primitive areas or recommending the addition of any 
contiguous area of national forest lands predominantly of 
wilderness value.22S[emphasis added] 
Here was the angle Ruckel and company could use to upset the development 
plans of the Forest Service. East Meadow Creek was contiguous to the 
designated wilderness of Gore Range-Eagle's Nest.229 
Suing the federal government was a relatively new tactic in early 1970. 
Preparing the way for environmental litigants to follow was the landmark Scenic 
Hudson I case230, a case that set the precedent for court's to review the 
authority of federal agencies to make management decisions. Scenic Hudson I 
had a wide application because it held that an agency could be accountable to 
justify its decisions when competing public interests are at stake.231 The East 
Meadow Creek development thus was reviewable in the courts. 
Ruckel and a legal team that included the future Governor of Colorado, 
Richard D Lamm, argued their case before District Judge William E. Doyle, Jr. 
228Wilderness Act of 1964, Section 3, (b). 
229Roth, 21. 
230Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission 
(Scenic Hudson I), 354 F.2d 608, 1 ELR 20292 (2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied. 
231Mock, 202; Frederick Anderson, NEPA in the Courts: A Legal Analysis 
of the National Environmental Policy Act, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1973), 18-19. 
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in Denver in January 1970. In Parker v. United States, Ruckel claimed that 
East Meadow Creek was contiguous to designated wilderness and that the 
country exhibited wilderness characteristics. He further claimed that the Forest 
Service had not considered that area for possible addition to the designated 
wilderness area. Ruckel completed his argument by stating that, according to 
the Wilderness Act, the Forest Service could not change the area's wilderness 
character until they completed a study and the President and the Congress had 
an opportunity to consider the area for inclusion into the existing wilderness 
232 area. 
Judge Doyle found that the Parker team had legal standing to contest the case 
and that the district court had jurisdiction. He therefore rejected the 
government's request for summary judgement to dismiss the case. Doyle further 
allowed into evidence testimony by 'expert witness' Clifton Merritt attesting to 
the genuine wilderness values present in East Meadow Creek.233 
The Forest Service's attorneys did not contest the essential wilderness quality 
of East Meadow Creek. Rather, they relied on a tactic that they would continue 
to rely upon in future wilderness squabbles, a doctrine of strict adherence to the 
definition of wilderness as provided for in the Wilderness Act. The proximity 
232Parker v. United States 309 F. Supp. 593 (1970), at 594. 
233309 F. Supp. at 595, Roth, 21. 
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of the nearby road to East Meadow Creek prohibited the area from wilderness 
consideration, the defendants argued. Furthermore, mining claims existed in the 
area and the Denver Water Board looked to the area as a possible water 
diversion site. East Meadow Creek violated the Forest Service's 'purity 
principle'234 and thus was best utilized for timber management.235 
Judge Doyle ruled for Ruckel, agreeing that the Forest Service had to allow 
the President and Congress the opportunity to consider contiguous wilderness 
for inclusion into the National Wilderness Preservation System. A timber sale 
would irrevocably remove this opportunity, and so he issued an injunction to 
enjoin the contract with Kaibab Industries. Unconvinced by Doyle, the Forest 
Service and timber companies appealed the decision. On October 1, 1971 the 
United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Doyle's ruling and the 
U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear any further appeal.236 
Parker represented a major defeat for the Forest Service, and not just in 
Colorado. The agency would have to consider the decision every time they 
attempted to develop a site contiguous to wilderness. The courts had restricted 
234The Forest Service's purity principle refers to the agency's strict 
adherence to a literal reading of the definition of wilderness provided in the 
Wilderness Act. Critics claim that the purity principle was used to exclude 
some roadless areas from wilderness consideration due to trivial human 
alterations of those roadless areas. 
235309 F. Supp. at 596. 
236Parker v. United States, 448 F. 2d 793 (10th Cir, 1971), cert, denied. 
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the management options of the Forest Service concerning contiguous wilderness. 
Later, the National Environmental Policy Act would encroach further into the 
Forest Service's realm of timber management and cause untold trouble for the 
agency. ? 
In late 1970, as if the Forest Service did not have enough to worry about, 
another stinging critique of the management policies of the Forest Service 
emerged from the mountain West. Senator Lee Metcalf released a report made 
by a select committee of the University of Montana on the management 
practices of the Bitterroot National Forest. By the time the Bitterroot 
Controversy had run its course, Forestry and the Forest Service would never be 
the same. 
As the process of timber harvesting gained momentum in the 1960s, the results 
of intensive timber management began to become visible to the public; clearcuts 
on the sides of hills were not hard to recognize. In the scenic Bitterroot Valley 
of western Montana, surrounded by the Bitterroot National Forest, some local 
residents took offense to what the Forest Service was doing to their valley's 
237 scenery. 
237The Bitterroot National Forest cut 583.3 MMBF during the years 1961-
1970, while the annual allowable cut during the same period was 504 MMBF; 
in 1961 31 MMBF were cut; by 1969 this figure was 71.6 MMBF. As a 
percentage of the Northern Region's total cut for the 1961-1970 time period, the 
Bitterroot National Forest accounted for a mere 4.23% of the total. These 
figures illustrate that the Bitterroot National Forest, as a part of the more arid 
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In 1962, Bitterroot Valley citizens established a Resources Conservation and 
Development (RC&D) Project that focused on the emerging denuded slopes of 
the Bitterroot Mountains. Three former Forest Service employees, Charles 
MacDonald (a former district ranger), Champ Hannon, and former long-time 
Bitterroot National Forest Supervisor G.M. Brandborg allied themselves with the 
discontented locals. They believed the Forest Service's methods of managing 
timber were wrong and especially in the case of Brandborg, their dissent from 
the Forest Service caused personal hardships. Active Forest Service employees 
received orders not to associate with the dissenters.238 
Local concerns that the Forest Service was harvesting timber at an 
unsustainable rate coalesced in a subcommittee of the RC&D called the 
Recreation Committee. By 1968, this committee took the offensive against 
Bitterroot National Forest officials who refused to respond to their complaints. 
They contacted the Regional Office in Missoula, invited journalist Dale Burk of 
Broad Valley Rockies geographic region, was not a primary timber producer in 
the Northern Region and yet still exceeded its annual allowable cut by a 
substantial 79.3 MMBF for the years 1961- 1970, the period of the Bitterroot 
Controversy. Source for figures: United States Forest Service, Northern Region, 
"Region One Timber Sale Program Statistics," December 16, 1992. 
238Arnold Bolle, "The Bitterroot Revisited: A University Re-View of the 
Forest Service," Public Land Law Review, (Vol. 10, 1989), 6. Dale Burk, 
primary chronicler of the events of the Bitterroot Controversy as state editor for 
the daily newspaper The Missoulian, referred to the three as the "dissidents," 
Chrisopher T. Ransick, "The Bitterroot Controversy: Dale Burk's Dual Role as 
Journalist and Activist," M.A. Thesis, University of Montana, 1988, 18. 
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The Missoulian to come and have a look, and they appealed to Senators 
Mansfield and Metcalf.239 Early in 1969 this barrage of pressure prompted 
Regional Forester Neal Rahm to appoint an in-house task force to review the 
i i a a n a g e m e n t  p r a c t i c e s  i n  t h e  B i t t e r r o o t . 2 4 ®  - s  > K r  »  
As the Forest Service Task Force conducted their review, Dale Burk broke the 
story of public discontent with the Bitterroot National Forest in a series of 
articles that began in The Missoulian on November 2, 1969. These articles 
featured Bitterroot citizens who thought the Bitterroot National Forest's 
managers were destroying the countryside, and interviews with both the 
dissenters and officials of the Forest Service, notably Bitterroot Supervisor 
Merrill Tester. Burk's expose sparked a fierce public debate over what was 
gaining notoriety as the Bitterroot Controversy.241 
As Dale Burk informed western Montana of the controversy, Senator Lee 
Metcalf wrote a letter to Arnold Bolle, Dean of the School of Forestry at the 
University of Montana. Metcalf told Bolle he had received a number of letters 
from his constituents (Metcalf had grown up in Stevensville, a small town in the 
Bitterroot Valley) critical of Forest Service timber policy. He asked Bolle to 
239Bolle, 6. 
^"Management Practices on the Bitterroot National Forest: A Task Force 
Appraisal, May 1969- April 1970," United States Department of Agriculture, 
Forest Service, April 15, 1970. 
^Ransick, 21. 
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form a committee to study the Forest Service's management in the Bitterroot 
National Forest. Metcalf closed his letter to Bolle with a bit of flattery, "I look 
forward, as always, to receiving advice from the best School of Forestry in the 
nation."242 
Bolle selected six fellow faculty members at the University of Montana to 
assist in preparing a report for Senator Metcalf.243 Bolle and his fellow 
faculty members received the official title of 'Select Committee of the 
University of Montana'. At first, the committee did not recognize the 
significance of their work. Committee member Thomas Payne remembers the 
mission of the study was originally felt to be little more than "quieting some 
local concerns."244 Soon Payne and his colleagues would be at the center of a 
firestorm. 
While the Select Committee pursued their study, the Forest Service's Task 
Force released their findings. Known as the 'Worf Report' after the Task 
242Lee Metcalf to Arnold Bolle, December 2, 1969, reprinted in Senate 
Document No. 91-115, "A University View of the Forest Service," December 1, 
1970, v. 
243The faculty members were: Richard Behan, Associate Professor of natural 
resource policy and administration at the School of Forestry; W. Leslie 
Pengelly, Professor of wildlife management at the School of Forestry; Robert 
Wambach, Professor of forest economics; Gordon Browder, Professor of 
Sociology; Thomas Payne, Professor of political science; and Richard Shannon, 
Professor of economics. 
^Interview with Thomas Payne, October 30, 1992, notes. 
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Force's Chairman William R. Worf, Chief of the Regional Division of 
Recreation and Lands, the Task Force offered a thorough critique of the 
management practices of the Bitterroot National Forest. The first observation 
listed in the report stated that an attitude existed among much of the staff of the 
Bitterroot Forest that "resource production" goals come before other land 
management considerations. The Task Force admitted that this emphasis on 
resource production goals was not unique to the Bitterroot Forest but derived 
from "subtle pressures and attitudes coming from above."245 
The Task Force severely criticized the Bitterroot's lack of adequate 
communications with the public. This situation, in part, resulted from the lack 
of advancement in multiple use planning to provide firm management direction 
necessary for quality land management. This direction would facilitate 
informing the public of the Forest Service's long range plans. Additionally, 
quality control on Forest Service projects needed improvement. Timber projects 
had left scars and waste that angered citizens and Task Force found these lapses 
in quality control unnecessary. Finally, the Task Force warned that the needed 
improvements in the Bitterroot National Forest could not come as a result of 
simply increasing funding and that the public should hot expect changes 
overnight.246 
^"Management Practices," 9. 
^Ibid, 9-15. 
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The Worf Report represented the agency's attempt to keep the Bitterroot 
Controversy localized; the Forest Service viewed the controversy as a Forest 
Service problem and not the manifestation of any 1960s-style social movement 
that fostered a distrust of anything related to the government. The Task Force 
labored hard and provided a disturbing picture of the Bitterroot, and they were 
careful to avoid any appearance of favoritism or bias. They addressed, while 
not always finding fault with sensitive subjects such as the overuse of 
terracing247, and clearcutting.248 
Outside of the Missoula-Bitterroot area, the Worf Report drew little attention. 
But when the Select Committee released its report "A University View of the 
Forest Service," suddenly national attention was focused on the Bitterroot 
Controversy. To the surprise of the faculty members of the committee, Senator 
Lee Metcalf released the report to the press and ordered 20,000 copies printed 
^Terracing was a site preparation method to ensure maximum forest 
regeneration after a substantial harvest technique, such as clearcutting or seed 
tree cutting, had been employed. Bulldozers carved terraces into the steep 
hillsides to facilitate machine replanting and seedling survival. Terraces left the 
landscape with a 'stadium-like' appearance and was especially resented by the 
residents of the Bitterroot Valley. The practice began in 1964 and ended with 
the Bitterroot Controversy. Even today (1993), evidence of terracing is still 
visible from the valley floor on sites with poor forest regeneration. 
^Luke Popovich, "The Bitterroot- Remembrances of Things Past, Part 
One," The Journal of Forestry, (December 1975), 791-792. 
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as a Senate Document.249 Suddenly, the Forest Service was on the defensive; 
they had to defend their policies on a level and scope far beyond any of the 
other controversies they faced in the 1960s. 
The 'Bolle Report', as the Select Committee's work was known, charged the 
Forest Service with poor management in the Bitterroot National Forest, but 
stopped short of a full condemnation of the Forest Service.250 Among the 
more severe of the committee's findings were: 
Multiple use management, in fact, does not exist as the governing 
principle on the Bitterroot National Forest; Quality timber 
management and harvest practices are missing. Consideration of 
recreation, watershed, wildlife and grazing appear as afterthoughts; 
The practice of terracing on the BNF should be stopped. Existing 
249Arnold Bolle thought Metcalf would use the report privately. Thomas 
Payne believes Metcalf may have been searching for ammunition to support his 
private environmental crusade, and Bolle remembers Metcalf as very concerned 
with the developing controversy in the Bitterroot. Metcalf, influenced by the 
power of the Anaconda Company on Montana life, viewed himself as the 
people's champion. "I guess you could say he was a populist," says Arnold 
Bolle, Arnold Bolle, Oral History 249, conducted by Gerald Williams May 1, 
1990, K. Ross Toole Archives, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, 
Missoula, MT, Interview with Thomas Payne. 
250The popular portrayal of the Bolle Report as a ringing polemical 
condemnation of the Forest Service and of the Worf Report, is somewhat 
inaccurate. Many similarities exist between the two reports, the key difference 
seems to be one of the degree of critique. Bolle did not think that the report 
condemned the Forest Service at all, in fact the Select Committee revised earlier 
drafts of the report to tone down harsh language, Luke Popovich, "The 
Bitterroot- A Fading Polemic," Journal of Forestry, (January 1976), 39; Arnold 
Bolle Oral History. 
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terraced areas should be dedicated for research; A clear distinction 
must be made between timber management and timber mining251 
Finding a deviation from the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act's definition of 
multiple use, the Bolle Report accorded with the Worf Report. However, the 
charge of timber mining stung the agency. The Select Committee charged the 
Forest Service with cutting marginal timber on sites that were not conducive to 
economical regeneration. This charge engendered the sharpest opposition from 
the Forest Service.252 
Officially, the Forest Service welcomed the Bolle Report as "one more 
important input toward meeting our goal of achieving high quality, balanced 
management of the national forests." Regional Forester Rahm released a 
statement that praised the Select Committee for their "frankness, courage, and 
dedication." Rahm then went on to point out that his, the Worf Report, 
investigation had already addressed the problems mentioned in the Bolle Report, 
and that the Select Committee's findings supported most of the Worf 
Report.253 
251"A University View of the Forest Service," 13. 
252"A University View of the Forest Service," 24; Popovich, "The Bitterroot-
Remembrances of Things Past," 792. 
253"Forest Service Welcomes University Review of Bitterroot National Forest 
Activities: Commends Committee for Frankness, Dedication," United States 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release #R-1 
860, November 25, 1970, Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, 
University of Montana, Missoula, MT. 
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Despite the Select Committee's professed intent to the contrary, the Bolle 
Report devastated the Forest Service. The report called into question the 
agency's competence to manage the nation's forests- forests that the agency 
viewed as their own. Multiple use policy was now in a shambles; timber 
production mania had crippled the policy's credibility. The profession of 
forestry was bitterly divided over the Bolle Report, as timber industry foresters 
took offense to the implication that they were behind the Forest Service's 
devastation of the Bitterroot scenery. Debate raged in professional journals as 
foresters took sides.254 Most importantly, the Forest Service lost its position 
as leader of the profession and its multiple use creed was reduced to the level of 
a slogan.255 
Dale Burk considers the Bitterroot Controversy to be the turning point in 
Forest history. Many changes resulted from the controversy, most notably the 
congressional guidelines on clearcutting promulgated by Senator Frank Church. 
The 'Church Guidelines' laid the foundation for the 1976 National Forest 
Management Act and was the first comprehensive legislation to govern forestry 
practices on the national forests. As the 1970s dawned, the Forest Service 
254For examples of the acrimony surrounding the controversy, see the 
various articles in American Forests during the time of the Bolle Report, 
November 1970 until well into 1971. Significantly, interviews with professional 
foresters from that era reveal substantial hostility about the controversy, hostility 
that still exists today. 
255Clary, 187. 
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confronted a new public consciousness on things environmental. The agency 
would have a difficult time adjusting to the infusion of public opinion into the 
policies of the national forests.256 
256Interview with Dale A. Burk, March 18, 1993, Stevensville, MT, notes. 
CHAPTER FOUR: Courts, Congress, and Roadless Area Controversies 
Wilderness controversy was not solved by the congressional action to protect 
wildlands with statute law. Conflict quickly developed over the expansion of 
the Forest Service's portion of the National Wilderness Preservation system. 
The Forest Service, and later the Carter Administration tried to solve the 
'problem' of how much acreage to include in the system with large nationwide 
programs that failed in their objectives and engendered increased hostility 
between the competing land use interest groups. 
With President Johnson's signing of the Wilderness Act on September 3, 1964, 
9.1 million acres became 'instant wilderness'. Congress, through the Wilderness 
Act, also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to study, within ten years, all the 
remaining L-20 primitive areas and report to the President their suitability or 
non-suitability for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System. 
While the act included as well a directive to the Secretary of the Interior to 
study and report on every roadless area containing 5,000 or more acres located 
in the national parks, monuments, and wildlife refuges, Congress neglected the 
status of de facto wilderness in national forests.257 This important omission 
257The Wilderness Act of 1964, Public Law 88-577, 78 Stat. 890, Section 3, 
b, c. 
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had severe consequences for both the Forest Service and the 'user' groups, as 
debate focused on the disposition of the roadless area resource in the national 
forests. 
The Forest Service began its task of implementing the Wilderness Act by 
appointing a task force to draw up policy guidelines.258 Two immediate 
problems confronted the task force: the management of the wilderness areas 
according to the provisions of the act, and the completion of the primitive area 
reviews prior to the congressional deadline of September 3, 1974. After nine 
months of study, the task force presented a first draft of the wilderness 
regulations on November 20, 1964.259 
The public reviewed the draft regulations for a year and a half, afterwhich the 
Forest Service released final regulations covering its portion of the National 
Wilderness Preservation System on May 31, 1966. The public commentary on 
the regulations generated "heated discussion," with the majority of respondents 
sympathetic to the wilderness concept. Also of significance, in the process of 
drafting the regulations the task force discovered that future management 
258This task force included: Arnold Synder, District Ranger, Sierra National 
Forest, California; George Williams, Wilderness staff Region 6; Ed Slusher, 
Wilderness staff, Region 1; and Bill Worf, Supervisor of the Bridger National 
Forest in Wyoming. 
259William A. Worf, C. Glen Gorgensen, and Robert C. Lucas, "Committee 
Report on Wilderness," United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 
May 17, 1972, Wilderness file, Archives, Headquarters Northern Region, 
Missoula, MT, 2. 
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procedures would have to account for possible, even likely, expansion of the 
wilderness system.260 
As early as the mid-sixties, during the drafting of the widerness regulations, 
the Forest Service determined to adopt a policy of strict adherence to the letter 
of the Wilderness Act for determining an area's suitability for wilderness. As 
with the multiple use policy, the task force noted the pressure to satisfy all the 
"special interests" demanding that their use be accommodated in the wilderness. 
Some of the uses violated the Wilderness Act in that they proposed uses at 
variance with wilderness preservation, Howard Zahniser had called these 
activities non-conforming. This pressure influenced a reliance on a strict 
interpretation of the Wilderness Act for determining suitability. Strict 
adherence, or the purity principle, also worked effectively to exclude from 
wilderness consideration many roadless areas that had commercial timber.261 
The 1964 Task Force recognized that many roadless tracts of Forest Service 
land possessed 'outstanding potential' for wilderness and should receive 
consideration for inclusion into the wilderness system. In the first draft of the 
regulations, the task force called for the identification of these roadless areas by 
260Ibid, 3-5. No doubt this realization owes something to the Lincoln-
Scapegoat and Magruder Corridor controversies that were raging full-scale at 
that time. 
261Ibid, 5. The East Meadow Creek Controversy represents an early 
example of the Forest Service's use of the purity principle to attempt to exclude 
potential timber from wilderness. 
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December 31, 1966. The Chief and the Regional Foresters accepted this 
recommendation in principle but thought that the deadline was too short.262 It 
was not until January 1967, that the Washington Office issued a directive to the 
Regional Foresters "to identify all areas which seem to satisfy the criteria 
meriting recommendation for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation 
System."263 
The directive set June 30, 1970 as the deadline for completion of the roadless 
area inventory.264 However, most Regional Foresters and their subordinates 
ignored the directive. To the rangers 'in the field' the directive to inventory 
roadless areas was an additional burden added to the task of evaluating primitive 
areas by the congressionally established deadline. Some district rangers were 
upset by the directive one ranger in the Willamette National Forest in Oregon 
reportedly replied, "I'll delineate the boundaries of those roadless areas, by 
clearcutting right up to their edge."265 
262Ibid, 7. 
263"Roadless Area Review and Evaluation, Final Environmental Impact 
Statement," United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, October 
15, 1973, 13. 
264"Committee Report on Wilderness," 7. 
265Interview with Tom Donahue, Recreation Specialist, Northern Region, 
March 17, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes. 
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Roadless area inventories were overlooked in the effort to review the primitive 
areas. In the Missoula area, one primitive area review in the Mission Mountains 
produced a controversy. The Forest Service announced its list of alternatives for 
the future of the Mission Mountain Primitive Area in 1969.266 These 
alternatives ranged from preserving the entire area as wilderness to releasing the 
entire area to non-wilderness multiple use management. The Forest Service 
solicited public opinion in their deliberations on the area. In June 1970, it 
released its recommendation to the President that the Mission Mountains be 
included in the Wilderness System- with some boundary shrinkage of the former 
primitive area.267 
The Mission Mountains proposal was illustrative of the purity principle as a 
determinant factor in a wilderness recommendation. Controversy arose out of 
the recommended exclusions of areas that exhibited human impact in the 
Missions. In the 1950s' spruce bark beetle infestations in some areas of the 
primitive area had been clearcut, and these areas were now excluded from the 
wilderness recommendation. Despite the Forest Service's admission that the 
logged sites had substantial tree regeneration and that the roads had been closed 
since the completion of the timber harvests, they excluded the areas because 
266United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Flathead 
National Forest, "A Proposal: Mission Mountains Wilderness," May 1971. 
267John M. McCabe, "A Wilderness Primer," Montana Law Review, (Vol.32, 
1971), 32-33. 
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"man's imprint" was noticeable, thus disqualifying the areas from wilderness 
protection.268 
Preservationists, enlisting the aid of Senator Lee Metcalf, contested the Forest 
Service deletions from the Mission Wilderness proposal. They argued that the 
human impacts in the Mission Mountains were temporary; wilderness would 
heal and return to its natural condition. Public organizations became involved in 
an effort to reverse the Forest Service's deletions. A unique example of public 
participation in wilderness politics was a 'Project 100' (a children's 
rehabilitation program) class that handed out information pamphlets to people at 
street corners and supermarkets in Missoula.269 
The Forest Service recommended a portion of the primitive area that lacked 
commercial timber for wilderness and this was characteristic of the agency's 
recommendations. In fact, much of the proposal concentrated on the economic 
evaluation of the area's raw material capacity and not its suitability for 
wilderness. A wilderness area recommendation prerequisite seemed to be a lack 
of raw material potential. The Forest Service would rely on this qualifier in 
future wilderness recommendations.270 
268Ibid, 34. 
269Interview with Dale Burk, March 18, 1993, Stevensville, MT, notes; 
McCabe, 34. 
270Ibid, 33. 
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The Mission Mountains Primitive Area received formal wilderness protection 
with the passage of an omnibus wilderness act in 1975.271 The Forest 
Service-backed legislation sought to designate 73,207 acres in the Mission 
Mountains as wilderness, while in the House a bill called for 75,588 acres. The 
approximate 2,000 acre difference corresponded to the Forest Service deletions 
of the previously harvested timber areas. Reasoning that to exclude the areas 
that exhibited the non-conforming use would cause a major disruption to 
management, the House negotiators, in the Conference Committee proposed 
including the disputed 2,000 acres.272 
Led by Lee Metcalf, the Senate concurred in the House addition of the 
disputed acres and included Metcalf's amendment to tack on another 370 acre 
parcel. The Forest Service specifically opposed wilderness status for this parcel 
because of close-by roads and timber harvest sites. For the Forest Service, this 
parcel of land lacked sufficient purity with respect to the definition of 
wilderness provided for in the Wilderness Act. Metcalf's amendment effectively 
represented congressional rejection of the purity principle, and tacitly recognized 
271"An Act Designating Certain National Forest Wilderness Areas in 
California, Colorado, and Montana," Public Law 93-632, 88 Stat. 2155. This 
multi-state omnibus bill designated six wilderness areas comprising a total of 
998,088 acres. 
272"An Act Designating Certain National Forest Wilderness Areas in 
California, Colorado, and Montana," Senate Report 93-1043, SS 13057-6, 41-44. 
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the recuperative powers of nature.273 The Mission Mountains Wilderness 
stood as an example that Congress would decide what constituted wilderness 
and not the Forest Service- a process that actually began three years earlier with 
the passage of the Scapegoat Wilderness bill. 
Congress, somewhat unwittingly, had a major impact not only on Forest 
Service wilderness policy but on forest management in general with its passage 
in 1969 of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).274 With the 
arguable exception of the 1973 Endangered Species Act, no other piece of 
legislation has had an equal impact on citizen's legal challenges to forest policy 
than NEPA.275 Central to the power of the act to affect Forest Service policy 
was Section 102 that mandated the preparation of an Environmental Impact 
Statement when the agency undertook any action that would have a major 
impact on the environment.276 
273Ibid, 42. 
274National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law 91-190, 83 Stat. 
852 (1970). NEPA's legislative history reveals little discussion of the potential 
of the act to affect federal agency policy as it affects the environment. 
275William C. Siegel, "Environmental Law: Some Implications for Forest 
Resource Management," Environmental Law, (Fall, 1973), 122. 
276Throughout the rest of this chapter I will have numerous occasions to 
refer to environmental impact statements; the following abbreviations will be 
used: EIS, environmental impact statement, in general; DES, draft environmental 
impact statement; and FES, final environmental impact statement. 
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NEPA was far from a precise statute and much confusion developed over the 
law's true meaning. Federal agencies such as the Forest Service initially chose 
to regard NEPA as a broad, general statement of policy goals, not as a directive. 
The judiciary, as a result of lawsuits brought under the act, emerged as the 
enforcement element in NEPA's role as a environmental reform law. Congress 
seemed to desire the judicial branch of government to become the enforcement 
element: Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall recognized this intent when 
he wrote, "In fact, this vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve as no 
more than a catalyst for development of a 'common law' of NEPA."277 
The first lawsuit to involve NEPA directly, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating 
Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission (1971)278, : 
provided a clear view of the courts' intentions concerning the act. District of 
Columbia Circuit Judge Skelly Wright ruled that the courts have the power to 
require federal agencies to comply with the requirements of NEPA. 
Enforcement of Congressional legislative intent fell to the judicial branch: as 
Judge Wright wrote in the court's Calvert Cliffs opinion, "Our duty, . . .is to see 
that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not 
lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy."279 
277Dissent in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 421, (1976). 
278449 F.2d 1109 (1971). 
279449 F.2d at 1111. 
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Calvert Cliffs established the doctrine of "strict compliance" in regard to 
NEPA. The Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, an environmental group, 
challenged the Atomic Energy Commission's regulations governing the 
consideration of environmental issues. Calvert Cliffs maintained that the 
Commission's preclusion of review in a case involving nonradiological 
environmental matters, unless specifically raised during the agency's internal 
review process, was a violation of NEPA.280 Calvert Cliffs claimed the 
Commission's rules failed to satisfy the rigor demanded by NEPA. On the 
other hand, the Commission maintained that NEPA was vague and left room for 
broad interpretation and that the challenged rules were well within the 
provisions of the act.281 
Congressional intent formed the basis for the D.C. Circuit's opinion that 
established the standard of strict compliance. Judge Wright rejected NEPA as a 
general policy guideline and construed it as a more forceful procedural directive. 
Through NEPA, Congress "reordered priorities" so that agencies would consider 
the environment as an equal with other considerations such as economics and 
technical matters. Thus, NEPA was not "highly flexible" but instead set a strict 
standard for compliance.282 
280Ibid. at 1109. 
281Ibid. at 1112. 
282Ibid. 
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Section 102, of Title I of the act, provided the impetus for the D.C. Circuit's 
opinion. Granting that the first section of the act, 101, could supply only a 
flexible guideline, the court found that Section 102 set definite procedures.283 
Environmental protection became part of every federal agency's mandate. The 
multiple considerations of economics, technicalities, and the environment 
involved a "balancing process" in which no one consideration automatically 
outweighed another.284 Agencies had to consider the environment precisely by 
law, and failure to do so would involve the courts. 
Therefore, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the 
District Court's ruling in favor of the Atomic Energy Commission and 
established the first real interpretation of NEPA. After Calvert Cliffs, the courts 
held agencies, including the Forest Service, accountable for compliance with 
283In summary, Section 102 mandates that agencies: (a)utilize a systematic, 
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and 
social sciences ... (b) identify and develop methods and procedures ... which will 
insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be 
given appropriate consideration in decision-making along with economic and 
technical considerations; (c) prepare a written impact statement for every action 
significantly affecting the human environment; (d) study, develop, and describe 
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action; (e) where consistent 
with the foreign policy of the United States, coordinate with international 
interests in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's 
world environment; (f) make available to States, counties, municipalities, 
institutions, and individuals, advice and information ...; (g) initiate and utilize 
ecological information ... National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public 
Law 91-190. 
284449 F.2d at 1113. 
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NEPA in the strictest sense. In further litigation, and there would be much of it, 
the standard first articulated by the D.C. Circuit would provide guidance to 
other courts as they assumed their duties as the interpreters of NEPA. 
NEPA and the courts first clashed with the Forest Service, in a substantive 
way over the agency's first Roadless Area Review and Evaluation. In 1967, the 
Washington Office, in part responding to preservationist clamor, directed 
Regional Foresters to inventory the roadless areas in their regions that met the 
requirements of the Wilderness Act. As we have seen, because of conflicts with 
primitive area reviews and general lack of interest the agency realized, by 1969, 
that the regions could not meet the deadline date of June 30, 1970.285 
Accordingly, the Chief amended the regulations in May 1969 to extend the 
deadline to June 30, 1972.286 
By 1971 Chief Edward P. Cliff recognized that the new June 1972 deadline 
was in jeopardy. He issued directives to the regions to complete the inventory 
by the specified date and to report their recommendations for areas that merited 
285"Committee Report on Wilderness," 7. 
286Glen O. Robinson, The Forest Service; A Study in Public Land 
Management. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 163, 
"Committee Report on Wilderness," 7; Roadless Area Review and Evaluation 
FES 1973, appendix 11. 
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further study as New Study Areas.287 These new directives, in part a response 
to growing outside pressures to expand the wilderness system, were a 
continuation of the 1967 directives, but received the title: Roadless Area Review 
and Evaluation (RARE).288 
The objective of the RARE program did not involve actual recommendations 
for wilderness additions; rather it proposed the selection of those areas that were 
best suited for further study of possible future wilderness suitability. RARE 
attempted to employ a systematic analysis from which to derive wilderness 
study recommendations. This analysis included: an inventory of the roadless 
areas in the national forests; public involvement; Regional Forester 
recommendations; an interdisciplinary evaluation of the Regional Foresters' 
recommendations; and finally, the Chief's final selections. The first phase of 
287Robinson, 163. Craig W. Allin notes congressional and administration 
pressure to inventory the roadless areas. Preservationists maintained that the 
Forest Service, as demonstrated by the Mission Mountains Controversy, was 
misapplying the 1964 Wilderness Act by relying on the purity principle to 
determine wilderness suitability. In 1971, the Council on Environmental 
Quality, created by Title II of NEPA, circulated a draft executive order to 
inventory the roadless areas and protect them as wilderness until the President 
and Congress considered them for official inclusion in the system, Allin, 159-
160. 
288Interview with Tom Donahue; "Roadless Area Review and Evaluation, 
Final Environmental Impact Statement." 
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RARE produced a DES, followed by a second evaluative phase that produced 
the program's final recommendations.289 
To qualify as a RARE roadless area (not necessarily conferring New Study 
Area status), an area had to exhibit two characteristics: be roadless and 
undeveloped; and contain at least 5,000 acres.290 An area that was roadless 
and undeveloped had to pass three tests: need, suitability, and availability291 
These three tests, promulgated in the wilderness regulations drawn up by the 
1964 task force, applied the Forest Service's purity principle to the evaluation of 
wild country. 
The 1964 task force's explanation of the reasons for relying on the purity 
principle notwithstanding, what an examination of the three tests for roadless 
area qualification reveals a determination to protect commodities from 'lock-up' 
and economic non-utilization. Gifford Pinchot's original idea for the national 
forests to supply timber to local communities and industries still guided Forest 
Service managers. Forests contributed to the local communities' economies first 
and foremost; wilderness preservation occupied a lower priority. This reality 
was evident in the availability test, as specified in . . . 
289"Roadless Area Review and Evaluation, Final Environmental Impact 
Statement," 13-27. 
290Ibid, 14-15. 
291Ibid, appendix 11, 605. 
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Following are examples of lands which must, in the public interest, 
be fully developed and intensively managed for sustained yield 
production of resources other than Wilderness. The following 
would usually be considered as unavailable for Wilderness: 
1. Areas where the need for increased water production and 
additional onsite storage is so vital that the installation or 
maintenance of works and facilities incompatible with Wilderness 
is an obvious and inevitable public necessity. 
2. Areas where the Wilderness classification would seriously 
restrict or prevent the application of wildlife management measures 
of considerable urgency and importance. 
3- Highly mineralized areas . . . 
4- National Forest areas supporting heavy stands of high-quality 
timber, all of which is essential to the economic welfare of existing 
dependent communities, [emphasis added] 
5 Areas containing natural phenomena of such unique or 
outstanding nature that general public access should be provided. 
6. Lands needed to meet important long-range needs for 
developed recreation areas, such as winter sports sites, 
campgrounds, and picnic areas.292 
This availability test effectively omitted those lands with marketable stands of 
timber from the inventory, thus preserving the timber base. 
The RARE FES discussed, at length, the public commentary involved in the 
project. Nationally, the Forest Service held over 300 public meetings attended 
by 25,000 people. The agency received approximately 54,000 written 
individual and group opinions on RARE, and petitions containing 18,000 
signatures came to the Forest Service. The goals of soliciting public opinion 
were to ascertain whether the public desired more wilderness, and to receive the 
public's suggestions for additions or deletions to the inventory. The Forest 
292Ibid, 609. 
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Service reported strong support for more additions to the National Wilderness 
Preservation System, but they also reported that public opinion indicated that not 
all the roadless areas should be preserved.293 
Inventory and initial evaluation of the roadless areas occurred during the 
winter and spring of 1971-1972. RARE turned out to be more haphazard than 
systematic or comprehensive. In the Northern Region a ranger remembered 
RARE as nothing more than a quick response to a memorandum from the 
Washington Office. "We assembled a series of maps, drew lines around the 
roadless areas and sent them off," a Kootenai National Forest planner said; no 
in-depth physical inventory happened 294 
The San Francisco-based Sierra Club, disturbed at what they interpreted as a 
ploy to speed the development of America's remaining unprotected wild 
forested lands, observed that RARE might be vulnerable to NEPA in court. 
Consequently, they filed suit against the Department of Agriculture and the 
Forest Service to enjoin any development of national forest roadless areas. The 
Sierra Club obtained a preliminary injunction against Forest Service 
development of listed RARE roadless areas on August 16, 1972.295 
293Ibid, 15-19. 
294Interview with Robert Meuchel, Director of Planning, Lolo National 
Forest, Missoula, MT, April 13, 1992, notes. 
295Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 ELR 20071 (1972). 
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In Sierra Club v. Butz, District Judge Samuel J. Conti, following the Calvert 
Cliffs interpretation, found that the Forest Service failed to comply with NEPA 
in their RARE program. The Sierra Club pointed out that the areas not 
recommended for study status by the RARE process were likely to be developed 
under multiple use management. They argued that this was a major federal 
action that required compliance with NEPA. Conti was cognizant that his 
decision would be considered by the Forest Service as judicial interference in 
forest management, but Conti asserted the court's authority to ensure that the 
Forest Service complied with the law. Conti reduced the case to a question of 
NEPA compliance and judged that the Forest Service's RARE program fell 
under the purview of NEPA.296 
Attorneys from the Department of Justice, representing the Forest Service, 
argued that NEPA did not apply to RARE; the Forest Service's policy stemmed 
from the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act. They further protested that RARE 
did not represent a federal action as contemplated by NEPA. Without a formal 
decision to commit an action that would impact the environment, the defendants 
maintained, there could be no NEPA applicability. Conti disagreed: 
But as we all know that sometimes a non-decision or a non-action 
can be a breach of an affirmative duty to act. And I believe in 
this case, where you have a situation where the Forest Service in 
not acting upon this land in an affirmative nature and unclassifying 
2963 ELR at 20072. 
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it, and by having it in a category of unclassified, that it then 
becomes under the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, that it is 
susceptible to the letting of timber contracts, that in effect you are 
classifying it and you are classifying it as timber that is available 
for harvesting and timber available for letting.297 
Conti said, in effect, that the decision not to include an area as a New Study 
Area, was tantamount to releasing it for development, and that was indeed a 
major federal action, deserving an EIS. Conti issued a temporary injunction 
against the development of non-classified RARE lands and a full scale trial was 
set for November 6, 1972.298 
The Forest Service alerted its rangers of the need to adhere to the terms of the 
injunction; an EIS would need to precede any development of any RARE 
area.299 Meanwhile, the Forest Service contemplated the ramifications of 
defending their policies in court. They decided that to contest the issue was not 
in their interests, and thus they agreed to file an EIS prior to any action that 
would alter the landscape of any RARE area.300 On December 11, 1972, 
297Ibid. 
298Ibid at 20074. 
299United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Washington 
Office to Regional Foresters, Subject: Roadless Area Review, October 24, 1972, 
copy in possession of author. 
300United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Washington 
Office to Regional Foresters, Subject: Roadless Area Review, November 28, 
1972, copy in possession of author. 
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Judge Conti dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the case without 
prejudice.301 
Judge Conti's decision derailed the Forest Service's attempt to put at an end 
the question of wilderness expansion. In following the purity principle, the 
Forest Service excluded many areas from wilderness study consideration. By 
the terms of the RARE process those areas excluded were to remain in non-
wilderness multiple use management and continue to contribute to a forest's 
annual allowable cut of timber. NEPA functioned to prevent these areas from 
automatically falling under the axe; development could proceed only in 
compliance with NEPA or the courts would intervene. 
In January 1973, the Forest Service released its RARE DES. Preservationists 
immediately complained of the paucity of wilderness study recommendations-
only 11 million acres out of 56 million inventoried. The Wilderness Society 
and the Sierra Club decried the RARE results, noting that large tracts of 
roadless lands were omitted from New Study Area status. The Wilderness 
Society specifically mentioned Montana as containing large unclassified 
tracts.302 The DES results for Lolo National Forest seem to substantiate the 
preservationist's point. Out of 717,549 RARE acres, only two areas, Hoodoo 
3013 ELR at 20074. 
302James Risser, "The Forest Service and its Critics," The Living Wilderness. 
(Summer 1973), 8. 
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(the Montana portion of the Great Burn area) and Grizzly Basin, containing a 
scant 80,688 acres received New Study Area status.303 
Preservationists were not the only segment of the population concerned with 
the RARE results. Despite the release of the overwhelming majority of roadless 
acreage to multiple use management, the timber industry expressed apprehension 
over the amount of timber excluded from the annual allowable cut by the New 
Study Areas. At a Missoula press conference, Jack Stevenson, President of 
Intermountain Corporation in Darby, Montana, questioned whether the initial 
DES classification would reduce the cut. Regional Forester Steve Yurich 
replied that until the final classification there would be no reduction. When the 
final classifications were set, then the Region's cut would drop 55 MMBF per 
annum. Stevenson said he had no problem with the study areas as long as there 
was no drop in the annual allowable cut.304 However, Jean Warren, local 
Missoula representative for the Sierra Club, saw RARE as a victory for the 
commodity interests. She said, "I feel what we've seen today is quite a victory 
303Charles B. Tribe, Program Officer, Planning, Lolo National Forest, to 
Mike Comola, Northwest Citizens for Wilderness, March 8, 1977, RARE file, 
Headquarters, Lolo National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
304Dale Burk, "39 Wilderness Candidate Study Areas Designated," 
Missoulian, January 19, 1973, 1. 
for the miners and loggers, ... the wilderness resource has really been 
lost."305 
The Forest Service set an initial date of April 17, 1973 for comments on the 
DES. During the review of the DES, preservationists were able to prevail upon 
the Forest Service to include more areas as New Study Areas and when the new 
Chief Forester, John R. McGuire, announced the results of the FES on October 
15, it contained added acreage. But, McGuire knew that RARE provided little 
to resolve the roadless area conflict, "The process of reconciling the many 
conflicting uses, and demands, on the National Forests will no doubt take 
years."306 
As a result of public commentary, Lolo National Forest's 
RARE New Study Area acreage more than doubled during the review of the 
DES. The Forest Service added the 102,991 acre West Side Swan- Monture 
area, adjacent to the west boundary of the Bob Marshall Wilderness. 
Wilderness management protected the RARE study areas from extractive uses. 
Raymond Karr, Information Chief for the Northern Region, said this protection 
would last until the areas' final status was determined by administrative study. 
305Ibid. 
306John R. McGuire, "Introductory Statement Announcing final list of the 
New Wilderness Study Areas," October 15, 1973, copy in possession of author. 
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Chief of Timber Management John Milodragovich said that the Northern 
Region's annual cut would shrink by 57 MMBF due to the study areas.307 
As the courts moved, through NEPA, to reform federal land management 
behavior, so too did Congress. The 1970s witnessed a flurry of environmentally 
based legislation.308 The most significant of these new laws were the Forest 
and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA) of 1974 and the 
National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976.309 Traditionally, Congress 
seldom interfered in the Forest Service's management of the national forests, 
and prior to 1974 the Forest Service's basic legislative directive was the 
antiquated Organic Act of 1897, as amended by the Multiple Use Sustained 
Yield Act of I960.310 
RPA attempted to reform the longstanding budgetary woes of the Forest 
Service by requiring long-term resource and budget planning. Every ten years 
the Forest Service was to prepare an assessment of the status of the renewable 
307Dale Burk, "43 Wilderness Areas Selected in Northern Region," 
Missoulian, October 16, 1973, 1. 
308For an excellent overview of the 1970s legislation and the consequent 
effects on the U.S. Forest Service, see: Dennis C. Le Master, Decade of Change: 
The Remaking of Forest Service Statutory Authority During the 1970s. 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984). 
309Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, 88 
Stat. 476; National Forest Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2849. 
310Charles F. Wilkinson and H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource 
Planning in the National Forests. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1987), 36-37. 
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resources of the nation's forests and rangelands, and every five years the Forest 
Service would be responsible for a long-range resource plan with a forty-five 
year horizon. Additionally, every year the agency was to produce an annual 
RPA progress report. The President, in his annual budget request to Congress, 
would have to submit an explanation for all funding requests not consistent with 
his RPA required five-year Statement of Policy, which governs funding 
i 
requests. 
In practice, RPA has not fundamentally changed the Forest Service's 
budgetary process.312 Budget proposals and appropriations have consistently 
lagged behind the goals contemplated by the required plans.313 But RPA has 
served the bureaucratic purpose of deflecting criticism of Forest Service 
inadequacies in funding the various multiple uses of the national forests. 
Congress has the responsibility for appropriating funds for the various programs, 
including wilderness management funds.314 
Congress passed the National Forest Management Act to quiet the storm of 
protest over Forest Service management practices in places like Montana's 
311Ibid, 39-40. 
312For a collection of essays about resource planning and RPA see: Charles 
E. Hewitt and Thomas E. Hamilton, Forests in Demand: Conflicts and Solutions. 
(Boston: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1982). 
313Ibid, 40. 
314Clary, 189-190. 
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Bitterroot National Forest and West Virginia's Monongahela National Forest. In 
1973, in the case West Virginia Division of the Isaak Walton League of 
America, Inc. v. Butz the West Virginia Division of the Isaak Walton League of 
America, Inc. sued the Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz to stop the sale of 
timber in the Monongahela National Forest. The Isaak Walton League claimed 
that the Forest Service was in violation of the 1897 Organic Act with their 
methods of harvesting timber, namely clearcutting.315 
A literal reading of the Organic Act, still very much in effect in 1973, 
revealed language that prohibited many Forest Service timber management 
techniques. Trees had to be more than just mature enough to cut profitably, 
they had to be also physically mature and prior to harvest had to be marked 
individually with a slash of paint. These requirements made even-age 
management by the use of the clearcutting harvest method illegal. Accordingly, 
District Judge Earl Maxwell granted the League's motion for summary 
judgement to enjoin all timber harvests not in compliance with the Organic 
Act.316 
The Forest Service appealed the decision. They claimed that to comply with 
the provisions of the Organic Act would be economically impossible. U.S. 
315 West Virginia Division of the Isaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. 
Butz, 522 F. 2d 945 (1975). 
316Ibid. 
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge Field wrote that the language of 
the Organic Act was unambiguous; the law was clear on the methods to follow 
to harvest timber. Field realized the Appellate Court's decision to affirm 
Maxwell's ruling had severe consequences for the Forest Service and those 
dependent on public timber. Field wrote: 
We are not insensitive to the fact that our reading of the Organic 
Act will have serious and far-reaching consequences, and it may 
well be that this legislation enacted over seventy-five years ago is 
an anachronism which no longer serves the public interest. 
However, the appropriate forum to resolve this complex and 
controversial issue is not the courts but the Congress.317 
A year and two months after the Monongahela decision, President Gerald Ford 
signed NFMA into law, on October 22, 1976.318 NFMA expanded upon the 
RPA's directive to prepare land and resource plans. All contracts, permits, and 
other legal instruments involving the national forests had to conform to NFMA. 
NFMA guidance on timber harvesting borrows from the Church Guidelines, the 
congressional response to the clearcutting controversies of 1970. NFMA 
established clear limitation to the amount of timber that could be sold by the 
Forest Service. Most significantly, NFMA directed that National Forest 
317522 F. 2d at 955. 
318Dennis C. Le Master and Luke Popovich, "Development of the National 
Forest Management Act," Journal of Forestry, (December 1976), 808. 
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managers attempt to complete comprehensive 'forest plans' by 1985. NFMA 
planning would come to play a distinct role in wilderness planning.319 
Congressional guidance to the Forest Service in the form of legislation did not 
shelter the agency from all controversy as the 1970s advanced. The old sticking 
point of how to allocate the roadless areas still remained.320 As directed by 
the Conti decision from 1972 to 1977 the agency processed land allocations, 
both wilderness and non-wilderness, through the NEPA mandated EIS 
procedure. From the Forest Service viewpoint this process proved to be slow 
and tedious, and by 1977 they had allocated only five million acres of roadless 
land.321 
Development interests, such as the timber industry, were also frustrated at the 
slowness of the allocation process. Industry needed a stable timber base on 
which to base capital investments and plan for sales. These pressures, coupled 
with preservationist demands for more additions to the wilderness system, 
pointed toward another national attempt to resolve the roadless dilemma. This 
319Wilkinson and Anderson, 43. Wilkinson and Anderson's treatment of 
NFMA in Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests is the standard 
reference on the subject. 
32(>The term allocation refers to what management determination the Forest 
Service has made for an area. Some examples would be: timber base, wildlife, 
roadless, or combinations of two or more management techniques. 
321Raymond W. Karr, "Forests for the People: Case Study of the RARE II 
Decision," Ph. D. Dissertation, School of Forestry, University of Montana, 1983, 
121. 
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was speeded along when Jimmy Carter's administration assumed office in 1977 
and Dr. M. Rupert Cutler received the appointment as assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture for Natural Resources, the political head of the Forest Service.322 
Cutler had served as a forestry professor at Michigan State University, and had 
held positions in the Wilderness Society. Upon assuming his new duties in the 
Cater Administration, Cutler determined to launch a new roadless area review 
and evaluation that came to be called RARE II. Cutler's new inventory had two 
primary goals: first, to determine which roadless and undeveloped areas to 
recommend to Congress for wilderness designation; and second, identify those 
areas that should be released to non-wilderness multiple use management. 
Cutler set a deadline for the project's FES at the end of 1978 but he realized 
that definitive decisions on all areas by that date were unrealistic. Therefore the 
familiar 'study' category of 'further planning' would suffice in the areas for 
which the Forest Service could not immediately make a decision.323 
RARE II involved three phases: inventory; evaluation; and recommendation. 
The inventory phase consisted of the identification and mapping of roadless and 
undeveloped areas.324 Since the failure of the original RARE (I), the passage 
322Ibid. 
323M. Rupert Cutler, "RARE II: A Review of the Current Roadless Area 
Review and Evaluation," Western Wildlands, (Fall 1977), 6-7; Karr, 121. 
324Federal Register, United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 
"Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE II)," November 18, 1977. 
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of congressionally evaluated wilderness bills, such as those establishing the 
Scapegoat and Mission Mountains Wildernesses, and the recent passage of the 
Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975 all of which repudiated the Forest Service's 
once-governing purity principle, the criteria for qualification was less severe 
than in the previous inventory in 1971.325 
The Forest Service encouraged public participation in the inventory phase, 
even before its completion, in 227 public workshops held during the summer of 
1977, 17,000 people attended. The Forest Service officially welcomed 
suggestions for additions or deletions to the inventory.326 However, 
preservationists criticized the Forest Service's handling of this initial public 
commentary period. No evaluation of the roadless areas occurred at the 
meetings; the inventories had not yet been compiled at the time of the 
workshops. Preservationists complained that the input of the 17,000 attendees 
served no perceptible purpose other than public relations.327 
Lolo National Forest's public workshop, held on August 2, 1977, drew 150 
participants to Missoula's Eagle's Hall. The Forest Service asked these people 
325Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975, 88 Stat. 2096. Passed over the 
objections of the Forest Service, this act established sixteen wilderness areas in 
the Eastern United States. Passage of this act implicitly rejected the purity 
principle, as all the areas had signs of human impact. 
326Ibid. 
327Tim Mahoney and Jody Bolz, "RARE II: A Test for Forest Wilderness," 
The Living Wilderness, (Autumn 1978), 8. 
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to provide written comments on their proposed inventory of local roadless 
areas.328 In response to public demand, RARE II staffers conducted a second 
workshop at Superior, Montana. At this meeting participants complained that 
the Forest Service left little opportunity for verbal commentary on the 
329 program. 
The evaluation phase's goal was to identify the "gaps" in the existing structure 
of the National Wilderness Preservation System, and to fill them with 
appropriate RARE II areas.330 To determine which areas were appropriate, the 
Forest Service employed an agency-devised system called Wilderness Attributes 
Ratings System (WARS). This evaluative system competitively rated roadless 
areas by assigning a numerical score to each area. The basis for each area's 
score was a sum of separate ratings of each area's wilderness attributes. These 
attributes stressed those qualities identified in the Wilderness Act: natural 
integrity, apparent naturalness, outstanding opportunities for solitude, primitive 
328Linda Robbins, "Public Comment Solicited at Roadless Area Hearing," 
Missoulian, August 4, 1977, 5. 
329Margie Hahn, "Questions about RARE II Remain Unanswered," 
Missoulian. August 28, 1977, 7. 
330Federal Register, November 18, 1977. 
146 
recreation, and outstanding ecological, geological, scenic, and historical 
features.331 
During RARE II, Forest Service officials identified 28 roadless areas in Lolo 
National Forest comprising 686,000 acres. Additionally, five other areas were 
added to the inventory list because they were either pending in congressional 
wilderness legislation or received strong citizen support; these areas totaled 
126,300 acres.332 Of these areas, those with the highest WARS ratings were 
the same areas proposed for New Study Area status during RARE I; Hoodoo 
(Great Burn) and the Swan-Monture. Those areas with low WARS ratings 
tended to be those highest in potential timber yield.333 
The final phase of RARE II, the recommendations, attempted to follow the 
NEPA process. With the release of the RARE II DES on June 15, 1978, the 
Forest Service provided a list of ten possible recommendation alternatives. 
Roadless area allocations ranged from all areas released to non-wilderness 
multiple use to all areas recommended for wilderness. One alternative proposed 
331United States Forest Service, Wilderness Attribute Rating System Task 
Force, "RARE II Wilderness Attribute Rating System: A User's Manual," copy 
in possession of author, 1. 
332Charles B. Tribe to District Rangers and Program Officers, Subject: 
RARE II Inventory, November 10, 1977, RARE II Files, Headquarters Lolo 
National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
333Charles B. Tribe to District Rangers and Program Officers, Subject: 
RARE II Wilderness Attribute Rating System, February 17, 1978, RARE II File, 
Headquarters Lolo National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
147 
keeping the status quo, rendering RARE II invalid. Importantly, the Forest 
Service did not reveal its preferred alternative in the DES.334 
Preservationists were not satisfied with the Forest Service's list of alternatives 
and proposed one of their own- Alternative W.335 In Montana, Alternative W 
received support from the Montana Coalition for Wilderness, an umbrella group 
comprised of local chapters of the Sierra Club, the Montana Wilderness 
Association, and numerous smaller, local grass-roots groups. Alternative W 
responded to the preservationist perception that the Forest Service's range of 
alternatives were heavily slanted toward development.336 
With the release of the RARE II DES, another round of public commentary 
commenced. The Forest Service gave the public three and a half months to 
make their final comments on RARE II. The Montana respondents to the 
RARE II DES separated into polar interest groups. A review of the letters 
received at Region One Headquarters and Lolo Forest in Missoula seems to 
334Federal Register, United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 
"Roadless Area Review and Evaluation: RARE II Update,"; "Alternative 
Overview," internal Forest Service Document, RARE II File, Headquarters, Lolo 
National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
335Alternative W proposed a separate list of locations for wilderness. In 
Lolo National Forest Alternative W recommended: HooDoo, Meadow Creek, 
Marshall Peak, Cube Iron\ Silcox, Rattlesnake, Burdette Creek, Garden Point, 
Lolo Creek, and MacGregor-Thompson. 
336Bill M. Comola to Robert Torheim, Northern Region Forester, September 
29, 1978, RARE II File, Headquarters, Lolo National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
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indicate equivalent support for wilderness and development. 
Representative of the polarity of opinion, the Montana League of Women 
Voters wrote to urge the Forest Service to consider the economic and 
environmental costs of developing roadless areas. Also, echoing the concern of 
the Sierra Club, the League decried the lack of an adequate period for 
considering public opinion.337 In an opposing viewpoint, the Montana 4x4 
Association, Inc., wrote to Lolo Forest urging the adoption of the alternative that 
allocated all roadless areas for non-wilderness use.338 
The University of Montana hosted a national conference on RARE II, held on 
August 4 through the 5, 1978. The National RARE II Symposium saw such 
notables as Assistant-Secretary of Agriculture M. Rupert Cutler, Chief Forester 
John McGuire, and Congressman Max Baucus (then also candidate for the U.S. 
Senate) in attendance. The conference brought together the widely disparate 
interests involved in the RARE II process, including the administration, 
337 Priscilla Maclean, President, Montana League of Women Voters to 
Robert Torheim, Regional Forester, United States Forest Service, Region One, 
Missoula, MT., September 22, 1978, Lolo National Forest RARE II files, 
Headquarters Lolo National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
338 Jerry L. Smith, Regional Vice-President, Montana 4x4 Association, Inc. 
to Lolo National Forest, Missoula, MT, September 21, 1978, Lolo National 
Forest RARE II files, Headquarters, Lolo National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
149 
Congress, industry, academia, and conservationists, to discuss the DES and the 
general progress of RARE II.339 
Presenting the congressional perspective on RARE II, Max Baucus stressed the 
importance of basing land allocation decisions on the effects those decisions 
have on people. Baucus noted the demands of competing resource interests on a 
growing scarcity of resources. Wilderness could not be separated from the other 
related forest issues according to Baucus, and the RARE II process had to 
address the problems of scarcity and competition for resources. The soon to be 
senator (who would replace wilderness champion Lee Metcalf) offered no 
concrete opinion on the potential success of RARE II but said expectations that 
RARE II would solve the entire national roadless area issue in "one fell swoop" 
were unrealistic.340 r- r ^ 
In a prophetic speech, Douglas Scott, the Sierra Club's northwest 
representative and national RARE II coordinator, predicted the failure of RARE 
II. Calling RARE II "fundamentally misdirected," Scott railed against the Forest 
Service's quest for speed in solving the roadless question. The Sierra Club saw 
the Forest Service's efforts as unfair and the latest in a series of "quick and 
339 Montana Forest and Conservation Experiment Station, School of 
Forestry, University of Montana, Proceedings: Professional Perspectives on 
RARE II Decision-Making for the Western United States. August 4-5, 1978, 
Missoula, MT. 
340 Max Baucus, "The RARE II Process: Congressional Views, Cares, 
Concerns", Proceedings, pp.159-161. 
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dirty" attempts to resolve the roadless areas' fate. Scott interpreted the 
preoccupation with rapidity as an effort to get back to the business of 
development.341 
Speaking for development interests, William Mote, a geologist from the 
Northwest Mining Association, appealed to national security concerns for the 
necessity of developing Western public lands. Stating that the United States 
imported more than half its annual requirement of 18 (unspecified) critical, non-
fuel minerals, Mote noted the existence of many of those critical minerals on 
Forest Service land. He stressed the danger of relying on foreign sources (1978 
saw OPEC limit oil supplies to the U.S., resulting in the infamous gas lines) and 
the essential need for home supplies. Mote conceded the wisdom of preserving 
"truly outstanding wilderness," but emphasized the need to quantify that 
outstanding wilderness and return the remaining national forest roadless areas to 
multiple use.342 
Once the time allocated for public commentary on the DES expired, the Forest 
Service went to work producing the FES. This document arrived, on schedule, 
in January, 1979. Contained in the FES were the agency's recommendations to 
congress for the roadless areas. The preferred allocations emphasized high 
341 Douglas W. Scott, "Views, Cares, Concerns From The Non-
Development Perspective", Proceedings, pp.60-61. 
342 William Mote, "Statement by Northwest Mining Association", 
Proceedings, pp.308-312. 
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resource outputs while adding to the wilderness system those areas with the 
highest WARS ratings. Nationally, this translated into 624 areas with 
15,088,838 acres recommended for wilderness, 1,981 areas with 36,151,558 
acres for non-wilderness, and 314 areas with 10,796,508 acres for further 
planning.343 
In Montana, the Forest Service recommended 35 areas totaling 603,381 acres 
for wilderness and 28 areas with 1,300,614 acres received further planning 
status. Non-wilderness roadless areas released to non-wilderness multiple use 
totaled 158 with 3,437,044 acres.344 Six Lolo National Forest areas received 
recommendations for wilderness: a Bob Marshall addition, Schley Mountain 
and Hoodoo (Great Burn), Clearwater-Monture, Quigg, and Dunham Point. 
These areas totaled 246,351 acres representing the creation of two new 
wildernesses, the Great Burn and Sliderock (Quigg), plus additions to the Bob 
Marshall complex and Selway-Bitterroot. One area just north of Missoula, the 
Rattlesnake, received further planning status.345 
343 United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "Summary-
Final Environmental Statement: Roadless Area Review and Evaluation", 
January, 1979, pp.2-3. 
344 United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "RARE II: 
Final Environmental Impact Statement", January, 1979, Appendix J, p.J-1. 
345 Ibid, p.J-5. 
152 
The FES proposed to President Jimmy Carter the legislative designation of 
wilderness for those areas recommended for wilderness. Non-wilderness area 
selections were to be released to non-wilderness multiple use management by 
April 15, 1979. Lands that fell into the further planning category were to 
remain essentially undeveloped until individual forest planning, under the 
provisions of NFMA, decided their ultimate fate.346 
Front page headlines announced the release of the RARE II FES in Missoula 
on January 5, 1979. Missoulian writer Don Schwennesen interpreted the results 
of RARE II as a victory for wilderness opponents because the FES supported 
the release of two-thirds of the nation's roadless areas to non-wilderness 
use.347 Preservation groups blasted RARE II and the Forest Service. John 
Piatt, Executive Director of the Oregon Environmental Council, expressed 
extreme disappointment over the results. The Sierra Club's Doug Scott frankly 
stated, "RARE II decisions in the Pacific Northwest are the worst in the nation." 
Doug Jones, of Friends of the Earth, questioned the motives of the program, 
346 Ibid, p.4. 
347 Don Schwennesen, "Wilderness Foes Score a Victory in North Region", 
and "Wilderness Advocates Dismayed, Industry pleased by RARE II Results", 
Missoulian, January 5, 1979, pp. 1-2. 
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claiming that "most of the areas proposed for wilderness have never been 
available [for resource development] anyway."348 
On April 16, 1979, after two and a half months of public review of the Final 
EIS, President Carter released his formal recommendation to Congress. 
Deviating little from the RARE II FES, Carter recommended 15.4 million acres 
for wilderness, 36 million acres for non-wilderness, and 10.6 million acres for 
further planning. Calling RARE II a "comprehensive nationwide review and 
evaluation" Carter hoped that his recommendations would end the controversy 
over the fate of the roadless lands.349 
Yet, far from ending the controversy, the RARE II Final EIS stirred up a 
hornet's nest of opposition from preservationists, Congress, and state 
government officials. Representing developers, Congressman Thomas J. Foley, 
Democrat from Washington, tried twice to get pro-development wilderness 
legislation passed. First, Foley introduced The National Forest Multiple Use 
Management Act of 1980. This act proposed the immediate release of the 36 
million acres of roadless land not recommended for wilderness by RARE II. 
Additionally, those areas in the further planning category that had not had their 
348 "Northwest Conservationists decry RARE Recommendations", 
Missoulian, January 7, 1979, p.3. 
349 Ibid. 
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status resolved by January 1, 1985, reverted to multiple use planning. Foley's 
bill had 54 co-sponsors and that was about all the support it received.350 
Foley tried again with a second bill, a revision of his failed first, called the 
National Forest Roadless Areas Act. A compromise with preservationists, 
Foley's second bill would have immediately conferred wilderness designations 
on the areas selected for wilderness by RARE II. Areas not selected for 
wilderness passed into non-wilderness multiple use planning. House of 
Representatives forces sympathetic to the preservationist cause also rejected 
Foley's second bill.351 
As the RARE II EIS became the topic of discussion among those interested in 
public lands issues, the state of California explored the possibility of judicial 
action to reverse the roadless area allocations of RARE II. Once again, NEPA 
would be used by preservationists to suspend temporarily an unpopular federal 
land management program. When RARE II failed to withstand the rigors of 
judicial review, future wilderness expansion was left to individual state 
congressional delegations and in Montana, this process has ground down into 
stagnation. Congress and the courts continued to influence wilderness policy 
during the 1980s. As the conservative Reagan Administration assumed office, 
environmentalist prepared to wage battle for the last remaining vestiges of wild 
350 Allin, 164. 
351 Ibid, 164-165. 
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country in America.352 The wilderness debate polarized between two 
philosophically opposed groups, environmentalists and a new, grassroots activist 
impulse- the utilitarian wise use movement.353 Caught in the middle of the 
political crossfire stood the U.S. Forest Service. 
352For public lands policy during the first term of the Reagan 
Administration, see: C. Brandt Short, Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands: 
America's Conservation Debate, 1979-1984, (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1989). 
353The Wise Use movement began with a meeting in Reno, Nevada in 
August 1988. This movement, comprised of conservative ideologues, Business 
interests (especially those involved in natural resource dependent activities), 
conservative politicians, and grassroots organizations, seeks to minimize federal 
control of federal lands and to maximize those lands economic profitability. 
The Wise Use movement is explicitly against further wilderness designations, 
Robert L. Barry, "The Wise Use Movement: A Briefing Paper for Montana," 
Montana Alliance for Public Policy, 1992. 
CHAPTER FIVE: Judicial Critique, Congressional Stalemate, 
and Polarization 
Congress and the courts continued to influence wilderness policy during the 
1980s. As the conservative Reagan administration assumed office, 
environmentalists prepared to wage battle for the last remaining vestiges of wild 
country in America.354 The wilderness debate polarized between two 
philosophically opposed groups, environmentalists and a new, grassroots activist 
impulse- the utilitarian Wise Use movement. Caught in the middle of the 
political crossfire stood the U.S. Forest Service. 
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture M. Rupert Cutler stated two goals for 
RARE II in 1977: to complete the National Wilderness Preservation system for 
the national forests, and to release those areas not selected for wilderness to 
multiple use management.355 With the distribution of the RARE II FES, 
wilderness advocates expressed deep dissatisfaction with the results. Far from 
resolving the future of wilderness allocation, RARE II produced a renewed 
354For a discussion of public lands policy during the first term of the Reagan 
administration, see: C. Brandt Short, Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands: 
America's Conservation Debate. 1979-1984. (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1989). 
355Raymond W. Karr, "Forests for the People: Case Study of the RARE II 
Decision," Ph. D. Dissertation, School of Forestry, University of Montana, 1983, 
122-124. 
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effort from preservationists to save the remaining wild places. The Wilderness 
Society called for pressure on Congress; the State of California sued to enjoin 
the release of designated non-wilderness areas in that state; and in Montana, a 
grass-roots wilderness group struggled to designate a unique wilderness, just 
north of the Missoula city limits.356 
RARE II occurred during a period of much activity in the process of land 
management planning. While the national roadless inventory proceeded, the 
Forest Service continued with RPA and National Forest Management Act 
(NFMA) planning, and Congress furthered separate wilderness legislation. 
According to one land management study, RARE II contributed "another layer 
of confusion" to the forest planning process.357 To complicate matters further, 
with California's decision to sue the Forest Service in California v. 
Bergland358, the judiciary entered the picture, under the familiar pretext of the 
now familiar National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 
Looking back, the Forest Service's record with NEPA and wilderness issues 
was not outstanding. RARE I had died in Sierra Club v. Butz. In Wyoming 
356Tim Mahoney, "RARE II's Results: Too Little Wilderness," The Living 
Wilderness, (January-March, 1979), 12. 
357Samuel Trask Dana and Sally K. Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy: Its 
Development in the United States, (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing 
Company, 1980), 302. 
358California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465 (1980). 
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Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, (1973) the court had enjoined two 
valuable timber sales; and in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 
(1974), the court had issued an injunction to halt logging adjacent to a 
wilderness area. These cases revolved around the Forest Service's inadequate 
preparation of environmental impact statements. One might assume that by the 
time of RARE II the service would have ascertained the complexities of Section 
102,(2),(C), but in 1980 a federal district court discovered that the service still 
had much to discover. 
California's main point of contention in California v. Bergland centered on the 
Forest Service's alleged failure [to] "critically examine" the effect of its 
decisions on the wilderness quality of the RARE II areas. District Judge 
Lawrence Karlton replied to the California allegation, 
My examination of the RARE II environmental statement has 
convinced me that the Forest service either never seriously 
considered the impact of its decision on the wilderness qualities of 
the RARE II areas, or that the Forest Service has simply failed to 
disclose the data, assumptions, and conclusions employed by it in 
such a consideration.359 
Judge Karlton further criticized the RARE II EIS for not revealing what the 
service was to sacrifice (in terms of land) by releasing the preponderance of 
acreage to non-wilderness uses.360 Additionally, aside from accounting for 
359483 F. Supp. at 470. 
360Ibid. 
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the impact of a non-wilderness designation on an area, the proposed action still 
had to constitute a major federal action in order for NEPA to apply. Defining a 
major federal action as one that changed the status quo, Judge Karlton held that 
RARE definitely qualified as a major federal action.361 Indeed, the Forest 
Service never questioned the applicability of NEPA to RARE II. 
NEPA's Section 102, (2), (C), directs agencies to include in their EISs a list of 
alternatives to the proposed action.362 Judge Karlton recalled how the courts 
had found the duty to include alternatives as the "lynch pin" of the whole 
impact statement.363 Indeed, Judge Wright, in his Calvert Cliffs opinion, had 
found that using alternatives was the only way "the most intelligent, optimally 
beneficial decision will ultimately be made."364 The RARE II EIS listed 11 
alternative courses of action. One alternative proposed to put all the Roadless 
areas into wilderness and the other ten proposed some form of development. 
Judge Karlton found the list heavily "skewed" toward non-wilderness options. 
He concluded that the Forest Service had "acted arbitrarily in its restriction of 
the range of alternatives."365 The all-wilderness option that the Forest Service 
361Ibid. at 478. 
362Public Law 91-190, Title I, Section 102, 2, C, iii. 
363483 F. Supp. at 487. 
364Quoted, Ibid, at 488, see also Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d. at 1114. 
365483 F. Supp. at 489. 
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relied upon to demonstrate that they considered a "broad range" of alternatives 
was neither serious nor acceptable under NEPA.366 
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the content of the RARE II EIS 
centered on the methodology of the evaluation of roadless areas. The Forest 
Service devised its rating system, WARS, to rate competitively individual 
roadless tracts. WARS assigned a numerical score to each area, with only the 
highest scores even considered for wilderness designation.367 
Judge Karlton found WARS to be deficient under NEPA; WARS did not 
supply the type of analysis required by the legislation. The courts interpreted 
NEPA to require that agencies take a "hard look" at their proposed actions, and 
the RARE II EIS did not accomplish the hard look. According to Judge 
Karlton, WARS "utterly failed" to consider the impact of a non-wilderness 
recommendation. Judge Karlton even found fault with the terminology used by 
the Forest Service to describe landforms. The terms used in the comments 
section on the WARS worksheet were too vague, inspiring a humorous footnote 
in the opinion: "One can hypothesize how the Grand Canyon might be rated: 
'Canyon with river, little vegetation'."368 
366Ibid. 
367WARS scores were based competitively on each area's naturalness, 
apparent naturalness, opportunity for solitude, and opportunity for primitive 
recreation. 483 F. Supp. at 485. 
368483 F. Supp. at 486, note 22. 
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RARE II betrayed a not too subtle bias toward resource production, according 
to the opinion in California v. Bergland. The EIS failed to address the impact 
of the decision not to classify an area as wilderness. However, the EIS spoke 
volumes about the costs of foreclosing development.369 The Calvert Cliffs 
opinion had clearly announced that compliance with NEPA involved a balanced 
analysis of all factors370 yet the RARE II EIS never addressed the values lost 
or gained by the decision to develop a roadless area. NEPA demands full 
disclosure and full consideration of environmental factors.371 The Forest 
Service published instead a resource commodities report. 
Critical to Judge Karlton's rejection of the RARE II EIS was the lack of site 
specific analysis of the individual areas. The EIS contained just the numerical 
WARS ratings for each area listed in a computer print-out format. Forest 
Service counsel defended the EIS by arguing that if the agency included a 
written analysis of each RARE II area, the final document would be too 
"bulky."372 The judge's response: "A statutory duty cannot be excused simply 
because it is difficult to perform."373 The resultant difficulty in providing a 
369Ibid. at 485. 
370449 F.2d at 1113. 
371Ibid. 
372483 F. Supp. at 487. 
373Ibid. 
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site-specific EIS was not due to the statute but to the scope of the project that 
the Forest Service voluntarily took upon itself.374 
California also charged that the public commentary process on the RARE II 
EIS violated NEPA. The state raised three objections: first, the Forest Service 
failed to afford the public an opportunity to comment on the final EIS that 
contained the Forest service's recommendations375; second, the Forest Service 
never responded to site specific comments on the draft EIS, and third, the Forest 
Service changed its method of evaluating comments after the draft EIS376, 
NEPA and the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines contemplated a 
reasonable opportunity for public commentary on proposed federal actions;377 
Judge Karlton found that the RARE II EIS was at variance with this directive 
and held the California objections valid. 
As interpreted by the courts, the RARE II EIS contained serious flaws and was 
beyond salvation. Accordingly, Judge Karlton granted a motion for an 
injunction against the development of the forty-seven non-wilderness areas in 
374Ibid. 
375The Forest Service received public comments only on the draft EIS, 
which did not contain any land use recommendations. The final EIS that did 
contain the recommendations had a limited circulation to mostly government 
entities, so the public never had a chance to comment on the specific proposals. 
376483 F. Supp. at 493. 
377Ibid. 
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California. Full compliance, including an adequate assessment of the wilderness 
values in a site specific analysis, had to occur before such development could 
proceed.378 RARE II, in California, suffered the same fate as its predecessor, 
RARE I. 
As a federal district court dramatically identified the differences between 
RARE II and NEPA, a Montana wilderness example illustrated the differences 
in wilderness perception between RARE II and the Forest Service, the public, 
and the Congress. In the fall of 1974, newly retired Forest Service official 
William R. (Bud) Moore decided to spend his first winter of retirement trapping 
in the Welcome Creek drainage of the Sapphire Mountains. While on his 
trapping expedition, Moore maintained a journal that eventually would help 
establish a wilderness area. 
Welcome Creek was a roadless island in patchwork of clearcut developments 
in Lolo National Forest's southeastern section. Topographically not as 
spectacular as many existing wildernesses, such as the Bob Marshall, Welcome 
Creek's 28,000 acres featured forested ridges, steep slopes, rushing waters, rock 
outcrops and cliffs.379 Welcome Creek was most widely known as a tributary 
of the famous trout fishery, Rock Creek. The Forest Service had ignored 
378483 F. Supp. at 502. 
379Steve Woodruff and Don Schwennesen, Montana Wilderness: Discovering 
the Heritage, (Kansas City: The Lowell Press, 1984), 71. 
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Welcome Creek during RARE I because of a ten-year old timber sale in the 
area and the presence of an intruding road in the area's northeastern section.380 
Nonetheless, a minor controversy developed over the Forest Service's neglect 
of Welcome Creek during RARE I.381 Bud Moore remembers people 
repeatedly asking him his opinion of the area as interest in the roadless 
character of the creek drainage increased.382 By 1974, Moore's fascination in 
Welcome Creek was aroused sufficiently to convince him to make a September 
scouting of the area's potential for fur trapping. Moore's reconnaissance turned 
up much evidence of small fur-bearing mammals such as marten and bobcat, 
and thus he decided to trap Welcome Creek that winter.383 
When Moore began laying his trapline through the Welcome Creek drainage, 
he noticed the tell-tale signs of impending timber harvest. Cruisers had left the 
distinctive paint slashes on trees, marking not only harvestable timber 
380Interview with William R. Moore, telephone, December 2, 1992, notes. 
381Margaret Knox and the Montana Watercourse, For the Sake of the Creek: 
Land and Water Use in the Rock Creek Basin and the Effort to Preserve the 
Resource, (Bozeman, MT: The Montana Watercourse, 1991), 10. 
382Interest in the conservation of the entire Rock Creek draining increased 
during the 1970s. The Forest Service, in 1972, chartered the Rock Creek 
Advisory Committee to allow for the consideration of public opinion in the 
management of the drainage, Knox, vi. 
383William R. Moore, "Public Treasures in the Welcome Creek Drainage, 
Sapphire Mountains, Montana," unpublished report, April 1975, copy in 
possession of author. 
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boundaries but also road locations to support the harvest. Moore then conceived 
of his trip as more than a trapping venture; he kept detailed journals of his 
winter in Welcome Creek and thought his observations of the biotic diversity 
within the creek's natural setting might help the Forest Service to "step back" 
and reconsider their timber harvest plans.384 
Though lacking in towering peaks and reflective lakes, Welcome Creek 
displayed a unique wild nature to Bud Moore. He wrote in his journal: 
Because Welcome Creek's canyon walls are steep, fall and winter 
sun rarely brighten its bottom land. Except for the creek's 
energetic music, I hiked alone in silence deepened by the 
mountain's shadow. Each intimate twist in the trail. . .there are 
many . . . opened sudden new vistas, mini worlds they were, each 
different than the last, expanding ahead then closing behind a rock 
point or a giant spruce tree as I ambled on through the spell of 
evening hush.385 
Moore's journal continually argues for land managers to consider the natural 
elements in their planning decisions: 
I got to wondering if the timber marking foresters ever feel, as I 
do, that with each stroke of the paint gun the loggers are not only 
authorized to take wood out of the mountains but something 
priceless is lost forever.386 
384Interview with William R. Moore, December 2, 1992; "Public Treasures," 
2. 
385William R. Moore, "Winter of 1974-75 Trapping the Sapphire Country," 
unpublished journal, copy in possession of author. 
386Ibid. 
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His descriptions of Welcome Creek are cast against the impending destruction 
caused by future commodity extraction. More than timber harvest threatened 
the wildness of Welcome Creek. Welcome Creek, historically, supported 
mining activity. Moore suggested ways to make future mineral extraction 
compatible with the wild character of Welcome Creek. He observed: 
But what of the placer gold claims staked out along the creek? 
Given the mining history of the land, these somehow seem to fit 
into the scheme of an interesting future. If and when they're 
worked, mud would flow in the creek as it did during the big gold 
mining operations years ago. But this could be minimized by 
settling ponds near the sluice boxes. 
The key it seems to me, is to keep the big machinery out of here 
when mining. Mining by hand would be tolerable with wild 
values here. It would, in fact, rekindle the rich history of 
yesteryear and add a new dimension to the Welcome Creek 
3R7 experience. 
Moore's journal, and the subsequent report he wrote based on his journals, 
painted a picture of the creek's distinct wildness; the Welcome Creek drainage 
was a roadless area not deemed worthy by the Forest Service for consideration 
as wilderness. Even Moore did not originally support statutory wilderness 
designation for Welcome Creek, as his ideas on allowing mining indicate. 
Instead, he advocated some form of special management status that would allow 
for minor commodity extraction while preserving the drainage's essential nature. 
387Ibid. 
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Moore took his report to Regional Forester Steve Yurich who paid little 
attention to it as he believed the timber sales should proceed.388 
The professional wilderness advocates, however, gave Moore's report great 
attention. First, Clifton Merritt called Moore to obtain a copy, and later 
Montana Wilderness Society representative Bill Cunningham received a copy. 
Moore's report fit in nicely with a new legislative measure in Washington, D.C. 
Wilderness advocates and sympathetic Congressional members, such as Lee 
Metcalf and California Congressman Philip Burton had drafted a bill to protect a 
number of western roadless areas as statutory wilderness. This multi-state 
omnibus bill, the Endangered American Wilderness Act, originally contained 
three Montana areas selected by Bill Cunningham: MacGregor-Thompson and 
Welcome Creek in Lolo National Forest and Mount Henry in Kootenai National 
Forest.389 
Moore's report had inspired Bill Cunningham to seek congressional support 
for the area's inclusion in the Endangered Wilderness bill. Another influential 
person in providing site-specific data on Welcome Creek, and instrumental in 
the area's successful designation, was University of Montana wildlife biology 
professor and Director of the Wilderness Institute, Bob Ream. Ream supplied 
388Interview with William R. Moore, December 2, 1992. 
389Interview with William R. Moore, December 2, 1992; interview with Bill 
Cunningham, December 1, 1992, Missoula, MT, notes. 
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key data on elk in the Welcome Creek drainage that helped to sway 
• • 390 opinion. 
By 1977, however, Welcome Creek ran into trouble from Congressman Max 
Baucus. Baucus opposed Welcome Creek's inclusion in the Endangered 
American Wilderness Act because he had pledged his support to another 
Montana wilderness bill, the Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977.391 
Baucus forced the deletion of the three Montana wilderness proposals while the 
Endangered American Wilderness Act was in subcommittee.392 
However, Welcome Creek benefitted from the usual animosities inherent in the 
Congress. California's Philip Burton was no friend of Max Baucus, and when 
the Endangered Wilderness bill reached the full Interior Committee, Burton 
amended the bill to include Welcome Creek. In a twist of political discourse, 
Montana's Republican Representative from the eastern district, who was no 
supporter of preservationist measures, Ron Marlenee supported Welcome 
Creek's inclusion. Marlenee hoped to embarrass Baucus, and Welcome Creek 
390Interview with Bill Cunningham, February 1, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes. 
391The Montana Wilderness Study Act (Public Law 95-150), first proposed 
by Senator Lee Metcalf in 1974, classified nine areas, totaling almost a million 
acres, as wilderness study areas. This classification provided a less stringent 
(than statutory wilderness) protection for the areas until Congress decided on 
their future. Lorna Naegele, "Impasse over Montana Wilderness: An 
Environmental Perspective," professional paper, University of Montana, 1992, 
20. 
392Congressional Record- House, September 12, 1977, 28812. 
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stands as the only wilderness designation supported by Ron Marlenee during his 
long tenure in office.393 
Baucus did not discover that he had been politically outmaneuvered until the 
Endangered American Wilderness Act reached the floor of the House. When 
the bill reached the floor, the regular House rules were suspended, offering no 
chance of amendment. Baucus was livid; he said he would have offered an 
amendment to remove Welcome Creek if the rules had been in effect. Baucus 
then reiterated his opposition to the Welcome Creek Wilderness: 
Mr. Speaker, it is true that I did object to it, and that there were 
two contestants. It is true that there is one area that was included 
within the First District of Montana, and I think that area should 
not be included. The full committee did include that portion.394 
Custom dictates, in wilderness politics, that the congressional delegation of a 
state in which there is a wilderness recommendation approve an area's inclusion 
into the National Wilderness Preservation System. Rarely is this protocol 
breached, or if so, usually only over the objections of a minority party 
representative. Yet Baucus was a member of the majority Democratic party and 
he opposed a wilderness area located in his own district. Nevertheless, with the 
rules suspended, Baucus was helpless to prevent Welcome Creek's inclusion in 
393Interview with Bill Cunningham, December 1, 1992. 
394Congressional Record-House, September 12, 1977. 
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the bill. Baucus voted for the Endangered American Wilderness Act anyway, 
and on September 12, 1977, the House passed the bill.395 
Concurrent with the congressional debate over the Endangered American 
Wilderness Act was the Forest Service's RARE II. Due to administrative 
support, Welcome Creek was included in this inventory.396 However, the 
Forest Service rated the area low in its WARS summary, giving it only a 19, a 
low score indicating that through the RARE II recommendation process, 
Welcome Creek lacked any chance of recommendation.397 Welcome Creek's 
WARS rating indicated that the purity principle still exerted some influence on 
Forest Service wilderness policy and Welcome Creek's extractive potential. 
Forest Service plans to develop Welcome Creek were thwarted on February 
24, 1978, when President Carter signed the Endangered American Wilderness 
Act into law. The act specified that the national interest required that lands 
such as Welcome Creek be protected from the pressures of a "growing 
395Congressional Record- House, September 12, 1977, 28879. 
396Charles B. Tribe to District Rangers and Program Officers, Subject: 
RARE II Inventory, November 10, 1977. RARE II File, Headquarters, Lolo 
National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
397Charles B. Tribe to District Rangers and Program Officers, Subject: 
RARE II Wilderness Attribute Rating System, February 17, 1978, RARE II File, 
Headquarters, Lolo National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
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population" and increasing "large-scale and industrial growth."398 To 
preservationists, the symbolic value of Welcome Creek was as a demonstration 
that statutory wilderness, ultimately, would not be determined by programs like 
RARE II but by the Congress.399 Wilderness did not have to be rocks and ice, 
or spectacular scenery, but could encompass a more subtle and diverse ecology. 
Despite the Endangered American Wilderness Act, Judge Karlton's 
decision in California v. Bergland, and public discontent, the Forest Service 
attempted to salvage RARE II by appealing to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Meanwhile, Congress began enacting statewide wilderness bills based 
on RARE II. In Colorado and New Mexico, state bills passed in 1980. These 
enactments contained 'sufficiency' language- a congressional declaration that the 
RARE II EIS was sufficient for roadless area disposition in the states affected 
by the legislation. Most importantly, the Colorado and New Mexico bills had 
provisions written-in to preclude judicial review of the RARE II EIS for those 
states' bills.400 
398Endangered American Wilderness Act, Public Law 95-237 (92 Stat. 40), 
February 24, 1978, Section l,a,(3),b. 
399Interview with Bill Cunningham, December 1, 1992. 
400Karr, 150. 
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Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the renamed California v. 
Block401 reviewed the district court's findings that the RARE II final EIS did 
not contain a site specific analysis, that the EIS did not consider a sufficient 
number of alternatives, and that the public had an inadequate opportunity to 
comment on the project.402 
On the question of site specificity, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court. 
They agreed that the Forest Service had failed to conduct a "hard look" in their 
EIS. Moreover, the circuit court sustained the district's finding of undue bias 
toward resource production and an inadequate discussion of the implications of 
a non-wilderness designation. In summary, to refute the Forest Service's claim 
that site specificity was unfairly burdensome, Circuit Judge Tang said, 
We concede that conducting a detailed site specific analysis of the 
RARE II decision will be no simple task . . . The scope of 
undertaking here, however was the Forest Service's choice and not 
the courts'. NEPA contains no exemptions for projects of national 
403 scope. 
The Ninth Circuit also confirmed the other two points on appeal, alternatives 
and commentary. On alternatives, the circuit declared that, [the EIS] uncritically 
assumes that a substantial portion of the RARE II areas should be developed . 
401690 F.2d 753 (1982). The named defendant, Bob Bergland, Secretary of 
Agriculture, to which the Forest Service is a subordinate agency, was replaced 
by John Block as a result of the Reagan Administration's assumption of office. 
402Ibid. at 756. 
403Ibid. at 765. 
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. . . ."404 An obvious barb to the resource production bias of RARE II, Circuit 
Judge Tang called the range of alternative actions presented by the EIS 
"unreasonable."405 
The requirements for public commentary prompted the district court to adopt a 
standard of "clearly articulated" in relation to the proposed action presented to 
the public. The Ninth Circuit, however, found this a standard that would 
produce an endless series of EISs even for minor adjustments in the original 
plan. This was too extreme, and therefore the court rejected the district's 
standard.406 Instead, the circuit applied its own public commentary standard. 
This standard directed that, 
An impact statement should provide the public with information on 
the environmental impact of a proposed project as well as 
encourage public participation in the development of that 
information.407 
Judged against this standard, the circuit court concluded that the Forest Service, 
by withholding the final recommendation until the final EIS and thereby 
shielding the recommendation from public scrutiny, violated NEPA. Also found 
404Ibid. at 767. 
405Ibid. at 769. 
406Ibid. at 771. 
407Ibid. at 772. 
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insufficient was the service's response to the public's site specific 
commentary.408 
The effect of the Ninth Circuit's substantial affirmation of Judge Karlton's 
California v. Bergland opinion extended the injunction of the development of 
RARE II areas to the entire Ninth Circuit jurisdiction, which covered much of 
the West including Montana and therefore most of the roadless areas. 
California v. Block essentially rendered the objectives of RARE II invalid. As 
in Colorado and New Mexico, wilderness designation would have to go to 
Congress on an individual state-by-state basis; there would be no grand 
nationwide bill. Furthermore, the experiences of the Forest Service in the courts 
over NEPA provided a powerful indication that the courts would examine 
roadless areas' EISs very closely 409 
Thus in the post-Wilderness Act era, the most successful methods of 
expanding the National Wilderness Preservation System became multi-state 
omnibus bills (multiple areas in multiple states designated as wilderness) and 
single-area bills. Representative of the latter method and of the new power of 
grass-roots activism in achieving statutory wilderness designation under these 
revised conditions, is the story of the enactment of the Rattlesnake Wilderness. 
408Ibid. 
409Wilkinson and Anderson, 353. 
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Situated less than five miles north of Missoula's city limits, the Rattlesnake 
Mountains were unique as a roadless area. An almost complete ecosystem, the 
Rattlesnake featured a full array of animal life, including top predators such as 
wolves and grizzly bears. Combined with steep slopes, 8,000 feet high peaks, 
glaciated topography, and cold, clear waters, this wilderness existed in a 
somewhat primitive state because of the Rattlesnake Creek drainage's value as 
Missoula's water supply.410 
The two main landowners of the Rattlesnake drainage were the Montana 
Power Company and the Forest Service. In the early part of the twentieth 
century, the area contained numerous homesteads, and early settlers built timber 
and rock dams in the high country for water supply. Montana Power bought 
20,000 acres of the drainage to safeguard its investment in local water business. 
In the 1950s, the company decided to log some of its holdings in the 
Rattlesnake. A road was constructed along Rattlesnake Creek that climbed back 
into the forested slopes. Tributary sites along the upper creek were clearcut, and 
timber came rolling down the access road. Public criticism and the exhaustion 
410Bill Cunningham, Montana Wildlands: From Northwest Peaks to 
Deadhorse Badlands, Montana Geographic Series Number 16, (Helena, MT: 
Montana Magazine, American Geographic Publishing, 1990), 46; Woodruff and 
Schwennesen, 9. 
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of the easily harvested commercial timber forced the company to suspend 
further developments.411 
After the 1950s development, the Rattlesnake became a popular recreation spot 
for local people, especially those who preferred motorized recreation such as 
snowmobiles and motorcycles. As increasing litter, trails and conflicts between 
hikers and riders developed during the 1960s and early 1970s, a local grass­
roots protective group formed called, Friends of the Rattlesnake. This group 
included notable conservationist Arnold Bolle, and sought originally to regulate 
the competing recreation uses. Later, under the leadership of Cass Chinske, it 
came to support wilderness designation for the area412 
The Forest Service inventoried the Rattlesnake roadless area during both 
RARE programs. Rattlesnake rated a meager 21 on the WARS scale during 
RARE II, suggesting that the checkerboard land ownership patterns and the 
substantial evidence of human activity precluded the area from wilderness 
designation.413 When the RARE II DES was released, Rattlesnake generated 
411Ibid, 10. 
412Don Schwennesen, "The Rattlesnake: Missoula's Urban Wilderness," 
Western Wildlands, (Fall 1977), 11. 
413Charles B. Tribe to District Rangers and Program Officers, Subject: 
RARE II Wilderness Attribute Rating System, February 17, 1978, RARE II 
Files, Headquarters, Lolo National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
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more public commentary than any other area in the Northern Region.414 
Friends of the Rattlesnake worked closely with interested citizens in Missoula to 
provide over 700 written site-specific comments on the Rattlesnake.415 
In 1979 the final recommendations of the Forest Service's RARE II program 
gave the Rattlesnake a 'further planning' recommendation 416 This meant that 
the area would be reevaluated for its future status during the forest planning 
(NFMA) process. This recommendation focused the Friends of the 
Rattlesnake's determination to pursue statutory wilderness protection. Within 
the organization, wilderness advocates such as Arnold Bolle and Cass Chinske 
took over leadership, while original President Joe Musselman left the group 
because he opposed statutory protection417 
One of the big problems with wilderness protection for the Rattlesnake was 
the checkerboard land ownership pattern. Chinske proposed to Montana Power 
Company's Board of Directors either a land purchase or trade with the Forest 
Service. Chairman of the Board Joe McElwain responded to Chinske and the 
414United States Forest Service, Washington Office to Staff Directors, Forest 
Supervisors, and District Rangers, subject: RARE II, RARE II File, 
Headquarters Lolo National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
415Interview with Cass Chinske, January 25, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes. 
416United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "Final 
Environmental Statement; Roadless Area Review and Evaluation, RARE II," J-
5. 
417Interview with Cass Chinske. 
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Friends that the Montana Power Company would like to sell its Rattlesnake 
holdings to the Forest Service for protection as wilderness. Especially enticing 
to McElwain was the hefty congressional purchase appropriation.418 
The Friends of the Rattlesnake now turned to the ultimate arbiters of what 
constitutes wilderness- the U.S. Congress. Bolle and Chinske contacted 
freshman Congressman Pat Williams for support; since Williams had earlier 
expressed support for wilderness protection for the Rattlesnake. Missoula's 
unique collection of wilderness interests and the proximity of the Rattlesnake 
roadless area to those interests attracted Williams to the idea of establishing a 
wilderness educational center along with wilderness protection419 
The Friends of the Rattlesnake worked to build a solid local consensus behind 
the idea of statutory wilderness protection for the Rattlesnake. Along with the 
support of the Montana Power Company, local government officials, University 
of Montana professors and students, a large proportion of Missoula's residents 
expressed support for a Rattlesnake Wilderness 420 Timber industry opposition 
was de-fused by Lolo National Forest Supervisor Orville Daniels's testimony 
admitted Rattlesnake timber was an insignificant part of Lolo National Forest's 
418Matthew T. Blessing, "Grassroots Environmental Activism: A Case 
Study," M.A. Thesis, University of Montana, 1989, 96; Interview with Cass 
Chinske. 
419Blessing, 96-97. 
420Interview with Cass Chinske. 
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overall timber base.421 Only the motorcycle groups stood as organized 
opposition. 
Pat Williams introduced a wilderness bill for the Rattlesnake on November 14, 
1979, but was unable to advance it before the Christmas congressional break. 
Williams promised passage of a wilderness bill in 1980. During that interval, 
motorcyclists, operating as an organization called Rattlesnake Access 
Committee, approached Montana Senator John Melcher with a petition signed 
by 3,000 people opposing shutting off the Rattlesnake from motorized access. 
Melcher introduced a competing bill in the Senate that reserved an eight-mile 
access corridor along the old logging road along Rattlesnake Creek. Besides 
creating the 'Melcher Corridor', the Senate bill eliminated Williams's education 
center.422 
Melcher's amended proposal for the Rattlesnake earned him the lasting enmity 
of preservationists.423 His Rattlesnake plan would designate the northern 
30,000 acres of the drainage as wilderness with the southern section managed as 
a National Recreation Area along with the access corridor penetrating eight 
miles into the wilderness area. The bill provided for the purchase of the 
421Blessing, 103. 
422Blessing, 111-112. 
423Ibid, 113. 
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Montana Power Company holdings, along with other land exchanges to 
consolidate the Rattlesnake in federal ownership.424 
Williams's bill passed the House on September 23, 1980, without the Melcher 
Corridor and including the education center. Two days later, and ahead of 
schedule, Melcher put his bill before the Senate Energy Committee. All sides 
wanted the Rattlesnake legislation wrapped-up prior to the general election of 
1980; no one wanted to face the uncertainty of the brief post-election 
congressional session. Williams and Melcher met on October 1 to work out a 
compromise. Williams conceded his education center, but Melcher remained 
firm on the access corridor and yielded only a small 3,500 acre transfer from the 
recreation area to wilderness. Williams reported the compromise to Arnold 
Bolle and asked for an opinion; Bolle decided something was better than 
nothing and told Williams to go ahead.425 
President Carter signed the Rattlesnake Recreation Area and Wilderness Act of 
1980 on October 21, 1980. The Rattlesnake became perhaps the most unique 
component in the National Wilderness Preservation System primarily because of 
its proximity to the urban enclave of Missoula. The Wilderness area afforded 
statutory protection to an area complete with rugged and scenic terrain, but also 
424Senate Report No. 96-996, 96th Congress 2d Session, "Rattlesnake 
Wilderness," September 25, 1980, SS 13331. 
425Blessing, 113-115. 
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a diverse community of animal life- and all within a short hike from the 
Missoula city limits. The Rattlesnake represented a people's wilderness based 
on a community consensus and again, Forest Service management plans had 
been thwarted by popular will.426 
RARE II's nullification in the Block decision led to wilderness 
recommendations coming from the state congressional delegations. Most 
Western states followed the lead of Colorado and New Mexico and worked fast 
to resolve the roadless area issue. Montana and Idaho, however were unable to 
achieve a quick-fix to the fate of de facto wilderness existing in their national 
forests. While the wilderness debate in Montana polarized along familiar lines, 
wilderness planning and management reverted to the Forest Service and its 
NFMA forest planning process. 
Lolo National Forest planners conducted a re-inventory of all roadless lands 
within their forest's boundaries in 1983, as part of the NFMA forest planning 
process. Originally, planners relied upon the RARE II recommendations for 
roadless area planning purposes: However, the Block decision forced another 
assessment of the roadless areas' wilderness potential 427 Included in the 1983 
426Interview with Cass Chinske. 
4270rville Daniels, "Roadless Area Inventory: Lolo National Forest," Forest 
Service Information Packet, September 8, 1983, RARE II Files, Headquarters 
Lolo National Forest, Missoula, MT. 
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inventory were former Unit Plan roadless areas that were excluded from the 
RARE II inventory 428 With the addition of the Unit Plan areas, and 
accounting for the changes in acreage in the RARE II areas in the six years 
since that inventory, the 1983 inventory was not a replica of RARE II. 
The 1983 inventory reported 776,190 national forest roadless acres in Lolo 
National Forest. Unit Plan areas, such as the Petty Mountain Roadless Area 
(nearly 17,000 acres) west of Missoula, added to the total acres. Some areas, 
such as MacGregor-Thompson, located northwest of Missoula, were reduced by 
over 22,000 acres, as a result of timber harvest since RARE II.429 Besides 
recalculating acreage, the 1983 inventory recommended wilderness disposition 
for the upcoming forest plan. 
After going through the NEPA mandated requirements, in 1986 Lolo National 
Forest released its Forest Plan. The Forest Plan recommended 289,220 acres of 
new wilderness for Lolo National Forest (a 44,000 acre increase over RARE II 
recommendations) in basically the same geographic locations- Great Burn, Bob 
Marshall additions, and Quigg Mountain (located in the Rock creek drainage). 
428Planning conducted prior to NFMA was consolidated in Unit Plans, which 
were geographically categorized. Some Unit Plan areas contained roadless 
acreage and technically were managed according to the Unit Plan and thus 
exempted from RARE II. 
429United States Forest Service, Northern Region, "Roadless Area Inventory 
Report, April 25, 1984," Wilderness, Recreation, and Cultural Resources Office, 
Northern Region Headquarters, Missoula, MT. 
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These new proposed wilderness areas were to be managed in a manner that 
would preserve their wilderness characteristics until Congress decided their 
ultimate fate. An additional 169,982 acres of roadless land was placed in 
Management Area 11, a roadless management allocation code, under standards 
less restrictive than wilderness. The Forest Plan released the rest of the 
inventoried roadless acreage to various forms of development, including road 
construction and timber harvest.430 
As indicated by the Block decision and in the forest plans, Congress would 
decide the future of the roadless areas in state-by-state wilderness bills. 
Montana's congressional delegation introduced ten separate wilderness bills 
between June 1984 and September 1991 431 All ten bills failed to become 
law, and as of April 1993, Montana lacks legislation governing the final 
disposition of its roadless forested lands.432 Meanwhile, the individual 
national forest plans continue to manage the roadless areas. 
430United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Lolo National 
Forest, "Plan, February, 1986," III-32-III-55; United States Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, Lolo National Forest, "The Lolo National Forest 
Plan: Final Environmental Impact Statement, Appendices." 
431The last national forest wilderness area established in Montana was the 
259,000 acre Lee Metcalf Wilderness Area, located in the Beaverhead and 
Gallatin National Forests in 1983, as a single area bill. 
432Tom Donahue, Recreation Specialist for Northern Region, to author, 
March 23, 1993. 
184 
Standard post-RARE II wilderness politics require the unified support of the 
state's congressional delegation to pass a wilderness bill. In 1984, this 
consensus approach produced the proposed Montana Wilderness Act of 
1984.433 The 1984 bill closely resembled a typical RARE II bill, complete 
with RARE II sufficiency language for the state of Montana. Areas not 
designated as wilderness, or as special management areas were released to the 
forest plans, and the Forest Service was precluded from considering them for 
wilderness without the approval of Congress. The 1984 proposal designated 
747,178 acres of new wilderness in Montana. For Lolo National Forest there 
were to be two new wildernesses: Great Burn, 91,600 acres; Quigg Mountain, 
44,160 acres; and the Bob Marshall Complex additions, 139,560 acres plus a 
small Selway-Bitterroot addition at 3,700 acres.434 
Since the 1984 bill so closely resembled the RARE II recommendations, 
preservationists took the lead in opposing the bill. During the early 1980s, 
polarization occurred not only between preservationists and utilitarians, but also 
within the preservationist community. Increasingly, environmental groups, such 
as the Montana Wilderness Association, opposed the congressional consensus 
formula, which to them seemed automatically to produce bad wilderness 
433Naegele, 25. 
434United States Senate 98th Congress, 2d Session, "Montana Wilderness Act 
of 1984," S.2850, June 29, 1984. 
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legislation.435 Consensus politics required compromise- indeed compromise 
generally reflects the entire history of statutory wilderness, but many groups 
opposed compromise because it meant that certain areas would be excluded 
from protection as a matter of course. 
The 1984 Wilderness Act went nowhere in the 98th Congress. For Baucus, 
1984 was an election year and he was in no mood to press an unpopular 
bill 436 The next attempt at a Montana bill occurred in 1986, initiated by 
Melcher. This bill designated over a million acres as wilderness, including the 
Great Burn and Quigg in Lolo National Forest. Sufficiency and release 
language in the 1986 bill closely parallelled the 1984 legislation. Again, like its 
predecessor, Melcher's 1986 Montana Wilderness Act perished in the halls of 
Congress 437 
Montana came closest to a successful wilderness bill in 1988. In the summer 
of 1987, Senator Max Baucus and Representative Pat Williams introduced bills 
into both houses of Congress. By 1987, the consensus approach no longer 
restrained the Montana congressional delegation, with the exception of Melcher. 
Baucus fired first with his Senate bill designating 1,324,000 acres of wilderness 
435Interview with Bill Cunningham, February 1, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes. 
436Naegele, 25; Interview with Bill Cunningham. 
437United States Senate, 99th Congress, 2d Session, "Montana Wilderness 
Act of 1986," S.2790, August 15, 1986. 
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with standard sufficiency and release language configurations.438 Williams 
introduced his own bill in the House, and by October it passed with nearly 
identical acreage slated for wilderness439 
Senator Melcher opposed the Baucus bill in the Senate in 1987. By 1988, 
Melcher faced a reelection campaign, and attempted to craft the Baucus, and 
Williams, bills to suit his need to appear in control of the issue during his 
campaign. Melcher nit-picked on acreage that increased during the Baucus-
Williams negotiations by 100,000 acres; Melcher wanted the original 1.3 million 
designation. With time running out on the 100th Congress in October 1988, 
Melcher drew up his version of the Baucus-Williams bills and rammed it 
through the Senate and House before the November election.440 
What Melcher had failed to consider in his mad dash for a wilderness bill in 
1988 was the possibility of a presidential veto. As part of Republican strategy 
to defeat Melcher and replace him with conservative challenger Conrad Burns, 
President Ronald Reagan, no friend of wilderness designations, pocket-vetoed 
438United States Senate, 100th Congress; 1st Session, "Montana Natural 
Resources Protection and Utilization Act of 1987," S.1478, July 9, 1987. 
439United States Senate, 100th Congress, 1st Session, "Montana Natural 
Resources Protection and Utilization Act of 1987," H.R. 2090, October 15, 
1987. 
'^United States Senate, 100th Congress, 2d Session, "Montana Natural 
Resources Protection and Utilization Act of 1988," S. 2751, October 18, 1988; 
Naegele, 26. 
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the 1988 bill. Reagan's veto allowed Burns the opportunity to capitalize on the 
cumulative perceived failings of John Melcher to solve the divisive wilderness 
issue. Burns won the election, in part, as a result of the Reagan veto.441 
Meanwhile, the Forest Service's new Northern Region Forester John Mumma 
became intertwined in the process of the 1988 Montana Wilderness debate. 
Mumma and his staff responded to the demands of members of Congress who 
wanted immediate access to information on the Montana Roadless areas. 
Montana Representatives Pat Williams and Ron Marlenee, along with 
Minnesota's Bruce Vento, toured the roadless areas with Mumma for a firsthand 
look at the subjects of their deliberations. Mumma then testified in support of 
the 1988 Montana bill, an unpopular position within the Forest Service since the 
88 bill almost doubled the wilderness acreage recommended by the Forest 
Service in their separate forest plans.442 
According to Mumma, he ran afoul of Montana's Republican congressional 
representatives, timber industry officials, and the wise use movement, in part 
because of his support for the 1988 bill and his emphasis on wilderness 
management within Region One. Mumma funded pioneer wilderness education 
programs at Lolo National Forest's historic Nine Mile remount depot, and 
^Interview with Bill Cunningham, Naegele, 26-27; Interview with Tom 
Donahue, March 17, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes. 
^Interview with John Mumma, February 10, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes. 
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established a wilderness management office at Northern Region headquarters. 
Mumma's service on a wolf reintroduction committee and his refusal to cut the 
full allowable sale quantity of timber on Northern Region forests (and violate 
federal law) led to his forced reassignment to the Washington Office in 
November 1991. Rather than accept the transfer, Mumma created a sensation 
when he took an early retirement and publicly discussed his dismissal.443 
With the election of Conrad Burns, and with the perennial reelection of 
staunch wilderness opponent Ron Marlenee to the eastern district seat in the 
House, Republicans held half the Montana congressional delegation after 1988. 
Stung by earlier legislative failures, Baucus and Williams approached the 
wilderness issue with caution in the early 1990s. Max Baucus faced reelection 
in 1990, and he clearly did not wish to deal with a wilderness bill during his 
campaign.444 This political consideration by Baucus helped to negate a unique 
citizen's attempt to contribute to a wilderness solution in 1990. 
Montana organized labor had lost a friend in Congress when John Melcher lost 
in 1988, and they feared losing Max Baucus in 1990. Perceiving wilderness as 
a key contributory element in Melcher's defeat, Montana state AFL-CIO 
Executive Secretary Don Judge wanted the issue resolved and removed from the 
election agenda. Consequently, Judge and the AFL-CIO approached Montana 
^Ibid. 
^Naegele, 27. 
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environmental groups early in 1990 with a proposal to work out a compromise 
for at least two Montana national forests, the Lolo and Kootenai.445 
Without congressional or Forest Service interference446, the millworkers and 
preservationists constructed a compromise reminiscent of what public lands legal 
and historical scholar Charles F. Wilkinson describes as the optimum method for 
resolving western lands disputes in his book, The Eagle Bird.447 The political 
constituencies of the Lolo-Kootenai region were feasible for an accord because 
of the strong tradition of organized labor and of environmental activism. 
Groups of millworkers met face to face with preservationists to pore over 
roadless area data in a series of meetings. These meetings produced wilderness 
recommendations that were approved by the combined groups with a vote.448 
The product of this unprecedented dialogue were called the Lolo-Kootenai 
Accords. Actually, the agreement produced two separate accords. The Lolo 
Accord followed closely the old RARE II conservationist Alternative W 
^Interview with Bill Cunningham, March 31, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes; 
Interview with Don Judge, April 20, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes. 
44"The Forest Service, conspicuously absent from the negotiations, provided 
map and informational support to the accords process. 
^Interview with Bill Cunningham; Charles F. Wilkinson, The Eagle Bird: 
Mapping a New West, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 145. Wilkinson 
argues that federal legislation should be the product of agreements that are made 
from the ground up. Congress should ratify local accords between competing 
interests. 
^Interview with Bill Cunningham; Interview with Don Judge. 
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recommendations with 355,500 acres designated for wilderness and 430,700 
released to development. The Kootenai Accord was surprisingly somewhat 
stronger, recommending 430,610 acres for wilderness. Senator Baucus picked 
up the accords and introduced them in the Senate as a proposed wilderness bill 
in July 1990. When the bill failed to receive support from Senator Burns, and 
with his election in the balance, Baucus dropped his support of the accords. He 
won reelection.449 
In 1991 Baucus once again introduced the Lolo-Kootenai Accords in the 
Senate.450 This time the bill failed because of the determined opposition of 
Kootenai area citizen activists opposed to any reduction in the local timber 
base.451 The timber industry looked with alarm at the anticipated 'lock up' of 
2.2 billion board feet of timber contained in the proposed new wilderness areas. 
Timber industry officials resented not being included in the formulation of the 
accords, and questioned the participants' qualifications to make public land 
policy.452 
^^United States Senate, 101st Congress, 2d Session, "Kootenai and Lolo 
National Forest Management Act of 1990,"'S.2832, July 10, 1990; Interview 
with Bill Cunningham; Naegele, 27. 
450United States Senate, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, "Kootenai and Lolo 
National Forest Management Act of 1991," S.72, January 14, 1991. 
451Interview with Bill Cunningham. 
452Montana Wood Products Association Newsletter, "The Side Cut," July 
1990. 
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Local Libby, Montana, logging firm owner Bruce Vincent and his wise use 
activist group, Communities for a Great Northwest, led the fight against the 
accords. Local media were bombarded with letters opposing the idea and labor 
interests lost heart in the midst of fierce opposition from their fellow residents. 
Faced with outright local citizen opposition, Max Baucus again retreated from 
the accords and let his legislative proposal die. In retrospect, accords participant 
Bill Cunningham believes the accords were not "a politically viable vehicle," 
and that with the Kootenai Accord the participants attempted "too big a step in 
too short a time."453 However, the Lolo-Kootenai Accords stand as a national 
example of a way to escape the increasing polarization of western land use 
groups. 
As citizen and congressional attempts to achieve a wilderness bill for the state 
of Montana in the post-RARE II era continually met with frustration, the 
citizens of Montana increasingly polarized into competing and intransigent 
positions. Significantly for the future of statutory wilderness, this polarization is 
not limited to the natural competing interests of preservation and utilization, but 
also exists within the environmental community. Representing the split within 
453Interview with Bill Cunningham. 
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environmental groups in western wilderness politics is the rise in notoriety of 
the Missoula-based Alliance for the Wild Rockies, formed in 1988.454 
The Alliance formed to offer an alternative to the standard congressional 
method of state delegation control of wilderness legislation. Disillusioned with 
the paralysis in achieving meaningful, scientifically grounded wilderness 
protection for the northern Rocky Mountains 'ecoregion', the Alliance sought a 
national audience and constituency. In 1990, the Alliance's director Mike Bader 
announced the group's crafting of a Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act 
(NREPA)455 
NREPA posits the protection of wilderness, irrespective of political 
boundaries, that is instead based on scientifically determined ecosystems and the 
relatively new idea of ecosystems management. NREPA recognizes three major 
ecosystems in the Northern Rockies: the Greater Glacier/Continental Divide; the 
Greater Yellowstone; and the immense Greater Salmon River area. Smaller 
ecosystems and connecting corridors round out this futuristic multi-state plan. 
Missoula lays geographically in the middle of the triangular ecosystem plan. 
454An example of the split in the local western Montana environmental 
movement is the Lolo-Kootenai Accords process. The Alliance was not 
included in the negotiations primarily because of their no-compromise stand on 
wilderness preservation. 
455Sherry Devlin, "Five State Wilderness; Advocates go for Broke with 
National Appeal to Preserve 25 Million Acres," Missoulian. March 1, 1990, B-l, 
B-2. 
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NREPA seeks the protection of most remaining roadless areas as wilderness, six 
million acres in Montana alone.456 In pursuing an ecosystem based wilderness 
proposal, and by appealing to a national constituency, the Alliance might very 
well represent the future of statutory wilderness. 
The Alliance conflicts with traditional preservationist groups by its rejection of 
operating within the existing confines of congressional wilderness politics. 
Mainstream groups resent the no-compromise attitude proffered by the Alliance. 
During the Kootenai-Lolo Accords process, the Alliance chose not to participate 
in what they determined was a compromise endeavor. Congress's latest attempt 
to solve Montana's wilderness dilemma ended like all the previous attempts- in 
failure. Senator Burns became involved in wilderness politics in 1990 when he 
initially introduced a bill that would release 3 million roadless acres to 
development with RARE II scope recommendation for new wilderness. Baucus 
followed up Burns with a proposal of his own, with a by now familiar package 
of wilderness recommended. These competing bills in 1990 (they went nowhere 
in Congress), plus the residual effects of the failed Lolo-Kootenai Accords 
456The Alliance for the Wild Rockies, "The Northern Rockies Ecosystem 
Protection Act," informational bulletin, March, 1990; Public Meeting of the 
Alliance the Wild Rockies, November 17, 1992, Missoula County Public 
Library, Missoula, MT, notes. 
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process, laid the foundation for the proposed Montana National Forest 
Management Act of 1992.457 
The 1992 bill represented a compromise between Senators Burns and Baucus, 
one that left preservationists of all positions decidedly unsatisfied. The 
compromise bill recommended only 1.1 million acres of wilderness and 
contained unacceptable release language (the compromise bill came with a strict 
release provision that precluded many forms of judicial review and foreclosed 
many future wilderness designation opportunities). Once Burns and Baucus 
agreed to the compromise, they refused to discuss changes.458 
Problems arose with the Burns Baucus compromise when it went to the 
House 459 Representatives Williams and Bruce Vento amended the bill to 
increase the acreage to 1.4 million acres and reform the hard release language. 
This version of the wilderness bill was palatable to mainstream preservationist 
groups such as Montana Wilderness Society and for the most part to Senator 
Baucus, who fashioned an additional compromise with Williams, with an 
457Naegele, 28; Interview with Bill Cunningham; for a description of Burns's 
1990 roadless legislation, see; Sherry Devlin, "Burns Introduces Wilderness 
Bill," Missoulian, March 7, 1990, 1; Baucus's bill: United State Senate, 101st 
Congress, 2d Session, "Montana Interim Roadless Lands Release and 
Conservation Act of 1990," S.2403, April 3, 1990. 
458United States Senate, 102nd Congress, 2d Session, "Montana National 
Forest Management Act of 1992," S.1696, September 6, 1991. 
459The Senate passed the original compromise version on April 21, 1992. 
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impending electoral recess closing in. Incensed, Burns felt Baucus had 
abandoned him and had made a separate deal with Williams without his input. 
Burns offered his further modifications of the bill, which Baucus rejected. 
Perceiving himself shut-out of the new bill, Burns opposed it and waited for the 
next Congress.460 Baucus's attempt to bring the bill to the floor of the Senate 
for approval was frustrated by a logjam of senate business and by the opposition 
of five Republican senators led by Alan Simpson of Wyoming, and the bill died. 
The post-RARE II attempt to pass a wilderness bill for Montana is a long, 
complicated story of political stagnation and polarization. Parochial politics, in 
which state congressional delegations hold near absolute power over a bill's 
success or failure, have been consistently unable to rise above the din of 
competing interests and pass a bill. RARE II's failure to provide a national 
solution provided for the opportunity to designate wilderness areas such as 
Missoula's Rattlesnake, but it also engendered an increasingly hostile, 
institutionalized polarization within the citizens and visitors to Missoula and 
Montana. 
460Conrad Burns to David Jackson, November 2, 1992, copy in possession of 
author. 
CONCLUSION 
Western Montana's forest history, centered on Missoula, echoes the profound 
dilemma of how to manage the nation's forests to account for all competing 
uses. The Forest Service tried to be all things to all people with their Multiple 
Use philosophy and has failed to please anyone. Now the once-proud agency of 
Gifford Pinchot struggles to define its mission in an era when no public 
consensus on what that mission should be seems possible. Complicating this 
situation is a growing scarcity of both wild places and natural resources; scarcity 
breeds polarization that makes an accommodation about the future of Montana's 
forests a remote happening. 
People who depend upon the land to earn a living live in and next to the 
forests of western Montana. These people sometimes are multi-generation 
Montanans who have logged, mined, and grazed the national forests and in the 
process created a way of life and communities linked to the gainful use of the 
forest. With increasing scarcity of commercial timber available for harvest, 
these people's traditional existence is in jeopardy and they are angry. People 
and jobs, family and community, should come first before the land can be 
locked away for some spiritual and aesthetic purpose. 
Others, both long-term Montanans, recent arrivals, and regular visitors, see a 
scarcity of traditional American wild land heritage. Economic exploitation, 
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driven by capitalistic excess, threatens the one element of American uniqueness, 
that of unspoiled expanses of wild, untamed wilderness. This resource is a 
necessity to provide an alternative to the rigors of civilized life. With the 
wilderness extracted away, and its dependent biological life exterminated, 
humankind as a whole will face destruction. Wilderness preserves a means to 
measure the health of humankind and an outlet for the nourishing of souls. 
When polarization occurs because of such fundamental considerations, a 
solution seems impossible. The history of wilderness in western Montana, 
Missoula, and Lolo National Forest reflects win-lose scenarios, count the 
number of forest use/wilderness controversies. Montana is unique in its 
composition of competing interests, nowhere more so than in Missoula. This 
reality makes controversy more intense and passionate; Missoula is an exposed 
nerve ending for wilderness issues.461 
Given its history, Missoula perhaps might be the place to look for a solution to 
the wilderness dilemma. If a solution can be found in the atmosphere of 
animosity that surrounds wilderness politics in Missoula, then that solution will 
be a viable model for the nation as a whole. Missoula both reflected and made 
wilderness and forest history; the small Rocky Mountain city is both unique and 
representative of an American West dominated by the presence of federal public 
461Interview with Thomas Payne, November 5, 1992, Missoula, MT, notes. 
lands and containing the last vestiges of a wilderness that once covered the 
continent. 
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